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Computational (algorithmic) models of high-level cognitive inference tasks
such as logical inference, mathematical inference, and decision making can
have both theoretical and practical impact. They can improve our theoreti-
cal understanding of how people think and also provide practical direction for
applications such as automated reasoning systems, systems attuned to user-
interaction in decision-critical environments, and computer-aided education.
To support those benefits, cognitive models need to be detailed, composi-
tional, based in well-understood mathematics, and, to whatever extent pos-
sible, descriptively accurate. We introduce a new, interdisciplinary approach
that could be used to develop cognitive models of high-level inference with
these properties.
Two significant aspects of this approach are tactics and eyetracking meth-
ods. Tactics are used to express high-level inferences in fully formalized math-
ematics for automated theorem proving systems; eyetracking methods provide
insight into real-time and microcognitive information processing by permitting
analysis of the visual attention of people performing cognitive tasks. Combin-
ing tactics and eyetracking methods with traditional techniques from applied
logic, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science can result in more deeply
detailed and accurate cognitive models.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this new approach to modeling by de-
scribing its application to a calculational logic system that supports schematic
reasoning via metalinguistic operations (such as textual substitution) without
resorting to higher-order logic. We discuss several computational, psychologi-
cal, and pedagogical insights that resulted from this approach, and we present
a detailed, tactic-based model of calculational logic inference. Specific results
include: an explanation of calculational logic as a formalized metalogic; a
tactic-based implementation of calculational logic inference; some pedagogical
observations on the teaching of calculational logic; and experimental results
that demonstrate that eyetracking methods can provide insight into theorem
proving that could not be achieved by studies of written work alone.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computation is an established framework for modeling processes of human
cognition such as perception (vision, audition) and inference. The impact of
computational cognitive modeling has been two-fold; it has helped improve our
understanding of how people think1 while also providing direction for practical
applications in arenas such as computer vision, natural language processing,
and character animation. Within our particular area of interest —modeling
performance on high-level tasks such as logical inference, mathematical infer-
ence, and decision making— applications of cognitive modeling include sys-
tems better attuned to user interaction in decision-critical environments (e.g.,
[M + ]) and better computer-aided education (e.g., some applications of ACT-R
[And93]).
Our research explores a new, interdisciplinary approach to cognitive model-
ing of high-level inference, combining complementary ideas from applied logic,
artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. In this dissertation, we describe an
application of this approach to a particular inference task, resulting in several
psychological, pedagogical, and computational insights about that inference
task as well as a cognitive model with many desirable properties. In this in-
troductory chapter, we elaborate further on both the general approach and
the details of its first application.
Working with high-level inference, we want to reason about cognitive mod-
els as well as with them, to prove things about the models as well as use them
to predict behavior. We would like to understand the models on varying levels
of abstraction, analyzing them on the level of conscious, high-level inferences
as well as smaller (perhaps subconscious) inferences. Clearly, we also want the
models to describe the things people actually do when performing that kind
1Cognitive modeling is not identical to artificial intelligence. Examples of computational
cognitive models of high-level inference that have contributed to our understanding of how
people think include symbolist/algorithmic approaches like Johnson-Laird’s Mental Models
theory [JL83] and Rips’ PSYCOP [Rip94], as well as several connectionist models of language
processing.
1
2of high-level inference. For these reasons, we prefer cognitive models that are
compositional, detailed, based in well-understood mathematics, and, to what-
ever extent possible, descriptively accurate. By compositional, we mean that
an inference model can be understood in terms of components that correspond
to sub-inferences; in this computational context, we consider compositional-
ity and modularity to be similar concepts. Compositionality permits us to
develop, upgrade, and prove things about inference models by working with
component sub-structures that correspond to component sub-inferences. By
detailed, we mean that models should accommodate low-level analysis, perhaps
exposing sub-inferences that might not be immediately obvious. Reasons for
cognitive models to be mathematically well-understood and descriptively accu-
rate are clear: without those qualities, models lack descriptive and predictive
value.
We observed that existing methods in automated theorem proving and
eyetracking could be applied to cognitive inference modeling. The practice
of using tactics (see [GMW79]) in automated reasoning allows fully formal-
ized mathematical inferences to be expressed and manipulated at a level of
abstraction away from primitive logical rules. Tactics are intended to cap-
ture high-level inferences, including those that people might naturally make
in developing a proof, and cognitive modeling seems like a natural application
for tactic-based automated reasoning systems. For our research, we used the
tactic-based proof development system Nuprl [C + 86] as a platform for for-
malizing a high-level inference task and developing a tactic model of cognitive
inference. We discuss Nuprl and tactics further in chapter 4.
By allowing experimenters to observe the gaze and visual focus of people
performing cognitive tasks, eyetracking methods have provided significant in-
sight into real-time information processing. They have been used in a wide
variety of contexts, including high-level inference tasks like high school geom-
etry [ES96] and military tactical decision making [M + ]. Although cognitive
science has studied theorem proving in the past (e.g., [Mel94]), the application
of eyetracking methods to theorem proving has not been thoroughly explored.
Our experiments, described in chapter 8, support the idea that eyetracking can
provide insights into theorem proving that studies of written work alone could
not. These insights could be integrated into computational models of cogni-
tive inference so that components of models could be experimentally tested
for descriptive accuracy prior to implementation.
Just like general cognitive tasks vary in how well they can be analyzed by
eyetracking, inference tasks vary in how well they support the use of tactics
and eyetracking methods in developing cognitive models. In particular, our
approach seems likely to be most beneficial when used to model performance
on tasks that involve inference on some logically structured notation, i.e., a
notation that emphasizes the structure on which inferences are made. Rather
than fully tighten this loose definition/explanation, we elucidate it by giving
3negative and positive examples. Natural language English is not logically
structured; for instance, untangling the quantifier structure of the sentence
“Everyone hates someone” is not trivial. In contrast, successful formal logic
notations —be they variations of standard predicate logic notations, pictorial
systems such as Venn diagrams, or other expressive systems— are typically
logically structured. They would not have gained acceptance had they not
emphasized the aspects that people considered when performing inference.
Logically structured notation facilitates two major aspects of our approach
to modeling. It makes it more plausible that we might be able to represent
that notation in a formalized mathematical system and manipulate it using
relatively simple tactics.2 In addition, because the underlying structure used
for inferences is visible, we can reasonably hope to gain cognitive insight by
tracking the eye movements of people performing such inferences. For these
reasons, we consider only the application of our tactics-and-eyetracking ap-
proach to modeling inference on logically structured notation.
To establish the feasibility of our approach, we needed to test it on a
particular inference task; we chose theorem proving in calculational predicate
logic, a variant of first-order predicate logic described by Gries and Schneider in
their college-level textbook “A Logical Approach To Discrete Math” [GS93b].
(We provide a brief, self-contained introduction to calculational predicate logic
in chapter 2.) It had several advantages for our purposes. Calculational logic
had strong local support, being used for research and taught to students in
our Cornell University community. Its significant visual component made it
likely that eyetracking studies could yield interesting results, and there was
a ready subject population for eyetracking experiments. Overall, it seemed a
likely choice for a task on which our approach to cognitive inference modeling
could prove useful.
By choosing a particular method/topic to model instead of a more gen-
eral problem or theory, we were able to concentrate on the planning, semantic
analysis, cognitive science, and automated reasoning techniques needed for
our major accomplishments. We constructed a formal, compositional founda-
tion for our model, and our calculational logic tactics provide an interesting
perspective on areas of relative complexity or simplicity in the established
pedagogical presentation of calculational logic. Based on our understanding
of the cognitive inference of calculational logic, we implemented a tactic to
perform and verify a significant body of calculational logic proof steps. We
also demonstrated that eyetracking methods can indeed help develop cognitive
inference models on high-level, logical inference tasks like theorem proving.
2Imagine the complexity of an automated reasoning system for English —not just some
restricted or specialized subset, but the whole language. This seems implausible in part
because English does not facilitate recognizing its logical structure.
4Even more important than our particular results is the observation that
our approach might achieve similar depth and breadth of analysis with other
logically structured notations. The overall framework and techniques of our
approach lend themselves to scientific, computational studies of issues of gen-
eral interest. What does it mean for one inference (or method) to be simpler
than another? What information is necessary to support a given inference?
(Relatedly, what information do people actually attend to when making a
given inference?) How can we characterize obvious inferences (an important
issue when developing interactive environments)? What distinguishes novices
from experts? These questions arise in many domains, and we believe that
our approach might help answer them in contexts other than the one used for
this dissertation. There is nothing unique to calculational logic or Nuprl that
enables our research; they were simply convenient systems to use in demon-
strating the feasibility of our general approach to modeling high-level logical
inference.
Without de-emphasizing our belief that our modeling approach can be ap-
plied in many contexts, we also observe that calculational logic and Nuprl are
well-suited for this feasibility demonstration. Nuprl’s refinement logic embod-
ies a method of problem solving derived from the cognitive models provided
by Logic Theorist and GPS [NSS57, NS61, CKB84], and calculational logic in-
ference patterns can be effectively represented in this framework. We further
discuss tactics and this cognitive modeling aspect in chapter 9 on page 150.
Here is an overview of this dissertation:
• Chapter 2 is a brief, self-contained introduction to calculational logic
and the textbook [GS93b]. Most of the remainder of the dissertation
presumes that readers are familiar with this chapter.
• It was not immediately clear from [GS93b] that calculational logic could
be readily explained using only conventional semantics. Chapter 3 con-
tains our first major result: an explanation of calculational logic as a
formalized metalogic. We later use this explanation as a foundation for
our Nuprl formalization of calculational logic.
• Chapter 4 is a brief, self-contained introduction to Nuprl, tactics, and the
tools we use to formalize calculational logic and our cognitive inference
model.
• Chapters 5 and 6 describe our Nuprl formalizations of the language of
calculational logic and the inferences done by people performing calcu-
lational logic, respectively. Chapter 6 discusses technical details of the
implementation of our tactic model. The issue of how it can be under-
stood as a cognitive model is not addressed until chapter 9.
5These chapters also contain insights into the inferences necessary for
calculational logic that are not mentioned in [GS93b].
• Chapter 7 contains some observations on pedagogy. Pedagogical analysis
was not a primary goal of our research, but because we were formalizing
and modeling an inference method taught in the college-level textbook
[GS93b], it was not altogether surprising that some education-related
observations emerged.
• Chapter 8 describes our eyetracking experiments, which demonstrate
that eyetracking methods can provide insight into how people prove the-
orems that studies of written work alone could not offer.
• Chapter 9 contains a discussion of our tactics as a cognitive model. It
also contains concluding remarks, including comments on other, related
research.
Chapter 2
An Overview of Calculational
Logic
We needed an inference system to study via eyetracking experiments and
partially implement in Nuprl; the calculational logic described in [GS93b] was
a sensible choice. It was commonly used by students in the Cornell community,
thus providing a subject population for eyetracking experiments. Furthermore,
because of the stylized format in which they are written, calculational proofs
were easier for us to study than natural language proofs.
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of calculational logic; it is not a
complete specification. The goal is simply to familiarize readers with the basic
ideas and characteristic patterns present in the book [GS93b]; we will expand
upon and clarify these ideas in later chapters. We present this overview in
layers. First, we give a very brief introduction to the calculational approach,
enough to understand the remaining chapters but lacking many significant
details about calculational logic itself. Following that is a more detailed de-
scription of calculational predicate logic, including axioms and inference rules
as presented in [GS93b].
2.1 A Very Brief Overview
Calculational logic came about as a formalization of general calculational
methods, which attempt to emphasize simple syntactic manipulations in prob-
lem solving. It emerged from work by computer scientists on the formal de-
velopment of algorithms (see [Bac95, DS90, GS94] for historical notes and
sources). Gries and Schneider present it, along with heuristics and guidelines
for students, in a college-level textbook [GS93b] as a general technique for
logic and discrete mathematics.
In this section, we review some of the basic elements underlying a particular
method of proving equalities using a chain of equality-preserving rewrites. This
proof method is based on a fundamental, commonly exploited observation
about the language of calculational logic: If E and F are equal expressions,
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7then substituting F for E in an expression does not alter the value of that
expression. For example, since (P ⇒ Q) = (¬P ∨ Q) , we know (R ∧ (P ⇒
Q)) = (R ∧ (¬P ∨ Q)) . This is justified by an inference rule of “substitution
of equals for equals” called “Leibniz” in [GS93b]: because the premise (P ⇒
Q) = (¬P ∨ Q) is previously proved true, we can substitute the expression
on one side of the equality for the expression on the other (“substitute equals
for equals”). This substitution process permits the construction of proofs in a
formal manner that has the feel of ordinary calculation.
A typical calculational logic proof is based on a series of equality-preserving
rewrites, each justified by inference rule Leibniz; users of calculational logic
can prove a statement either by transforming the entire expression into a
previously established theorem or by transforming one side of an equality into
the other side. For example, a calculational proof step that establishes the
equality (R ∧ (P ⇒ Q)) = (R ∧ (¬P ∨ Q)) might have the following form:
R ∧ (P ⇒ Q)
= 〈P ⇒ Q ≡ ¬P ∨ Q 〉
R ∧ (¬P ∨ Q)
where the expression in angle brackets, called a “hint,” refers to the premise
of the instance of Leibniz that yields the conclusion (R ∧ (P ⇒ Q)) =
(R ∧ (¬P ∨ Q)) . (The equivalence sign ≡ in the hint P ⇒ Q ≡ ¬P ∨ Q
represents equality on booleans; it has the lowest precedence of any logical
operator in calculational logic.1 Further elaboration on calculational logic
conventions regarding = and ≡ is unnecessary for now.) Hints can be logical
statements or names that refer to them. For instance, we could have written
“Definition of Implication” as the hint in the example step given above, since
that is the name associated with the equivalence P ⇒ Q ≡ ¬P ∨ Q .
The following proof establishes the theoremhood of p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ ¬q ≡ p .
We read it as (p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ ¬q) ≡ p and prove p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ ¬q equal to p
using equality-preserving rewrites. (Boolean equality ≡ is associative on its
arguments, so the statement p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ ¬q ≡ p need not be explicitly
parenthesized.)
p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ ¬q
= 〈Distr. of ∨ over ≡ , p ∨ (q ≡ r) ≡ p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ r 〉
p ∨ (q ≡ ¬q)
= 〈 ¬q ≡ q ≡ false 〉
p ∨ false
= 〈Identity of ∨ , p ∨ false ≡ p 〉
p
1The order of precedence for operators is: =; ∧ , ∨ ; ⇒ ;≡ . As an illustration of the
different precedences of = and ≡ , the expressions P ⇒ Q = ¬P ∨ Q and P ⇒ Q ≡
¬P ∨ Q have different meanings; only the second one represents the traditional relation
between implication and disjunction.
8Each of the three equalities established in the proof above is justified by infer-
ence rule Leibniz. The conclusion follows from those component equalities by
transitivity of equality, which is also an inference rule of calculational logic.
This section was intended as only a cursory overview of the most basic
aspects of calculational logic; the next section provides more technical detail.
We do not provide a thorough, formal explanation of the logic until chapter 3.
2.2 A More Detailed Overview
Throughout this dissertation, we use the phrase “calculational predicate logic”
to refer to the predicate logic (with equality and function symbols) presented
in chapters 3, 8, and 9 of [GS93b]. This does not include many elements of
calculational logic that are only peripherally important to our research, such
as applications of calculational logic to discrete mathematics (see [GS93b]
and [GS94]) and proof methods other than simply using equality-preserving
rewrites (see [GS93b, chap. 4]). We do not elaborate on such elements in this
chapter. Although we were mindful of extensions and applications of calcu-
lational predicate logic —indeed, some design decisions in our formalization
of it were purposefully made to accommodate extensions beyond the current
scope— this chapter focuses only on aspects of calculational logic that are
centrally relevant to our research.
Calculational predicate logic uses notation similar to typical predicate log-
ics, but a few symbols merit discussion. We have already mentioned the use
of ≡ as equality restricted to booleans, an associative operation; in contrast,
the general equality symbol = applies to all types (including booleans), so
it is not associative. Calculational logic exploits this difference, treating ≡
associatively (as illustrated in the previous section) and treating = conjunc-
tionally, so a = b = c is read as (a = b) ∧ (b = c) . Note that in the simple
binary case for boolean p, q , the expressions p = q and p ≡ q have the same
value and are used interchangeably in [GS93b]. It is only in more complex
cases where differences emerge: for p, q, r:B , p ≡ q ≡ r is not the same as
p = q = r .
In addition, textual substitution is of primary importance to calculational
logic. Indeed, as we suggest in chapter 3, many features of calculational logic
can be seen as motivated by a desire to formally reason about textual substi-
tution. We use the notation E[v := P ] to stand for capture-avoiding textual
substitution, where E and P are logic expressions and v is a variable.
In the expected way, a theorem of calculational logic is either an instance
of an axiom2 or a conclusion of an instance of an inference rule whose premises
2We do not yet distinguish between axioms and axiom schemas. We clarify this and
other matters in our explanation of calculational predicate logic in chapter 3.
9Table 2.1: Axioms of calculational propositional logic
Associativity of ≡: ((p ≡ q) ≡ r) ≡ (p ≡ (q ≡ r))(2.1)
Symmetry of ≡: p ≡ q ≡ q ≡ p(2.2)
Identity of ≡: true ≡ q ≡ q(2.3)
Definition of false: false ≡ ¬true(2.4)
Distributivity of ¬ over ≡: ¬(p ≡ q) ≡ ¬p ≡ q(2.5)
Definition of 6≡: (p 6≡ q) ≡ ¬(p ≡ q)(2.6)
Symmetry of ∨: p ∨ q ≡ q ∨ p(2.7)
Associativity of ∨: (p ∨ q) ∨ r ≡ p ∨ (q ∨ r)(2.8)
Idempotency of ∨: p ∨ p ≡ p(2.9)
Distributivity of ∨ over ≡: p ∨ (q ≡ r) ≡ p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ r(2.10)
Excluded Middle: p ∨ ¬p(2.11)
Golden rule: p ∧ q ≡ p ≡ q ≡ p ∨ q(2.12)
Definition of Implication: p ⇒ q ≡ p ∨ q ≡ q(2.13)
Consequence: p ⇐ q ≡ q ⇒ p(2.14)
are previously proved theorems. In the following subsections, we present the
axioms and inference rules of calculational predicate logic, starting with its
propositional logic component.
2.2.1 Calculational propositional logic
The axioms of the propositional portion of calculational logic are given in
Table 2.1, ordered and grouped according to their presentation in [GS93b].
Equivalence is introduced first. Because the first axiom says that equivalence
is associative, we may eliminate parentheses from sequences of equivalences
that follow. For example, Symmetry of ≡ (2.2) is given as p ≡ q ≡ q ≡ p .
In addition, Associativity of ≡ reduces the number of axioms that need to be
listed. For example, we may parse (2.2) in five ways: ((p ≡ q) ≡ q) ≡ p , (p ≡
q) ≡ (q ≡ p) , (p ≡ (q ≡ q)) ≡ p , p ≡ ((q ≡ q) ≡ p) , and p ≡ (q ≡ (q ≡ p)) .
The calculational logic definition of conjunction, called the Golden rule
(2.12), exploits this flexibility with ≡ . To see that (2.12) is valid, check its
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Table 2.2: Inference rules of calculational propositional logic
Leibniz:
P = Q
E[v := P ] = E[v := Q]
Transitivity:
P = Q, Q = R
P = R
Equanimity:
P, P ≡ Q
Q
truth table or else use associativity and symmetry of ≡ to rewrite it as
p ≡ q ≡ p ∧ q ≡ p ∨ q .
Now, it may be recognized as the statement that two booleans are equal iff
their conjunction and disjunction are equal.
The inference rules of calculational propositional logic are given in Ta-
ble 2.2. Inference rule Leibniz is the justification for substitution of equals
for equals. Transitivity is used to derive a desired conclusion from a chain of
equalities, where each equality in that chain was itself derived from Leibniz.
Inference rule Equanimity justifies the previously mentioned proof method of
proving a theorem by reducing it to a previously proved theorem. For exam-
ple, to prove that an expression Q is a theorem, applications of Leibniz and
Transitivity might prove Q equal to P , for some previously proved theorem
P . Then, Equanimity establishes that Q is itself a theorem.
Here is a simple proof (taken from [GS93b, page 48]) that illustrates the
use of these inference rules. It derives the theoremhood of ¬p ≡ p ≡ false by
reducing it to Axiom Definition of False (2.4).
¬p ≡ p ≡ false
= 〈Distributivity of ¬ over ≡ , ¬(p ≡ q) ≡ ¬p ≡ q , with q := p 〉
¬(p ≡ p) ≡ false
= 〈Identity of ≡ , with q := p 〉
¬true ≡ false —theorem (2.4)
The above proof is based on a chain of two equalities, each established as an
instance of inference rule Leibniz. For instance, the first one, (¬p ≡ p ≡
false) = (¬(p ≡ p) ≡ false) , is the conclusion of an instance of Leibniz with
(¬p ≡ p) = (¬(p ≡ p)) as its premise. That premise is itself a theorem, an
instance of Axiom Distributivity of ¬ over ≡ . (Note the use of = instead
of ≡ ; as previously mentioned, on booleans, they are the same in the binary
case.) The other equality in the chain, (¬(p ≡ p) ≡ false) = (¬true ≡ false) ,
is similarly established using Leibniz.
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Then, with those two equalities as premises, inference rule Transitivity
establishes (¬p ≡ p ≡ false) = (¬true ≡ false) . Since ¬true ≡ false is a
theorem and (¬p ≡ p ≡ false) = (¬true ≡ false) has just been derived, these
form the premises of an instance of inference rule Equanimity, deriving the
theoremhood of ¬p ≡ p ≡ false , our original goal.
Proofs generally follow the format demonstrated above, and applications
of Leibniz and Transitivity are left implicit; their use is understood. Use of
Equanimity is indicated by text, as in the above example, stating that the
expression at one end of the chain of equalities is a previously proved theorem.
2.2.2 Calculational predicate logic
In its treatment of quantification, the calculational approach in discrete math-
ematics text [GS93b] utilizes the observation that, in many common contexts,
there is a similarity between iterated mathematical operators (such as summa-
tion
∑
and product
∏
) and traditional universal and existential quantifiers.
It therefore employs a single, general notation for all iterated operators and
quantifiers.
Let ? be a binary, associative, and symmetric operator that has an iden-
tity.3 The notation
(?i R.i : P.i)(2.15)
denotes the accumulation of values P.i , using operator ? , over all values i
for which range predicate R.i holds. If range R.i is true , we may write the
quantification as (?i : P.i) .
Here are some examples of this notation; gcd is the greatest common
divisor operator.
(+i 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 : i2) = 12 + 22 + 32
(∧ x 3 ≤ x < 7 ∧ prime.x : b[x] = 0) ≡ b[3] = 0 ∧ b[5] = 0
( gcd i 2 ≤ i ≤ 4 : i2) = 22 gcd 32 gcd 42
The calculational approach in [GS93b] exploits this single notation (2.15) for
quantification and other iterated operators by presenting a uniform treatment
of bound variables, scope of variables, free variables, and textual substitution
that encompasses all of those operators. Furthermore, many primary axioms of
calculational predicate logic are given using this notation because they hold for
all such iterated operations, not just predicate logic quantifiers (see Table 2.3).
3This is actually an oversimplification. For instance, if ? is associative and symmetric
but has no identity, then instances of the axioms of Table 2.3 that have a false range do
not hold. In addition, we restrict ourselves to instances where the accumulation converges
to a value, excluding cases such as (≡ x : false) .
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Table 2.3: Axioms for quantification
Empty range: (?x false : P ) = (the identity of ?)(2.16)
One-point rule: (?x x = E : P ) = P [x := E](2.17)
Distributivity: (?x R : P ) ? (?x R : Q) = (?x R : P ? Q)(2.18)
Range split: Provided ¬(R ∧ S) holds or ? is idempotent,(2.19)
(?x R ∨ S : P ) = (?x R : P ) ? (?x S : P )
Range split:(2.20)
(?x R ∨ S : P ) ? (?x R ∧ S : P ) = (?x R : P ) ? (?x S : P )
Interchange of dummies:(2.21)
(?x R : (?y Q : P )) = (?y Q : (?x R : P ))
Nesting: (?x, y R ∧ Q : P ) = (?x R : (?y Q : P ))(2.22)
Dummy renaming: (?x R : P ) = (?y R[x := y] : P [x := y])(2.23)
Note: The usual caveats concerning the absence of free occurrences of dummies
in some expressions are needed to avoid capture of variables. Further, some
of the axioms require the ranges of quantifications to be finite or ? to be
idempotent.
We also add one more inference rule to the calculational system to accom-
modate this notation:
Leibniz:
R ⇒ P = Q
(?x R : E[z := P ]) = (?x R : E[z := Q])
We already have an inference rule named “Leibniz,” but we also use the name
for this rule, which also permits substitution of equals for equals. This one sim-
ply specifies a different condition for substitution into the body of a quantifier
expression.
Calculational predicate logic requires just a few more axioms that deal
specifically with universal and existential quantification —see Table 2.4. When
the operator ? is ∧ (corresponding to universal quantification) or ∨ (exis-
tential quantification), calculational logic instead uses the more conventional
notation ∀ or ∃ to represent the operator.
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Table 2.4: Additional axioms for predicate calculus
Trading: (∀x R : P ) ≡ (∀x : R ⇒ P )(2.24)
Distributivity of ∨ over ∀:(2.25)
P ∨ (∀x R : Q) ≡ (∀x R : P ∨ Q)
(Generalized) De Morgan: (∃x R : P ) ≡ ¬(∀x R : ¬P )(2.26)
2.3 Intended Purpose of this Overview
The description of calculational logic in this chapter is admittedly shallow
—for instance, we acknowledged failing to adequately distinguish the notions
of axiom and axiom schema— but we trust that readers can get a general
feel for the moves of calculational logic despite this imperfection. Such a
passing familiarity is sufficient to understand the design and execution of the
eyetracking experiments described later, in chapter 8. In those experiments,
we simply analyzed the eye movements of people as they were constructing
calculational proofs. Some familiarity with the methods of calculational logic
is essential background for that chapter; a deep mathematical or semantic
understanding is unnecessary.
While the information present in this chapter provides the background for
the eyetracking portion of the research in this dissertation, the information
not present here —the unanswered questions and unresolved issues— serves
to motivate our formalization of calculational logic. After the cursory intro-
duction in this chapter, readers may wonder about the validity of some of the
inference rules, or how cleanly calculational logic incorporates a metalinguistic
operation like textual substitution. Answers and clarifications on issues like
these are in chapter 3, and our Nuprl implementation of calculational logic
inference follows from the framework in that chapter.
Chapter 3
Justifying Calculational Logic
by a Conventional
Metalinguistic Semantics
3.1 Introduction
The calculational approach to predicate logic represents an alternative to
higher-order logic for escaping the restrictions of first-order logic. It com-
bines selected aspects of metamathematics and standard predicate logic (with
equality and function symbols) in a single, formal system. It also presents
the challenge of justifying its atypical metalinguistic features; for instance,
calculational logic is intended to reason about textual substitution, but a con-
ventional object language does not permit assertions about substitution. In
this chapter, we demonstrate that a conventional metalinguistic semantics can
provide an adequate foundation for the purposefully non-standard language of
calculational logic. In addition, we enumerate the non-standard elements of
the language of the calculational logic of [GS93b]. We conclude that, although
calculational proofs may seem unusual and highly heuristic, the fundamental
inferences of calculational logic seem quite straightforward in the context of our
metalinguistic explanation, and they can be readily justified by conventional
methods.
Typically, logicians are formal in their description of first-order predicate
logic (with equality and function symbols) but informal in their use of met-
alanguage to describe properties of first-order logic, even when applying the
metalanguage to show some formula is a theorem, as in [HC68]. For example,
the following metatheorem,
The universal quantification (∀x)x = e ⇒ P , where x does not occur
free in expression e, is equivalent to P [x := e].
(3.1)
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is generally stated in English and would be proved informally, if at all. (Here
P [x := e] denotes a copy of formula P in which each free occurrence of x is
replaced by expression e in the usual capture-avoiding fashion.)
In the calculational approach to logic as presented in [GS93b] —see also
the IPL issue [Bac95], which is devoted to this approach— such metatheorems
are written in a formal notation as if they were part of an extended first-order
predicate logic. For example, (3.1) is treated as an axiom:
One-point rule: Provided x does not occur free in e, ((∀x)x = e ⇒
P ) ≡ P [x := e].
(3.2)
The calculational predicate logic in [GS93b] is designed to permit formal
reasoning about metalinguistic operations such as P [x := e] , so its proofs
incorporate both metamathematical manipulation and traditional predicate
logic steps. However, calculational logic systems developed thus far have not
been provided the kind of theoretical, formal foundation that is needed in
order to be sure that the systems are technically correct. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide such a foundation.
To illustrate the use of the calculational approach, we provide an example
of the kinds of properties that can be easily expressed and proved. Consider,
first, the following statement about integer arithmetic:
∑10
i=2 2i =
∑8
j=0 2(j + 2),
which in the calculational notation of [GS93b] is written as
(+i 2 ≤ i ≤ 10 : 2i) = (+j 0 ≤ j ≤ 8 : 2(j + 2)).
(Thus, the range of dummy i appears between “ ” and “ : ,” and the expres-
sion being “accumulated” appears after “ : ”.) The metatheorem that justifies
this equality is rarely stated. But in [GS93b], it is given explicitly and concisely
as:
Change of dummy: Provided ¬occurs(“j”,“R, P”) and function f has
an inverse, (+i R : P ) = (+j R[i := f(j)] : P [i := f(j)]).
(3.3)
The syntactic condition ¬occurs(Vs,Es) is true exactly when no variable on
list Vs occurs free in any expression on list Es .
Furthermore, in [GS93b], the theorem is stated in terms of a general op-
erator ? instead of the addition operator + ; the theorem holds for various
binary operators ? that are associative, symmetric, and have an identity. (We
do not claim here that it holds for all such binary operators, because we do
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not know a semantics for infinite iteration in general; we restrict ? to ∨ and
∧ for the purposes of this chapter.)
This theorem and its proof (Figure 3.1, taken verbatim from [GS93b])
incorporate many features of the calculational approach. The theorem is not
only succinctly and formally stated, it is also succinctly and memorably proved.
By memorable, we mean that at each step in developing the proof, the form
of the proof practically determines the next step; there is no need for tricks or
mnemonics, the proof’s form itself is a guide to its construction.
The proof of Theorem Change Of Dummy also integrates the primary
notational and mathematical novelties of the calculational predicate logic in
[GS93b], non-standard aspects such as a generalized treatment of quantifi-
cation, formal reasoning about textual substitution, formal reasoning about
syntactic properties such as free occurrences of variables in expressions, and a
proof format that leaves many inferences implicit. Because of this, we chose
this proof as a concrete example to help illustrate our metalinguistic founda-
tion for calculational predicate logic. In the next section, we introduce and
motivate our metalinguistic reading of this proof.
In later sections, we give a complete, technical exposition of our formal
foundation, applying it to explain the particular component propositions of
the Change of Dummy proof as well as other aspects of the calculational logic
presented in chapters 3, 8, and 9 of the discrete mathematics textbook [GS93b].
3.2 An Example Metalinguistic Explanation
The proof of Change of Dummy shown in Figure 3.1 is a chain of seven equali-
ties, where each equality is justified using inference rule “substitution of equals
for equals” (called “Leibniz” in [GS93b]). In English, this inference rule is: if
X = Y is a theorem, then so is P = Q , where Q is the result of replacing
some occurrences of X in P by Y . For example, the first line of the proof
of Change of Dummy is P , the third line is Q , and the second line refers to
the premise X = Y (within braces “ 〈 ” and “ 〉 ”). In this case, the premise
is the instance (?x x = f.y : P ) = P [x := f.y] of axiom One-point rule.
The transitivity of equality-derivability —known simply as “Transitivity”
in [GS93b]— is an inference rule of calculational logic. (Informally, the rule
states that if A = B and B = C are theorems under the same conditions, so
is A = C ; we will be more precise about what this means later in the chapter.)
Using it six times, we conclude that the formula on the first line of the proof
equals the formula on the last line.
This calculational system is quite different from conventional predicate
logics. First, it relies heavily on inference rule substitution of equals for equals,
instead of modus ponens. More importantly, it extends a conventional first-
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Theorem Change of Dummy. Provided ¬occurs( “ y ” , “ R, P ” ) and
function f has an inverse, (?x R : P ) = (?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) .
Proof. We start with the right side of (?x R : P ) = (?y R[x := f.y] :
P [x := f.y]) and show it is equal to the left side.
(?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y])
= 〈One-point rule (8.14)
—Quantification over x has to be introduced. The One-
point rule is the only theorem that can be applied at first.〉
(?y R[x := f.y] : (?x x = f.y : P ))
= 〈Nesting (8.20) —Moving dummy x to the outside
gets us closer to the final form.〉
(?x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈Substitution (3.84a) —R[x := f.y] must be removed
at some point. This substitution makes it possible.〉
(?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈R[x := x] ≡ R ; Nesting, ¬occurs( “ y ” , “ R ” )
—Now we can get a quantification in x alone.〉
(?x R : (?y x = f.y : P ))
= 〈x = f.y ≡ y = f−1.x —This step prepares for the
elimination of y using the One-point rule.〉
(?x R : (?y y = f−1.x : P ))
= 〈One-point rule (8.14)〉
(?x R : P [y := f−1.x])
= 〈Definition of textual substitution —¬occurs( “ y ” , “P ” ) 〉
(?x R : P )
Figure 3.1: Proof of Theorem Change of Dummy. Details of the cited premises
One-point rule (8.14), Nesting (8.20), and Substitution (3.84a) are presented
in section 3.7.
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order language by incorporating elements that are typically accounted for as
metamathematics about the logic. This can be seen even in Theorem Change
of Dummy itself: the notation for textual substitution —a metamathematical
concept— appears in what is purported to be a formula of the logic.
In light of this, a metalinguistic reading of the proof seems like the simplest
way to explain it. The theorems and proofs in calculational logic are not typical
predicate logic theorems and proofs; they are metatheorems and metaproofs
about theorems and proofs in a typical predicate logic.
To arrive at this conclusion, we need to formalize and thus understand
this calculational system in a more precise manner than is done in [GS93b].
We begin by defining a first-order predicate logic that we call the object lan-
guage. The object language does not contain metamathematical concepts like
substitution. Its purpose is only to serve as a concrete object level for the
metalinguistic development that follows.
Second, we formalize the data language, so named because it represents
the actual data that users manipulate when stating or proving theorems in
[GS93b]. In the data language, expressions may be object-expression valued.
For example, a variable P in the data language might range over expres-
sions of the object language, and data-level expressions like P ∧Q would be
object-expression valued, denoting the object-language expression constructed
by applying the object-level conjunction operator to the object expressions de-
noted by P and Q . The other signs for logical operators of our first-order
object language are represented in the data language in a similar fashion.
We can illustrate the difference between object language and data language
using two expressions that appear to stand for function application in Theorem
Change of Dummy. First, consider the expression f.y , a data-language level
term. f and y are variables in the data language; they are not themselves
a function and an argument. Instead, f.y denotes ApO(f ; y) , the object-
level term constructed by the object-level function application operator ApO
and the object expressions referred to by f and y . That is, the data-level
expression f.y is object-expression valued. The data-level variable f does
not range over data-level functions, but object expressions.
Now consider the expression occurs( “ x ” , “P ” ) , which is intended to have
the meaning “each variable in list x (of variables) occurs free in at least one
expression in list P (of expressions)”. In [GS93b], the two arguments of occurs
are quoted in order to make clear that the arguments are not the values of x
and P but the lists of variables and expressions themselves. However, at the
data-language level, we write this simply as occurs(x, P ) , where x is a term
that stands for a list of object-language variables and P is a term that stands
for a list of object expressions. The boolean-valued expression occurs(x, P )
then works in the ordinary way, applying function occurs to the terms x and
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P . It does not denote an object-level term the way f.y does in the above
paragraph.
Similarly, the (inherently metalinguistic) textual substitution operation
E[V := P ] is an object-expression valued operation in the data language.
With data-level variables E, V, P referring to object expression e , list of ob-
ject variables vs , and list of object expressions ps , respectively, E[V := P ]
denotes an object expression: a copy of e in which all free occurrences in e of
the variables on vs have been replaced by the corresponding expressions on
ps using simultaneous, capture-avoiding substitution.
With this introduction, we are ready to begin defining the object language
and then the data language.
3.3 The Object Language
The design of the object language should be broad enough to include the fun-
damental forms on which the abstractions of the data language are built as well
as general enough to be expanded to accommodate other aspects (i.e., other
than predicate logic) of the calculational approach to discrete mathematics in
[GS93b]. In the object language, we present a predicate logic in which each
model contains a domain of discourse, a typing environment, and a valuation.
Throughout, B denotes the set { False , True } .
3.3.1 Object language syntax
Definition. OV is a denumerable class of object variables —identifiers
used in the object language as propositional variables, predicate symbols,
function symbols, and variables over individuals. As in ordinary informal
practice, we make no syntactic distinction between quantifiable variables
and propositional variables, or indeed between these and uninterpreted
function and predicate symbols. Such distinctions will be introduced
with typing environments in section 3.3.2 on object language semantics.
(3.4)
Definition. OE is the class of object expressions, consisting of the ob-
ject variables in OV, the constant fO, and all instances of the distinct
operations ApO(E1; E2), E1 ⇒O E2, E1 =O E2, and (∀Ox.E1), where
E1, E2∈OE and x∈OV.
(3.5)
ApO is intended to stand for function application. We express multi-place
predicates and functions by currying with ApO . For example, an application
of two-place predicate P to E1 and E2 would be ApO(ApO(P ; E1); E2) .
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The infix operator =O stands for equality. Note that, as in [GS93b], equality
is applied to both individual and propositional expressions.
Definition. We also introduce the following useful syntactic abbrevia-
tions:
(3.6)
• ¬OP == P ⇒O fO
• tO == ¬OfO
• P ∧O Q == ¬O(P ⇒O ¬OQ)
• P ≡O Q == (P ⇒O Q) ∧O (Q ⇒O P )
• P ∨O Q == ¬OP ⇒O Q
• ∃Ox.P == ¬O(∀Ox.¬OP )
We use standard conventions for parenthesization with well-understood con-
nectives.
The Gries & Schneider text [GS93b] treats quantifiers in a more complex
and abstract manner than is represented above. It is not necessary to build
this into our object syntax; we discuss it more fully in a later section.
In fact, it barely matters what the object syntax is. The choice of primitive
operators for the object language presented here was not implicit from the
logic in [GS93b], and the method of inference we aim to explain does not work
directly on object expressions at all, but on a metalanguage about object
expressions. We chose this particular object language only for concreteness of
example.
3.3.2 Object language semantics
The semantics of the object language is given with respect to a domain of
individuals D , over which we define quantification.
Definition. The types of values that object (sub)expressions may de-
note have the forms
D(n) → D or D(n) → B
where (for A∈{D, B}) D(0) → A is A and D(n+1) → A is D → (D(n) →
A). That is, D(n) → A is the type of curried n-ary A-valued functions.
We let K(D) be the collection of all these types D(n) → A, for A∈{D, B}.
(3.7)
21
Definition. A model of the object language is a triple 〈D, σ, V 〉 where(3.8)
• D , a domain of discourse, is a non-empty collection of values.
• σ:OV → K(D) is a typing environment function that assigns a type in
K(D) to every object variable.
• V :(Πx:OV. σ(x)) is a valuation function; the binding Π notation allows
us to express that it assigns a value from type σ(x) to each variable x .
So, a model consists of a domain and an assignment of types and values to
variables. Where assignments to variables are concerned, we use superscripts
and subscripts to represent updating. For instance, for valuation V , V xd is
the same as V except that it assigns d to variable x . We also follow this
convention for typing environments and other objects throughout the chapter.
We now define a relation Osem to give the semantics of object expressions.
Definition. For a domain of individuals D, typing environment
σ:(OV → K(D)), valuation V :(Πx:OV. σ(x)), e:OE, T :K(D), and v:T ,
we recursively define Osem by the clauses below, where P, Q∈OE. We
intend Osem(D, σ, V, e, v, T ) to hold exactly when expression e has type
T and value v∈T under model 〈D, σ, V 〉.
To simplify notation, we elide the arguments D, σ, V from an Osem(· · ·)
expression where it is obvious what is meant. In clauses where these
terms are directly manipulated, they are included. We also treat each
clause in the definition as closed by universally quantifying over any
apparently free variables.
(3.9)
1. ∀x:OV. Osem(x, V (x), σ(x))
2. Osem(ApO(P ; Q), F (a), T )
if Osem(P, F, D → T ) and Osem(Q, a, D) .
3. Osem(fO, False , B) .
4. Osem(P ⇒O Q, q if p, B) if Osem(P, p, B) and Osem(Q, q, B) .
5. Osem((∀Ox. P ), (∀d:D. g(d)), B) if ∀d:D. Osem(σ
x
D, V
x
d , P, g(d), B) .
6. ∀T :{D, B}, p, q:T.
Osem(P =O Q, p = q, B) if Osem(P, p, T ) and Osem(Q, q, T ) .
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This semantics has a typical form, although some of its features are not
usually encountered in the language of a first-order predicate logic. Here, we
offer a few brief explanatory notes.
Clause 1 reflects our decision to allow any identifiers to be used with any
type; typing is assigned by σ . This formalizes the practice in [GS93b], which
seems practical and natural.
Clause 2 stipulates that the object language sign for function application
denotes actual function application (similarly for the usual boolean functions
related to clauses 3-5). Note that clauses 1 and 2 can be applied to expressions
of various function types, while the other clauses can be applied only to boolean
or individual-valued expressions.
Clause 6 is unusual for first-order predicate logic because it allows equalities
between booleans as well as between individuals. This is persistently exploited
by the methods of calculational logic in order to apply equality lemmas and
rules to equivalences (biconditionals). Note that the only difference between
P =O Q and P ≡O Q is that the latter has a value only when its arguments
have boolean values.
Despite its few novelties, the object language is sensible in standard ways,
as exemplified by the following theorems, whose straightforward proofs we
omit.
Theorem. Osem(D, σ, V, e, v, T ) defines v as a partial function of the
other arguments. That is, Osem(e, v, T ) ⇒ Osem(e, v ′, T ) ⇒ v = v′.
(3.10)
The above theorem was a design goal for the definition. It also happens that
Osem defines type T as a partial function of the arguments other than T
and v , but we might reasonably choose to extend the language to one that
is “polymorphic” with respect to types. We might introduce elements with
multiple types, such as a nil element if we used list types, or a constant that
for each function type stands for the identity function on that type. Or, we
might introduce types with shared values, such as N and Z . All of these
would be reasonable extensions if we were to include more of the discrete
mathematics of [GS93b] in our metalinguistic framework.
Theorem. Textual substitution is semantically equivalent to updating
environments. That is, Osem(σ, V, GxE, v, T ) iff Osem(σ
x
T ′, V
x
d , G, v, T )
and Osem(σ, V, E, d, T ′) for some d, T ′.
(3.11)
Theorem. Only free variables affect the value of a term: for any term
E, if two models agree on all free variables in E and E has a value in
one of the models, then E has the same value in the other model.
(3.12)
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Theorem. Change of bound variables preserves value: for any object
expression G, if G has a value in a model, then G′ has the same value,
where G′ is G under a renaming of bound variables.
(3.13)
3.4 Object-Level Theoremhood
Our data language is directly about the theoremhood of expressions in an
object language such as the one we defined. As part of the subject matter of the
data language, we develop an appropriate notion of object-level theoremhood
by defining a class of object theorems with respect to assumptions α . That is,
we define a derivability relation
() α ` P
where conclusion P is an object expression, α is a list of object expressions,
and  is a type expression assignment function (which we will soon describe
precisely). In this section, we present a little language of type expressions,
define object-level derivability, and discuss its relation to the data language.
3.4.1 Type expressions
We formulate object theoremhood with respect to type expression assignments.
Type expressions are syntactic elements that we interpret as types; for a do-
main D , type expressions refer to types in K(D) .
Formally, the class OT of object type expressions consists of the pairs
(n)r , where n ∈N and r is one of {bool, ind} (standing for the ground types
of booleans and individuals). The semantics for these simple expressions is an
interpretation into K(D) :
• [(n)bool]D = D(n) → B
• [(n)ind]D = D(n) → D
Note that we interpret type expressions as types only in the context of a
domain D , but we commonly elide the understood subscript D . In addition,
for simplicity, we write (n)r as r in cases where n is 0 .
A type expression assignment  is a function in OV → OT . For type
expression assignment  , we let []D be the corresponding type assignment,
eliding D when understood. That is, for object variable x , [].x is [.x]
under the above semantics for type expressions. Thus, for simplicity’s sake,
we may establish properties in terms of either type expression assignments or
24
typing environments, but we also consider them established in terms of the
other through this correspondence.
We define the assignment of type expressions to object expressions under
 as the strongest relation () A :: T that satisfies the following clauses. (We
elide the type expression assignment when it is just  .)
1. ∀x:OV. x :: (x)
2. ∀r:{bool, ind}. ApO(A; B) :: (n)r if A :: (n + 1)r and B :: ind
3. fO :: bool
4. A ⇒O B :: bool if A :: bool and B :: bool
5. (∀Ox : A) :: bool if (
x
ind) A :: bool
6. ∀r:{bool, ind}. A =O B :: bool if A :: r and B :: r
This definition follows the form of the clauses of the object language seman-
tics. For notational convenience, we also extend type expression assignment
to multiple expressions: () α :: T is defined as ∀A ∈α. () A :: T .
3.4.2 Definition of object-level theoremhood
The purpose of theoremhood (derivability) is to pick out a usefully large but
effectively recognizable subclass of valid expressions, doing so without referring
to the semantics. We express this in a semantic constraint on derivability
(which we will not prove here)
∀:OV → OT.(() α ` P ) ⇒ valid(, α ⇒ P )
where valid(, Q) iff for any domain D and valuation V such that 〈D, [], V 〉
is a model, Osem([], V, Q, True, B) . We also use α ⇒ P as iteration of
implication over antecedent lists, e.g., a1, a2, a3 ⇒ P is a1 ⇒ a2 ⇒ a3 ⇒ P .
Since () α ` P depends on the values of  only on variables that occur free
in α or P , the fact that the domain of  is infinite does not prevent effective
recognizability of theoremhood.
There is a noteworthy similarity between our motivations for choosing
a particular definition of the object language and a particular definition of
object-level derivability. Recall that, in many ways, the details of our partic-
ular choice of object language are of little consequence to the data language.
Similarly, although a sensible set of object theorems is a necessary foundation
for the metatheorems established by calculational logic, the data language and
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users of its inference methods remain generally insulated from any particular-
ities of the definition of the object theorem set. The metalogical approach of
[GS93b] emphasizes the data language forms of inference about object theo-
remhood and de-emphasizes the details about how the class of object theorems
is defined. Therefore, using (and justifying) calculational logic does not require
any particular definition of an object theorem set.
Nonetheless, to have a concrete example to refer to when discussing object-
level derivability, we present a definition of object theoremhood; it is not the
only possible adequate definition. Our set of object language theorems satisfies
the above semantic constraint (we omit the proof) and contains the theorems
of a traditional predicate logic. We adopt a few conventions for notational
simplicity: when we elide the type expression assignment, as in α ` P , it is
 ; P [x := A] denotes capture-avoiding textual substitution; P cbv Q means
that P and Q are related by mere change of bound variables.
Definition. We define object theoremhood () α ` P , for :OV → OT,
α:OE List, P :OE, as the strongest relation satisfying the following
clauses:
(3.14)
1. α ` P if P ∈α and α :: bool
2. α ∪ {A} ` P if α ` P and A :: bool
3. α ` Q if α ` P ⇒O Q and α ` P
4. α ` P ⇒O Q if α ∪ {P} ` Q
5. α ` P if α ` P ′ and P cbv P ′
6. α ` P [x := A] if α ` (∀Ox.P ) and A :: ind
7. α ` P if α ` (∀Ox.P ) and ¬(x free in P )
8. α ` (∀Ox.P ) if (
x
ind) α ` P and ¬(x free in α)
9. α ` P if α ` fO and P :: bool
10. ∀r:{bool, ind}. α ` P [x := B] if α ` P [x := A] and α ` A =O B and
A, B :: r and (xr ) P :: bool
11. ∀r:{bool, ind}. α ` A =O A if A :: r and α :: bool
12. α ` A =O B if α ` A ≡O B
Most of the clauses correspond to expected elimination and introduction forms
for operators in a natural deduction style for sequents: clauses 3 and 4 are elim-
ination and introduction for implication; clauses 6 and 8 are elimination and
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introduction for quantification over individuals; clause 9 is false-elimination
(there is no false-introduction); clauses 10 and 11 are elimination and intro-
duction for equality, with both boolean and individual expressions permitted
as the equands.
We comment briefly on the other clauses:
• Clauses 1 and 2 embody generic facts about assumptions.
• Clause 5 admits change of bound variables as an inference. While typ-
ically derivable, it is not worth the trouble to derive. Combinations of
clauses 3, 4, and 5 permit change of bound variables on hypotheses.
• Clause 7 entails the existence of individuals (elements of the domain),
making ∃Ox.tO derivable even when :OV → OT assigns bool to all
variables; all the other clauses are valid even for the empty domain.
In fact, clause 7 would be a special case of clause 6 if only there were
an individual-type expression for every  . Indeed, in formulations of
predicate calculus in which each variable has a syntactically fixed type
(equivalent to our fixing  for our entire formulation), there are always
individual-type variables. In our formulation, however, any variable may
be assigned any type, and there are no individual-type constants.
• Clause 12 has many effects. It makes possible the proof of non-trivial
equalities on propositional arguments. Indeed, it establishes material
equivalence as the equality for propositional values, thus prohibiting
multiple “true” or “false” values. Also, because of the way that we
defined A ≡O B , the standard interpretation of “bool” is forced under
our definitions of theoremhood. If A ≡O B were built in as a primitive
operator, then all these clauses would be intuitionistically valid. Because
A ≡O B is ¬O((A ⇒O B) ⇒O ¬O(B ⇒O A)) , however, we can derive
the characteristic theorem of classical logic, ¬O¬OP ⇒O P (let A be
P and B be tO ).
3.4.3 Notes on object-level derivability
If we were directly generating object-level proofs in accord with our definition
of derivability, the role of  might cause concern for at least two reasons: it is
an infinite function; and it specifies a type for every variable, failing to exploit
the polymorphism of equality that we troubled to admit. We do not, however,
intend to build a class of object proofs. Instead, we use derivability by making
claims and arguments about it in a metalanguage, and we interpret [GS93b]
as also doing so, in a very restricted formalized metalanguage.
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As mentioned above, the fact that  is infinite does not prevent effec-
tive recognizability of theoremhood. Let us now consider the polymorphism
concern. Here is a simple, contrived, book-style assertion:
Assuming Y =O X and V =O U, X =O Y ∧O U =O V.
It is polymorphic, independently, in both the type of X and the type of U .
We interpret it as:
∀r1, r2 : { bool , ind }. () α ` (X =O Y ∧O U =O V )
if Y =O X ∈α and V =O U ∈α and () X, Y :: r1 and () U, V ::
r2
where we implicitly quantify over the obvious types. The polymorphism of
object language variables is expressed using variables of the metalanguage to
range over type expressions.
3.5 Quantification and Iteration
One of the advances in [GS93b] is its treatment of quantification, which goes
beyond the typical structure reflected in our object syntax. Recall that the ob-
ject language quantifiers take only one variable. In the data language, however,
we want to include iterations of these quantifications over lists of variables. Be-
fore beginning our formulation of the data language, we informally introduce
notations for these iterated object language quantifiers.
We define iterated quantification by induction over lists of variables, as
follows.
(∀Ox¯ R : P ) =
{
R ⇒O P if x¯ is the empty list
(∀Oy. (∀Oz¯ R : P )) if x¯ = y.z¯
(∃Ox¯ R : P ) =
{
R ∧O P if x¯ is the empty list
(∃Oy. (∃Oz¯ R : P )) if x¯ = y.z¯
Similar to the practice in [GS93b], when R is tO , we may omit it from
the notation; for example, (∃Ox¯ : P ) is an abbreviation for (∃Ox¯ tO : P ) .
The common form of quantifiers is abstracted to a function of four variables,
(?Mxs R : B) , where variable M:{∧M ,∨M} is a kind of quantifier index. By
convention, (∧Mxs R : B) and (∨Mxs R : B) are written as (∀Oxs R :
B) and (∃Oxs R : B) , respectively. They are also defined inductively on
variable list xs .
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The motivating idea is that (?Mv R : B) is the iteration of a binary
operator x ?M y on the values that B takes for v satisfying R . For a
paradigm, consider the interpretation of (Σv R : B) as (+v R : B) ,
the iteration of x + y . For instance, assume predicate R.x holds only on
individuals i0 and i1 . Then, as expected, (Σv R.v : f.v) = f(i0) + f(i1) .
Correspondingly, in the treatment of quantifiers in [GS93b], (∃Ov R.v :
f.v) = f(i0) ∨O f(i1) , and similarly for ∀O .
Part of extending the formalization beyond predicate logic would be to
give a semantics to (?Mxs R : B) for various other operators M . (Indeed,
summation might be part of a sensible extension.) We require that M be com-
mutative and associative and that B assumes values other than the identity
of M only finitely often on R . In case M does not have an identity, we further
require that R be non-empty; the development in [GS93b] states that a quan-
tifier expression (?Mxs R : B) with an empty range gets the value id(M) ,
the identity of M .
When the related binary operator and identity are defined with respect
to the quantifier, useful properties can be stated abstractly. For M = ∧M ,
P ?M Q is P ∧O Q and id(M) is tO . Similarly, for M = ∨
M , P ?M Q is
P ∨O Q and id(M) is fO . Using this informal metalanguage, we may state
uniformities such as:
((?Mxs R : P ) ?M (?Mxs R : Q)) =O (?
Mxs R : P ?M Q).
The calculational style of [GS93b] is designed to exploit such properties.
3.6 The Data Language
We use the term data language for the expressions of [GS93b] that are di-
rectly manipulated by users. In a more conventional development, the data
language would simply be some notation for proofs whose constituent propo-
sitions would be about numbers, lists, sets, functions, or some other basic
domain of interest. We instead propose that the data language of the book
should be understood as a restricted, formalized metalanguage about theo-
remhood of an object language. In our opinion, the arguments of [GS93b] (at
least after the introduction of quantification) are most easily read as rather
straightforward arguments about the structure of expressions and derivability.
Indeed, our data language does not directly refer to the object language se-
mantics, only to a class of object theorems. This reflects a critical distinction:
the job of argument about object-level theoremhood belongs to the data lan-
guage; the job of addressing mathematical domains of principal interest (lists,
numbers, etc.) belongs to the object language.
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This, the data level, is the level at which several atypical features of the
calculational logic of [GS93b] are explained; the object language and object-
level derivability were only precursors to the data language, not domains in
which the details of the user level of calculational logic could be discussed.
In this section, we formally present the syntax and semantics of the data
language. We here restrict ourselves to calculational predicate logic, but we
anticipated eventual extensions to a broader range of the topics in the discrete
mathematics text [GS93b], which influenced some of our design decisions.
3.6.1 Data language syntax
We intend the data language to adequately represent the language actually
used in the book to discuss object theoremhood. Therefore, its syntax is
significantly more involved than that of our simple, standard object language.
Atypical features of calculational logic can be seen in the generalized treatment
of quantification and the relations involving object language syntax.
Definition. DT is a class of type expressions used in data language
quantifiers. It comprises the constants OV, OE, OT, N, { bool , ind },
and {∧,∨}, and it is closed under the operators T List and T × T ′.
The overloaded notation —OV, OE, etc. denote both types and type
expressions— should cause no confusion in our explanation. Context
can distinguish types from type expressions when relevant.
(3.15)
Definition. DV is a denumerable class of identifiers used as data-
language variables. The data language has no function or predicate vari-
ables, only variables over (several different types of) individuals. DE is
the class of data-language expressions, comprising DV and all instances
of the following (where a, b, c, ?, , α∈DE, x∈DV, and t∈DT):
(3.16)
• Various standard logical operations (including identity): if a then b;
a & b; a or b; not a; a is b; for x : t. a; a iff b .
• Constants and operations for lists and pairs: [ ]; a · b; 〈a, b〉 .
• A predicate denoting list membership: a ∈ b .
• Constants representing object variables: abc (for abcO ∈OV ).
• Various constants and operations for constructing object expressions:
a(b); t; f ; a ⇒ b; a ⇐ b; a = b;¬a; a ≡ b; a ∧ b; a ∨ b; (?a b : c);
a ? b; id(?); a[b := c] .
• Constants for the quantifier indices {∧M ,∨M} : ∧,∨ . (We may write
∀ for ∧ and ∃ for ∨ .)
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• Constants and an operation for denoting object type expressions: bool ,
ind , (a)b .
• A constant for each natural number: e.g., 99.
• Operations for various relations involving object syntax:
– Representing object theoremhood: () α ` a .
– Representing typing of object expressions: () a :: b .
– Updating of environments: ab . Note that we overload this notation,
using it for updating in both the informal metalanguage and the
formalized data language.
– Representing assumptions in statements about object theoremhood:
assuming ( ∈α) a, b .
– Representing that an object variable is free in an object expression:
a free in b .
3.6.2 Semantics of data language types
Before we use the type expressions of DT in our data language semantics, we
present a few preparatory notes.
Definition. The semantics of the type expressions in DT is straightfor-
ward. For t∈DT, [t] is defined as follows:
(3.17)
[OT] = OT
[OE] = OE
[OV] = OV
[{ bool , ind }] = {bool, ind}
[{∧,∨}] = {∧M ,∨M}
[N] = N
∀t:DT.([t List] = [t] List)
∀t1, t2:DT.([t1× t2] = [t1]× [t2])
We remind readers about our overloaded notation, previously discussed in
definition 3.15. We do not expect it to cause confusion.
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Definition. We also employ a subtype relation on DT. For t1, t2∈DT,
we define t1 ⊆ t2 as follows:
(3.18)
OV ⊆ OE
∀t : DT. t ⊆ t
∀t1, t2 : DT.(t1 List) ⊆ (t2 List) if t1 ⊆ t2
∀t1, t2, t3, t4 : DT.(t1× t3) ⊆ (t2× t4) if t1 ⊆ t2 and t3 ⊆ t4
Naturally, this subtype relation on the notations of DT represents actual
subtyping, i.e.,
∀t1, t2 : DT. t1 ⊆ t2 ⇒ [t1] ⊆ [t2] .
3.6.3 Data language semantics
We define the data language semantics using essentially the same methods
as for the object language. There are differences, such as multiple types of
individuals and subtyping, but we could easily adopt these devices in the
object language, too, if we were to extend it.
In the definitions that follow, Type refers to a collection of collections of
values.
Definition. A model of the data language is a pair 〈γ, V 〉 where(3.19)
• γ : DV → Type is a typing environment function.
• V : Πx:DV. γ(x) is a valuation, a function that assigns to each variable
x a value in the type γ(x) .
Definition. The data language semantics is given as a recursive defini-
tion of Dsem(γ, V, A, v, T ) for γ∈DV → Type, V ∈(Πx:DV. γ(x)), A∈DE,
T∈Type, v∈T . We intend Dsem(γ, V, A, v, T ) to hold exactly when ex-
pression A has type T and value v∈T under model 〈γ, V 〉. (As with the
object language semantics, we elide the arguments γ and V where it is
obvious what is meant.) It is defined according to the following clauses,
where variables range over data expressions unless otherwise specified:
(3.20)
1. Dsem(A, a, [t2]) if Dsem(A, a, [t1]) and t1 ⊆ t2 .
2. ∀x:DV. Dsem(x, V (x), γ(x)) .
3. Dsem(if P then Q, q if p, B) if Dsem(P, p, B) and Dsem(Q, q, B) ,
and similarly for the other connectives.
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4. Dsem(A is B, a = b, B) if Dsem(A, a, T ) and Dsem(B, b, T ) .
5. ∀g:[t] → B. Dsem((for x : t. a), (∀v:[t].g(v)), B)
if ∀v:[t]. Dsem(γx[t], V
x
v , a, g(v), B) .
6. ∀T :Type. Dsem([ ], nil, T List) ; note the type polymorphism.
7. Dsem(A ·B, the prepending of a to b, T List)
if Dsem(A, a, T ) and Dsem(B, b, T List) .
8. Dsem(〈A, B〉, 〈a, b〉, T1× T2) if Dsem(A, a, T1) and Dsem(B, b, T2) .
9. Dsem(abc, abcO,OV) ; similarly for other object variable literals.
10. Dsem(t, tO,OE) and Dsem(f , fO,OE) .
11. Dsem(A ≡ B, a ≡O b,OE) if Dsem(A, a,OE) and Dsem(B, b, OE) ;
similarly for other OE -constructors.
12. Dsem((?X R : P ), (?Mx r : p),OE)
if Dsem(X, x,OV List) and Dsem(R, r,OE)
and Dsem(P, p,OE) and Dsem(?, M, {∧M ,∨M}) .
13. Dsem(A[X := B], axb ,OE)
if Dsem(A, a, OE) and Dsem(B, b, OE) and Dsem(X, x,OV) ,
where axb is a capture-avoiding substitution function on object expres-
sions. (Fully specifying a textual substitution function for our purposes
would be tedious and unnecessary.)
14. And similarly for other operators that denote object expressions, quan-
tifier indices, object type expressions, numeric constants, etc.
Before continuing with the semantics for the remaining elements of data lan-
guage syntax —the operators that denote relations involving object syntax—
we introduce an auxiliary device. To simplify the data language, we have
avoided introducing function types. So, in our data language, we will use lists
of pairs to refer indirectly to assignments of object type expressions to object
variables. We introduce here a simple “  to OV → OT ” notation that maps
a list  to a function; unmatched variables are mapped to bool ∈OT so we
may consider the resulting function as total.
• ∀:(OV× OT) List.( to OV → OT) ∈OV → OT .
• ∀x:OV, t:OT, :(OV× OT) List.((〈x, t〉, ) to OV → OT)(x) = t .
• ∀x, y:OV, t:OT, :(OV× OT) List.
((〈x, t〉, ) to OV → OT)(y) = ( to OV → OT)(y) if ¬(x = y) .
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• ∀x:OV.([ ] to OV → OT)(x) = bool .
We now proceed with the remaining clauses of the data language semantics.
15. Dsem(() α ` P , (vts to OV → OT) as ` p, B)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV× OT) List) and Dsem(α, as,OE List)
and Dsem(P, p,OE) .
16. Dsem(() A :: B, (vts to OV → OT) a :: T , B)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV× OT) List) and Dsem(A, a,OE List)
and Dsem(B, T,OT) .
17. Dsem(XB , (〈x, T 〉, vts),OV× OT List)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV× OT) List) and Dsem(X, x,OV)
and Dsem(B, T,OT) .
18. Dsem((assuming ( ∈α) P, Q), p ∈ as ⇒ q, B)
if Dsem(α, as,OE List) and Dsem(P, p,OE) and Dsem(Q, q, B) .
19. Dsem(X free in A, variable x occurs free in some member of a , B)
if Dsem(X, x,OV) and Dsem(A, a,OE List) .
This is a conventional first-order semantics, and things are generally as
one would expect. For instance, clauses 1 and 2 state that subtypes and data
language models behave in the expected ways, clause 6 gives the expected
(polymorphic) meaning to the empty list, etc. We omitted many clauses that
would be included in an exhaustive presentation; these omitted clauses, how-
ever, do not require any additional semantic machinery.
Clauses 3 and 4 are examples of our treatment of logical operators typ-
ically written in natural language, like “if . . . then” and “is,” metalinguistic
operators used to discuss mathematics. We claim that the calculational logic
of [GS93b] can be read as a formalized metalanguage, however, with these
operators as part of the data language. There is also a temptation to con-
fuse OE -constructors with data-level logical operations. For instance, the
OE -constructor A ⇒ B is different from the data-level logical operation
if P then Q ; the former is an OE -valued operation on expressions of type
OE and the latter is an operation on B . Similar distinctions apply for the
OE -valued A ∧ B and the B -valued P & Q , etc.
Our syntax and semantics omitted a few expressions that appear in [GS93b]
that are easily definable in terms of the language we presented. For instance,
(X free in A) is extended to occurs(V :OV List, E:OE List) , a data-level pred-
icate that holds when some V ′ in V is such that (V ′ free in E) . It is typically
negated as not occurs(V, E) to indicate that none of the variables referred to
by elements of V occur free in any expression referred to by an element of
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E . Updating of type expression environments is also implicitly extended to
lists: for X:OV List and r:OT , Xr denotes a copy of :(OV×OT) List with
all variables on X updated to type expression r . It can be easily defined in
terms of the single-variable version. We believe it is clear how to incorporate
such simple extensions into our formal framework, and we consider them to
be in our data language for the purpose of examples in section 3.7.
Relatedly, we have not been explicit about certain conventions in [GS93b]
that are merely a matter of display. For instance, clause 18 of the semantics
indicates that “assuming” is essentially implication, as expected. In practice, it
is used only in the context of object theoremhood judgments and the “ ( ∈α) ”
notation is elided; it specifies that a particular expression is included among
the assumptions, making our notation look like that of the book [GS93b]. We
can use the more general “ if . . . then ” instead of the “assuming” display form,
if it improves readability. As another example, a three element list might be
written in the standard notation “ a, b, c ,” and a singleton list is written simply
as its element. All essential details of the formation of lists are present in that
representation and expressible in the data language. Similarly, when the types
of f and x are clear from context, we may write f.x instead of f(x) for the
OE -valued constructor of object-language function applications. Notational
conversions of this sort occur only for easily understood standard notation,
and they should not pose difficulties for readers. Unless otherwise explained,
standard notations have their expected meanings.
3.7 Using the Data Language
Our goal in this chapter is to demonstrate how calculational predicate logic
(as presented in chapters 3, 8, and 9 of [GS93b]) could be easily read as a
restricted, formalized metalanguage. We have formalized this data language;
the outline in this chapter is the basis for the formalization in chapter 5. We
do not here attempt to formalize the actual proof structure used in [GS93b];
we expect that the conventional semantics of our data language makes it clear
that one can do so.
In this section, we provide concrete examples of how material from the text
can be expressed using our data language; the names and numbers labeling
our examples are taken directly from the text [GS93b]. Our motivation for
providing these examples is two-fold. Foremost, we demonstrate that our data
language is adequate for calculational logic by using it to express various the-
orems and inference rules that were chosen to illustrate the full range of the
calculational logic language; in particular, we formalize the component propo-
sitions of the proof of Theorem Change Of Dummy, so readers can compare
our metalinguistic treatment with the text from [GS93b]. Equally importantly,
we provide examples of the propositions and inferences used in calculational
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logic. By showing detailed representations of the propositions, readers can see
that inferences from one to another could be formalized in conventional ways.
3.7.1 Theorems
We present data language expressions for a few objects classified as theorems
in [GS93b]. In [GS93b], typically only the notation that looks like standard
predicate logic is presented as the theorem; for instance, the first theorem
below, Identity of ∨ , is simply given as P ∨ f ≡ P . Here, we give full
explanations of the meanings of these common (in [GS93b]) theorems, brief
examples to illustrate the scope and adequacy of our formalized data language.
In particular, we include the theorems cited in the proof of Theorem Change
of Dummy (Figure 3.1) among our examples.
• (3.30) Identity of ∨ . For  : (OV×OT) List, α:OE List, P :OE.
if () P :: bool & () α :: bool then () α ` P ∨ f ≡ P .
• (3.35) Golden Rule. For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q:OE.
if () P, Q :: bool & () α :: bool
then () α ` P ∧Q ≡ P ≡ Q ≡ P ∨Q .
(Recall that the boolean operator ≡ is associative.)
• (3.84a) Substitution.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, r:{ bool , ind }, z:OV, e, f, P :OE.
if () α :: bool & () e, f :: r & (zr) P :: bool
then () α ` (e = f) ∧ P [z := e] ≡ (e = f) ∧ P [z := f ] .
• (8.14) One-point rule.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, ?:{∧,∨}, x:OV, E, P :OE.
if not occurs(x, E) & () α :: bool & () E :: ind & (xind) P :: bool
then () α ` (?x x = E : P ) = P [x := E] .
• (8.20) Nesting.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, ?:{∧,∨}, r:{ bool , ind },
x, y:OV, P, Q, R:OE.
if not occurs(y, R) & () α :: bool & (x,yind) P, Q, R :: bool
then () α ` (?x, y R ∧Q : P ) = (?x R : (?y Q : P )) .
• (9.2) Trading. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, x:OV, P, R:OE.
if () α :: bool & (xind) P, R :: bool
then () α ` (∀x R : P ) ≡ (∀x : R ⇒ P ) .
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3.7.2 Inference rules
The statements identified in [GS93b] as calculational logic inference rules ex-
press a relationship between object-level theoremhood judgments; typically,
they have the form “Provided certain syntactic constraints hold on P and Q ,
if P is an object theorem, then Q is an object theorem,” where P, Q refer to
object expressions. Statements like these are readily expressed using the data
language. Here, we present data-language re-statements of three calculational
logic inference rules, a “Leibniz” rule that permits textual substitution into the
body of quantifiers, the “Transitivity” rule of equality-derivability employed
in the proof of Theorem Change of Dummy, and an ≡ -elimination rule called
“Equanimity”.
• Leibniz.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, ?:{∧,∨},
Z:OV, X:OV List, A, B, P, R:OE, r:{ bool , ind }.
if not occurs(X, α) &
(Xind) α ` (R ⇒ A = B) &
(Xind) A, B :: r &
(X,Zind,r) P :: bool
then () α ` (?X R : P [Z := A]) = (?X R : P [Z := B])
• Transitivity.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q, R:OE.
if () α ` P = Q &
() α ` Q = R
then () α ` P = R
• Equanimity.
For :(OV× OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q:OE.
if () α ` P &
() α ` P ≡ Q
then () α ` Q
3.7.3 Proof content
One of the critical requirements for the data language is that it be adequate
for expressing the component propositions of calculational proofs in [GS93b].
Here, as a demonstration of adequacy, we present the central component propo-
sitions of the proof of Theorem Change of Dummy (see Figure 3.1). Other
proofs in [GS93b] can be read similarly.
For the first proposition, we are explicit in universally closing the proposi-
tion and listing all the components of the antecedent, including the “assuming”
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construct. For other propositions, we omit these details for a more concise pre-
sentation, but the statements are to be considered closed under the appropriate
universal quantification and guarded by the same antecedent. We can judge
data language adequacy in part by their similarities to the notation in [GS93b]
also used in Figure 3.1. Note that the similarities would be even greater if we
systematically abbreviated () α ` P to simply P .
This subsection (3.7.3) also provides the most direct support for our claim
that, although we do not formalize a proof structure for calculational logic
in this chapter, it could be done in a straightforward way. Using inference
rules and theorems like those previously presented as data-language expres-
sions, there are no unusual elements in the inferences from one proposition to
the next. A detailed account of these inferences, however, is unnecessary to
support the goals and claims of this chapter.
In the following, note that ? is a variable of the data language.
1. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, ?:{∧,∨}, P, R:OE, f, f−1, x, y:OV.
assuming ( ∈α) (?x, y t : x = f.y ≡ y = f−1.x),
if (xind) R, P :: bool & () α :: bool & (
x,y
ind) f, f
−1 :: (1)ind &
not occurs(y, [R, P ]) & not (x is y) & not occurs([x, y], α)
then  α ` (?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) =
(?y R[x := f.y] : (?x x = f.y : P ))
2.  α ` (?y R[x := f.y] : (?x x = f.y : P )) =
(?x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P )
3.  α ` (?x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P ) =
(?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
4. () α ` (?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P ) = (?x R : (?y x = f.y : P ))
5. () α ` (?x R : (?y x = f.y : P )) = (?x R : (?y y = f−1.x : P ))
6. () α ` (?x R : (?y y = f−1.x : P )) = (?x R : P [y := f−1.x])
7. () α ` (?x R : P [y := f−1.x]) = (?x R : P )
3.8 Conclusion and Discussion
By formalizing a metalinguistic interpretation of the language of the calcula-
tional logic of [GS93b], we have provided:
• A sensible, thorough reading for the language of calculational logic, using
only conventional semantic methods;
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• Meanings for the propositions manipulated by users of calculational logic,
providing evidence that there is nothing unusual about the inferences
needed for calculational logic;
• A framework in which one can evaluate the extent to which calculational
logic is non-standard.
We conclude the chapter by discussing each of these issues and how we have
addressed them. For this section, it will be helpful if readers have read some
of the examples of the data language (in section 3.7), but it is not necessary
to be thoroughly familiar with that section.
3.8.1 Justifying calculational logic
Using the examples from section 3.7 as support, we believe that the tech-
nical content of this chapter is an adequate basis for justifying calculational
logic. We explained the language of calculational logic using only standard,
well-understood semantic methods. The semantics that we gave resulted in a
sensible reading of the predicate logic in [GS93b], and it can be extended to
account for more of the discrete mathematics in that text.
There may be ways to formally justify calculational logic that are funda-
mentally different from ours. (There are certainly other ways to give an object
language and a definition of object theoremhood, but these descriptions are
not fundamental to our justification.) We simply intended to give one such
justification, some foundation to the method.
It was not immediately clear to us that such a reading could be given
at all. The combination of elements of object language and metalanguage
in the formal logic of [GS93b] made it seem possible that calculational logic
was entirely heuristic, a method for constructing arguments that would not
withstand the detailed investigation of formalization. This possibility can now
be discounted.
3.8.2 Calculational logic inferences
The inferences of calculational logic may seem odd, based on the typical cal-
culational proof structure presented in [GS93b]. We provided evidence to the
contrary; in fact, they are very straightforward and can be easily understood.
Any confusion about the inferences may have arisen from confusion about the
meanings of the propositions involved, a failure to distinguish object-level from
meta-level. The inference from proposition P to proposition Q can indeed
be difficult to understand without knowing what P and Q really are.
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It would be both tiresome and outside the scope of this chapter to fully for-
malize calculational logic inference. For instance, we would need to formalize
all the facts about how to deduce the correctness of a typing claim “ () A :: T ”
from other typing claims, and we would need to formalize many facts about
object theoremhood to support deductions of one object theoremhood claim
α ` P from other similar claims. Such facts can now be readily grasped,
expressed, and applied using standard methods, however, given our clarifica-
tion of the propositions underlying calculational logic. Indeed, we describe our
formalization and implementation of a substantial body of calculational logic
inferences in chapter 6 of this dissertation.
The proof structure of calculational logic can also be readily understood,
in the context of the fundamental inferences, and we do not discuss it here.
3.8.3 Is calculational logic non-standard?
When interpreted in a traditional framework for first-order predicate logic
(with equality and function symbols), the calculational logic in [GS93b] is
readily seen to be non-standard in the following ways:
1. Identifiers do not have fixed types.
2. P = Q is a proposition even for propositions P, Q .
3. There is (limited) type polymorphism. For example, A = A is a theorem
whether A is an expression of type boolean or individual.
4. Quantifier expressions are treated abstractly in two ways:
(a) the choice of underlying quantifier (∀ or ∃ )
(b) the number of quantified variables (i.e., not necessarily just one
variable)
5. Textual substitution E[V := P ] appears in theorems.
We interpret calculational logic in a different way: as a metalogic, in which
(for instance) the operation P ∨ Q refers not to the ordinary disjunction
operation on truth values but to a term-constructor, denoting an expression
that itself stands for disjunction in a separate object language. Under this
interpretation, we account for the first two of the features enumerated above
as slightly non-standard choices for the object language. In contrast, the re-
mainder are explained as phenomena of the formalized metalanguage. As this
chapter demonstrates, all can be readily formalized using only conventional
metalinguistic semantic techniques.
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With the clarifications provided by our formalization of calculational logic,
we also exposed several elements not apparent in the presentation in [GS93b].
They are listed in our data language syntax among the operations involv-
ing object syntax: representations of object theoremhood, typing of object
expressions, updating environments, and representing assumptions in object
theoremhood judgments. Some of these operations may seem non-standard
in the context of conventional first-order logics, but in the context of calcula-
tional logic —intended to permit reasoning about the typically metalinguistic
operation of textual substitution— they are readily seen as formalizations of
common or necessary aspects of inference. Furthermore, we have shown that
these operations, too, can be formalized in straightforward ways.
Interestingly, even though an operation representing object-level theorem-
hood is not explicitly present in formulas designated as theorems in [GS93b],
it is explicitly used in statements designated as metatheorems. Readers of
[GS93b] may notice that theorems and metatheorems seem to be smoothly in-
tegrated in the same logical system. Our interpretation of calculational logic
accounts for that by suggesting they are essentially the same: all the theorems
in the book are metatheorems, about theoremhood in some other object lan-
guage. It is therefore unsurprising that these two apparently disparate levels
can be effectively integrated; they are not different levels at all.
From the calculational proof structure given in [GS93b], it initially seemed
that there could be a considerable need for non-standard semantic methods
underlying the unusual appearance of calculational logic. In fact, no unconven-
tional semantic devices are necessary to interpret calculational logic as a met-
alogic. Perhaps most satisfyingly to supporters of the calculational method, a
straightforward metalinguistic formalization of calculational logic renders even
its non-standard elements readily explained by standard semantic methods.
Chapter 4
An Overview of Nuprl
The Nuprl proof development system provides a pre-existing platform for de-
veloping our model of calculational logic inference. This chapter is an overview
of Nuprl, intended both as an introduction for the uninitiated and, for read-
ers familiar with Nuprl, a brief summary of the Nuprl features that are most
important for our model of calculational logic inference. For a history of the
system and a more complete introduction, see [C + 86] and [Jac94].
4.1 Implementing Mathematics in Nuprl
In this section, we introduce some important features of Nuprl that we used in
implementing the data language. Our definitions were essentially built from
Nuprl’s type system and expressed by Nuprl terms, so we briefly discuss types
and terms. We also introduce Nuprl’s system of display forms, which preserves
the useful distinction between mathematical concepts and notation; for many
Nuprl objects, their display forms —which describe how the objects are to
be displayed in various contexts— are defined separately from the objects
themselves. We exploit display forms in several important ways.
We do not yet consider concepts particular to definitions of inference meth-
ods or other meta-level programs in this section; we discuss them in the next
section.
4.1.1 Nuprl types
In its standard semantics, Nuprl is based on an intuitionist type theory similar
to that of Martin-Lo¨f (see [ML82, All87, ACHA90]). This has a few significant
consequences for us as developers. For instance, booleans and propositions are
not the same, and we cannot generally do if-then branching on propositions; we
need to prove that the truth of a proposition is decidable before we can branch
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on it in an if-then context. In addition, readers may recall from chapter 3
that we do not have a function for object-level semantics in the data language.
Because calculational logic has a classical semantics and Nuprl does not,1 such
a meaning function could not be implemented directly in our Nuprl-based data
language. This does not, however, impede our project, because calculational
logic is based around the syntactic property of object-level theoremhood, not
the semantic property of object-level truth. Calculational logic is syntactically
oriented, and Nuprl is extremely flexible with respect to syntax. Semantic
mismatches between the two systems do not affect us.
Indeed, we do not need to consider most of the details of Nuprl’s type
theory in this introduction. Essentially, we simply defined functions and other
mathematical objects in a lambda calculus within a sophisticated type system;
that level of understanding should suffice for most of our readers. Nuprl’s type
theory, however, is much deeper and more broadly applicable than we represent
here. See [C + 86] for more information.
We now discuss some types and related functions, to provide some neces-
sary background for forthcoming chapters and a feel for how we use Nuprl.
Disjoint union A union operation + is one way to combine types: if T1 and
T2 are types, then we can express the notion that a term t is in one
of T1 or T2 by saying it is in the union of the types, i.e. t ∈T1 + T2 .
The type system of Nuprl uses a disjoint union to combine types, so
given an element of T1 + T2 , it must be possible to determine which
component t is in, T1 or T2 . To accomplish this, Nuprl uses the term
constructors inl and inr; for t1 ∈T1 , inl( t1 ) is in T1 + T2 , and for
t2 ∈T2 , inr( t2 ) is in T1 + T2 . The respective inverse operations are
outl and outr: outl(inl(t)) is t, and similarly for outr. We elide the
parentheses from inl, outl, etc. when it improves readability.
We take this opportunity to introduce two ways in which union types are
used in our calculational logic implementation. For one, in our type OE
for object expressions, we conceptually separate object variables from
non-object variable expressions; we reflect this by using a disjoint union
type of the general form (variables) + (other expressions),2 so we can
syntactically determine whether or not any object expression is an object
variable. Another use of union types is for a function that looks up values
related to keys in a table; we can use a union type (success type) + (failure
type) as the lookup function return type, for any success type and failure
type we may choose. When the lookup succeeds on a key, it returns
1The standard semantics of Nuprl is non-classical. There are non-standard semantics for
Nuprl that are classical, such as [How96]. We worked with the standard Nuprl semantics.
2We give a full explanation of type OE in the next chapter, merely using it here as a
motivating example.
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inl( s ) for some s ∈ success type ; when it fails, it returns inr( f ) for
some f ∈ failure type .
Cartesian product The expected pair constructor is present: 〈a, b〉 ∈A×B .
In contrast, the primitive Nuprl function for pair decomposition may be
unfamiliar to readers: the form is spread( p; u, v.b), where p is a pair
and b is an expression in variables u and v ; spread( 〈p, q〉; u, v.t )
= t[p, q/u, v] . So, for instance, the standard first and second compo-
nent projections of a pair can be represented as spread( p; u, v.u) and
spread( p; u, v.v ), respectively.
Dependent types Dependent types are used to create compound types in
which one component type depends on a particular value in another
component type. For instance, consider a function f on integers that
returns an integer on odd inputs and returns a Z → Z function on
other inputs; we would represent the type of f as x:Z → F (x) , where
F (x) = if x is odd then Z else (Z → Z ).
A similar dependent type notion applies to products: if A is a type and
B is a type-valued function on A , then an element of x:A×B(x) would
be a pair 〈y, z〉 where y ∈A and z ∈B(y) .3
Recursive types Nuprl’s type theory can also represent recursive types. For
example, consider the recursive structure of unlabeled binary trees with
integer leaves; in Nuprl, it can be defined as rec( node.Z+node×node ),
where variable node is bound in the union type expression. Its elements
include inl 5, inr <inl 3, inl 7>, and inr <inr <inl 2, inl 4>,
inl 6>.
The relationship between a Nuprl type T and its members is expressed
with assertions of the form A ∈ T or A = B ∈ T . A ∈ T expresses that
A is a member of T ; A = B ∈ T expresses that A and B are members of
T and equal in T .4 In this dissertation, the form A = B ∈ T refers only to
Nuprl equality.
These are just some of the elements of Nuprl’s type theory; clearly, it is
a very expressive system. All the concepts above are used in our type OE of
object expressions, but our type definitions do not generally use that much
expressive capacity.
In a way, types in Nuprl are the basis for all our work, not just definitions of
types needed for implementing calculational logic. Nuprl uses the propositions-
as-types correspondence known as the Curry-Howard isomorphism, so its gen-
eral theorem proving emerges directly from proof rules for its type theory.
3Other common notations for x:Z → F (x) and x:A × B(x) are Πx:Z.F (x) and
Σx:A.B(x) , respectively.
4Type enters into the expressions of Nuprl equality because different types may have
different equalities. For example, 5 and 10 are equal in Z5 but not equal in Z .
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In addition, Nuprl’s lambda calculus —the familiar formalism extended to
Nuprl’s type system— is the basis for our mathematical definitions. Despite
this, readers need not understand most of the concepts in Nuprl’s type theory
to understand this dissertation. We generally work with familiar constructs
at a level of abstraction away from the type theory (constructs for recursion,
case splits, etc.), and we generally explain our work that way.
4.1.2 Terms and term structure
The Nuprl data structure term is used for a variety of purposes. For instance,
all Nuprl propositions and expressions in Nuprl’s type theory are represented as
terms. The mathematical/logical objects we define for our data language —as
distinguished from inference methods and other higher-level procedures— are
also represented by terms, so we briefly discuss Nuprl terms before presenting
the data language implementation.
We do not give a full definition of Nuprl term structure, omitting many de-
tails that are not directly relevant to this dissertation. Our concise description
captures the general feel of Nuprl’s use of the general-purpose data structure
term, and that should be sufficient.
Nuprl terms have roughly the following structure:
opid(s1, . . . , sn).(4.1)
The parts of a term are:5
• opid is the operator identifier; we call this feature an opid. Often, opids
serve as the names of terms in our development. For instance, the opid
of our object-level theoremhood predicate is Othm and the opid of our
object-level conjunction constructor is oand. Readers should generally
be unconcerned with low-level details such as Nuprl opids, but we do
refer to them in describing our implementation in the next chapter, so
we introduce them here.
• si is bound-term i of the term. Each bound-term itself has a complex
structure: sj = x
j
1, . . . , x
j
aj
.tj , where each of the x ’s is a variable and
ti is itself a term. This bound-term binds free occurrences of variables
xj1, . . . , x
j
aj
in tj ; this is the standard notation for variable binding in
Nuprl, also used above in contexts such as the pair-decomposition func-
tion, spread( p; u, v.t ).
5It is possible to supply other atomic parameters to operators, but we do not generally
do so.
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We discuss terms frequently in this dissertation without using Nuprl term
notation to display them. In general, we opt for the common, intuitive nota-
tions permitted by the flexible system of Nuprl display forms, described next.
4.1.3 Display forms
Although Nuprl terms have a uniform syntax, their appearances on page or
screen can differ greatly from that syntax. This is one of the strengths of
Nuprl: the display forms for a term are defined at a level of abstraction away
from the term and its syntax. For instance, consider pair-decomposition op-
eration spread mentioned above. Displaying it in uniform term syntax can
get somewhat clunky. Instead, it has an abbreviated typical display form:
spread(pair;u,v.body) is displayed as let <u,v> = pair in body, or sim-
ply as (pair/u,v.body), according to the user’s preferences. This significantly
improves readability.
As another example, consider the common propositional logic operators.
In a typical Nuprl session, the logical conjunction operator would be input by
typing the word ‘and’, corresponding to its opid and therefore its representa-
tion in the uniform term syntax presented above. But it is displayed using the
character &, a convenient abbreviation; the argument slots are structured so
that & appears to be an infix operator in the expected way. Similar mecha-
nisms are used for disjunction, implication, etc., making formulas much easier
to read than they would be if logical operations were expressed in the pre-
fix/English term syntax.
This allows for the systematic, unambiguous overloading of notation: we
may associate the same display form with several operators, but Nuprl ma-
nipulates the unambiguous underlying terms. We exploit this in our work,
using (for instance) the symbol ⇒ for two different infix operations: the
OE-constructor for object-level implication and the logical/propositional im-
plication operator in Nuprl. There is no ambiguity when entering the expres-
sions into Nuprl —they have different names— but they look the same on the
screen. We avoided overloading symbols such as & in chapter 3, but in the
remainder of this dissertation, we use display forms to overload traditional
logical symbols such as ⇒ and ∨ . This helps us correspond to both conven-
tional Nuprl notation, in which the symbols stand for propositional operations,
and the notation in [GS93b], in which they are OE-constructors, without any
actual ambiguity. In this dissertation as in a Nuprl session, context informally
disambiguates their usages.
Nuprl users can alter display forms; for instance, a change from & to ∧
could be easily made. This is relevant when considering our display forms for
operations relating to quantification in calculational logic, one area where we
intentionally diverge from the notation in [GS93b]. For instance, the book’s
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notation for the general form of quantification is (?X R : B) , whereas we
use (?b X R : B) , making explicit the indexing argument b .
6 Users who
prefer that the b be elided (or perhaps want the star to be a different kind, or
other modifications) could make that change. When entering the term, the b
would still need to be accounted for —the term structure of the quantification
wouldn’t change— but it could simply be erased from the display form. We
feel that this indexing is an important feature to emphasize, and using a star
as a variable instead of the b would make things harder to read. This is not
a conceptual divergence from [GS93b], however, and users of our calculational
logic system could make the quantification display forms suit their tastes.
This system of display forms also permits case-dependent notation, where
the same operator can be displayed in different display forms depending on
its operand. This has numerous applications, including the ability to elide
default values, which we exploit in managing calculational logic quantifica-
tion. Recall that, in chapter 3, we defined the two expected predicate logic
quantifiers (∀X R : B) and (∃X R : B) as instances of the general
form (?b X R : B) for calculational logic quantification, based on whether
argument b indicated universal or existential quantification. We implemented
that directly in Nuprl using our display form for (?b X R : B) . When
argument b is filled by the constant indicating universal quantification, we
simply display (?b X R : B) as (∀X R : B) . We do not have a separate
object for the specific universal quantifier form; it is just a different notation
for the same object, given a particular value for b . (Similarly for existential
quantification, of course.) When the slot for b is filled by a variable in the
general quantification form —say, as part of a lemma statement that quantifies
over the possible kinds of calculational logic quantifiers— we use its standard
display form, explicitly displaying argument b .
This practice not only makes our implementation more readable, it also en-
codes the desired relationship between the related quantifier forms. We do not
need to define separate operators and prove relationships between them. We
have only one operator, corresponding to the definition of our data language,
which looks different in different contexts.
There is also a facility in Nuprl for associating user-defined input commands
with a display form; for instance, we could type CLquant to get the general
form for calculational logic quantification, no matter what the opid of that
operator is. Combining this with the representation of default values, we can
directly input operators with certain default values filled in; for instance, we
could type CLall to get the calculational logic universal quantifier form, i.e.
the general form with a particular value filled in for b . It is somewhat similar
6The ?b notation is what we use in our Nuprl implementation to represent the theoretical
concepts expressed using ?M notation in chapter 3. Changes in notation as we move from a
theoretical outline (chapter 3) to an actual implementation should not be seen as troubling.
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to the effect of a macro: it is as if we typed CLquant and entered a value for
b , all by typing CLall.
The value of this tremendously powerful system in our work is worth noting.
In developing a language that must have the same appearance as a pre-existing
notation, the flexibility to assign display forms to specific cases, access them
directly, and alter display forms without affecting the underlying mathematics
all make our lives as developers much easier. We can test designs, recover
from notation errors, establish shortcuts, use post-hoc mnemonic names, etc.,
all without significant cost. It permits us all the mechanical and logical benefits
of Nuprl’s uniform term syntax without constraining the apparent notation of
our terms. It truly separates the underlying meaning of expressions from their
appearance, a tremendous virtue.
For this reason, we are somewhat loose with some aspects of notation and
meta-notation in this dissertation. We may be careless with list notation
in our descriptions, for instance, displaying a singleton list as its element or
otherwise dropping the brackets that indicate a list in Nuprl. Such small
differences in appearance between our descriptions and our direct inclusions
of Nuprl notation should not confuse readers (the typing of expressions will
often disambiguate cases when there is some doubt). These differences, after
all, are only matters of display, not about the underlying mathematics.
We do not describe how to create Nuprl display forms. Instead, we have
discussed only the most important aspects and how they are used in our im-
plementation. For more details on display forms, see [Jac94, All98, MA94].
4.2 Nuprl ML, Tactics, and Proofs
Inference modeling uses a different set of tools from those used for formalizing
the mathematical language of calculational logic. Nuprl inferences (such as
those used in implementing calculational logic inference) are at a meta-level
to the mathematics formalized using the concepts introduced in section 4.1. To
implement inferences and various meta-level auxiliary functions, Nuprl uses a
dialect of the programming language ML —the metalanguage of the Edinburgh
LCF system (see [GMW79])— as its general-purpose metalanguage. Once we
have introduced Nuprl ML and the related concepts of tactics and tacticals,
we will discuss a few details of Nuprl inferences and proofs.
As with section 4.1, this is a very brief overview of an intricate system.
For a more balanced and thorough introduction to the use of metalanguage in
Nuprl, see [MLm93, Jac94, C + 86].
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4.2.1 Nuprl ML
We use Nuprl ML for two distinct but complementary purposes: creating
tactics for carrying out inferences and creating auxiliary functions for doing
general tasks that are not well-suited for expression as inferences, such as
• simple list manipulation,
• heuristic guessing (without proof) whether two expressions might be
equal,
• heuristic guessing (without proof) the type of an expression in an envi-
ronment.
The second and third examples above reflect that we may want to use heuristics
that are not as computationally expensive as tactics to determine if a tactic
is even worth calling in a context. Running a small, non-tactic ML program
is often far less time-consuming than running a tactic, so we can use ML to
implement heuristics to guide tactic inferences.
Although tactics are ML programs, we tend to consider them separately
from general ML programs that do not involve tactics. Indeed, we may use
the phrase “ML programs” to refer to only those non-tactic programs. In this
section, we discuss the ML language in general, independent of any explicitly
tactic-related constructs. We discuss tactics in section 4.2.2.
In Figure 4.1, we present a subset of the ML syntax given in [MLm93,
section 3.1]. See [MLm93] for more details on both these syntax equations and
their associated semantics.
To make this section a somewhat more self-contained introduction, here
are a few key points:
• It may be difficult to see how the local declaration construct (given under
Expressions) is used, so we provide an example. Consider this contrived
definition of a factorial-like function f :
letrec f n =
let non zero i = (i > 0) in
if non zero n then n · (f n− 1) else 1
(We ignore any issues about restricting values of n .) This illustrates the
local declaration of function non zero in the declaration of function f
as well as the constructs for function application and recursive function
declaration.
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Declarations d
d ::= let b ordinary variables
| letrec b recursive functions
Bindings b
b ::= p=e simple binding
| p1 p2 . . . pn = e function definition
Patterns p
p ::= var variable
| p1.p2 R list cons
| p1,p2 R pairing
| [p1;p2 . . .;pn] list of n elements (n may be 0)
Expressions e
e ::= ce constant
| var variable
| e1e2 L function application
| e1.e2 R list cons
| e1@e2 R list append
| e1=e2 L equality
| not e negation
| e1&e2 R conjunction
| e1,e2 R pairing
| failwith e failure with string
| if e1 then e2 else e3 conditional
| e1 ? e2 failure trap
| e1;e2 . . . ;en sequencing
| [e1;e2 . . . ; en] list of n elements (n may be 0)
| d in e local declaration
| \ p1p2 . . . pn. e abstraction
Figure 4.1: ML syntax equations
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• Only functions can be defined with letrec. For example, letrec x = 2-x
is syntactically incorrect.
• All the variables occurring in a pattern must be distinct. On the other
hand, a pattern can contain multiple occurrences of the wildcard ‘()’.
4.2.2 Tactics
The tactic structure of Nuprl (based on [GMW79]) is one of the primary rea-
sons it seemed practical to model cognitive inference in an automated rea-
soning system. (See [CKB84] for elaboration on the idea of tactics used in
Nuprl and their representation of mathematical thinking.) Given a collection
of pre-specified primitive inferences, a tactic is a program for reducing a proof
goal to premises by iteration of these primitive inferences. Essentially, a tactic
is a program for constructing such an inference tree; which tactics are applied
depends on how one wants to generates subgoals from the proof goal.7 Exe-
cuting a tactic gives rise to an inference step; the premises of that inference
are the unproved leaf-premises of the primitive proof tree.
The execution of a tactic might raise an exception or fail to terminate. For
a program to count as a tactic, however, if it terminates without exception, it
must be guaranteed to generate subgoals justifiable by the primitive rules.
In order to freely write heuristic tactics, there must be some practical
criterion for recognizing tactics. In ML, this criterion is type checking to the
type of tactics.
The labor of justifying inference is split between justifying “tactichood” and
checking the primitive inference rules. (Presumably, the primitive inference
rules are formulated to make such verification feasible. For example, they tend
to be schematic.) The justification of complex forms of inference via tactics
is in terms of the generic criterion for being a tactic and is not schematically
described.
Here are a few simple tactics in Nuprl that pertain to points of interest in
our development:
• Id is the identity tactic; applying it to a proof goal leaves it unchanged.
As we illustrate shortly, it is useful in constructing complex tactics from
simple ones.
• FailWith takes a character string as an argument. When applied to a
proof goal, it fails and outputs its string argument as an error message.
In conjunction with a failure-trapping mechanism, it permits developers
7We discuss tactics from a more cognitive science oriented perspective in chapter 9,
page 150.
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to output more informative, customized failure messages than Nuprl’s
generic ones.
• AUTO is perhaps the most important tactic in Nuprl. It performs a wide
variety of simple inferences, such as typing judgments, some trivial equal-
ities, and some trivial proofs from hypotheses. In essence, AUTO repre-
sents the class of inferences considered too obvious for Nuprl’s users.
In implementing calculational logic inference, we did not use AUTO in our
tactics. It is very high-level, and tactics built around it can be fragile
because someone may want to change AUTO and the class of obvious
inferences it represents without affecting other, more specific tactics.
Therefore, we presume that users of our calculational logic tactics will
invoke AUTO themselves.
• There are several varieties of chaining lemmas in Nuprl. For instance,
BackThruLemma is a simple backchaining tactic, whereas BackThru is
a more complex one, wrapping BackThruLemma in levels of pattern-
matching and other mechanical intelligence. There are also other tactics
for forward chaining, backward chaining, and lemma instantiation, and
we use some varieties of them extensively.
For reasons similar to those expressed regarding AUTO, above, we used
only the lowest-level chaining tactics in our calculational logic implemen-
tation. Indeed, higher-level chaining tactics may themselves call AUTO,
so the identical reasons apply.
Although all of Nuprl ML can be used to create new tactics from old
ones, for common applications, it is often simpler to use Nuprl’s language
of tacticals, which are functions for composing tactics. We made extensive
use of tacticals in creating our calculational logic tactics, but their use as
programming constructs is so simple that we do not spend much space here
even introducing them. Here are a few simple examples of tacticals; see [Jac94]
for a more complete list.
• REPEAT is analogous to the common programming language looping con-
struct: for tactic T , REPEAT T repeatedly runs T on the subgoals
resulting from previous applications until no progress is made.
• ORELSE is the failure-trapping tactical: for tactics T1 and T2 , T1
ORELSE T2 tries running T1 ; if it fails, it runs T2 instead. With
the FailWith tactic mentioned above, this can be used for customizing
error messages.
• Try T tries to run tactic T on a proof goal, but if T fails, it leaves the
proof goal unchanged; it is defined as T ORELSE Id. This is extremely
useful in tactic development.
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• T1 THEN T2 first runs T1 and then runs T2 on all subgoals gener-
ated by T1 . The combination of a tactic T with AUTO, written as T
THEN AUTO, has an abbreviated alternative display form: T ..... This
abbreviated form comes up in example (4.3) in section 4.2.3 below.
• Complete T is useful for determining if tactic T will finish a proof; it
runs T and fails if T generates any subgoals.
Tactics can get increasingly complex; there is a full programming language
for use in constructing them. Some complex inference patterns could also be
captured in lemmas; a lemma can represent the result of a chain of inferences
just as a tactic can. In this way, there is an interesting division of inferential
labor, as it were, between tactics and lemmas: increased reliance on one of
them can facilitate less dependence on the other. In our implementation,
we tended to use lemmas where it seemed helpful, rather than create more
complicated tactics. This was, however, simply a design decision. If our
important inferences had been more clearly expressed by tactics than lemmas,
we would have decided differently.
4.2.3 Proving things in Nuprl
Nuprl’s inference style is based around sequents. A sequent is written as
H1, . . . , Hn ` C , where C is the conclusion of the sequent and each Hi
is either a hypothesis or a declaration of a variable with its type. Normally,
Nuprl displays sequents vertically, with explicit numbers for the hypotheses:
1. H1
...
n. Hn
` C
(4.2)
We may refer to the hypotheses and the conclusion of a sequent as clauses. In
addition, by goal (or proof goal) we may refer to either a full sequent or only
its conclusion.
Our introduction to Nuprl proofs is a simplification of the more detailed
one in [Jac94] and other sources, intended primarily to permit readers to un-
derstand the rest of this dissertation. We see proofs as tree structures in which
every node has a sequent component and a tactic component; the tactic com-
ponent of a node may be empty or otherwise ill-formed. The children of a
node N are the subgoals generated by the tactic of N applied to the goal of
N . If a node has no children, its tactic fully solves its proof goal.
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As an example of how tactics generate subgoals, consider the following
contrived example for backchaining:
1. propn1 : Prop
2. propn2 : Prop
` ¬(propn1 ∨ propn2)
by BackThru: Thm* ∀A,B:Prop. ¬A & ¬B ⇒ ¬(A ∨ B) ....
\
` ¬propn1 by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬propn2 by <TACTIC>
(4.3)
It backchains through a simple lemma, then calls tactic AUTO —which is rep-
resented in abbreviated form by the four dots after the backchained lemma—
to handle routine manipulation (proving typing subgoals, etc.). Note that an-
tecedents in the lemma became subgoals after the tactic. We will refer again
to this pattern of antecedents becoming subgoals in the forthcoming chapter
explaining our implementation of calculational logic inference.
In the expected way, a proof is complete when all of its nodes have the
expected properties: all variables in every sequent are bound in that sequent;
all nodes have a tactic; every goal is proved by its tactic, assuming provability
of its children; etc.
Proof goals in Nuprl also have a label, which roughly indicates their classifi-
cation or purpose. For instance, goals corresponding to the primary inferences
generally have the (normally elided) default label main; other labels, such as
assertion and rewrite subgoal, mark proof goals that arise in particular
circumstances with which most readers of this dissertation need not be con-
cerned. As developers, we must take some minimal care to manage our tactics
correctly on these labels. With one exception, discussed immediately below,
users of the system never encounter them.
The one kind of non-main proof goal that is significant to users of our
calculational logic system is well-formedness goals, which are used to establish
that Nuprl expressions have the necessary types; they have the label wf. Well-
formedness goals are critical and pervasive in Nuprl, because everything must
be type-correct. They are typically handled automatically by Nuprl’s AUTO
tactic. Often, when Nuprl users want to invoke a tactic TAC, they wrap it in
AUTO, instead applying TAC THEN AUTO. It is a strength of the tactic system of
Nuprl —and its AUTO tactic in particular— that Nuprl users are often insulated
from typing judgments and other simple inferences. Further, when AUTO does
not solve a well-formedness subgoal, it is often a useful indication of user error;
when a user fails to assign a correct type to a variable, for instance, it comes
up in the form of an unsolved wf goal.
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In our implementation of calculational logic inference, we assume that our
tactics will be wrapped in tactic AUTO, so we do not try to solve well-formedness
subgoals ourselves. We do solve all other subgoals that may emerge, no matter
what their label, but users of our calculational logic tactics who do not also
call AUTO may well be greeted with a message from Nuprl informing them that
there are hundreds of unsolved subgoals remaining. In our experience, these
are all wf subgoals. Well-formedness subgoals that remain after AUTO have the
same value as in any other Nuprl context: they frequently indicate user error.
Our tactics do nothing to obscure this.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
As mentioned in this chapter, specific features of Nuprl guided our design
decisions in several ways. Prominently, Nuprl’s type theory influenced our
choice for type OE, which affected the rest of our development. Nuprl’s many
degrees of abstraction —between syntax and display, between term-level and
meta-level, etc.— also affected the overall structure of our mathematics and
our implementation of calculational inference, as did the relative simplicity of
expressing some procedures as tactics and others as general ML programs.
We conclude this chapter with a few comments on how we used tactics.
One of the primary aspects of our design philosophy for tactics has already
come up in our discussion of AUTO, but it bears repeating: it was our conscious
goal to keep our tactics as low-level as possible, to build them from component
tactics that are themselves as close as possible to Nuprl’s primitive rules. One
result of this is that our tactics never called AUTO directly, but we also never
used high-level tactics for chaining, expression decomposition, etc. This results
in a more robust system, because Nuprl’s high-level tactics are more likely to
be changed from version to version (or customized from user to user) than low-
level ones, and our dependence on these more variable tactics is minimized.
In addition, because our implementation is part of a feasibility demon-
stration for our overall cognitive modeling method, we frequently used an
exceptional tactic that is not mentioned on the list in section 4.2.2: Fiat is
a tactic that, when applied, signals Nuprl to treat an incomplete proof as if
it were complete. Indeed, it embodies the idea of “proving by fiat,” resulting
in Nuprl’s accepting a proof goal as fully solved without further justification.
Fiat could even prove False, which makes it extremely dangerous to use.
We used it regularly to speed up our implementation of calculational logic
inference —instead of spending time proving obvious properties of our imple-
mentation, we simply stated them as lemmas and used them in our tactics,
a philosophy we refer to as state-and-use in future chapters. If there are er-
rors in our development, they probably arise from gaps in reasoning that are
artificially filled with Fiat.
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In fact, we nearly overlooked such an error. We created a heuristic ML
program termeql to tell if two Nuprl terms are equal modulo a simple equiv-
alence relation that we did not want to take the time to implement formally
in Nuprl; then, we wrote a tactic that essentially claimed that if we wanted to
prove a goal A = B ∈T , the truth of termeql A B was sufficient. Instead
of formally working through all the reasoning for such a tactic, we used Fiat,
and that resulted in a false tactic: it failed to account for all the typing infor-
mation needed to prove such a goal. We believe that no such errors currently
exist in our system, but as a matter of full disclosure, we felt compelled to
mention their possibility due to our use of Fiat.
Chapter 5
Implementing the Data
Language
5.1 Introduction
Some of the data language given in chapter 3 is already present in Nuprl:
for the standard logical operations of the data language, we use the Nuprl
propositions ⇒ , & , ¬ , etc.; we also use Nuprl’s own list construction and
pairing operations, and Nuprl’s types for natural numbers ( N ), pairing (the
product type T1 × T2 ), and lists. We introduced by definitions the rest of
the data language into Nuprl, including the fundamentals of our calculational
logic object language and how we manipulate it. In this chapter, we describe
our Nuprl implementation of the data language —from the object language on
which it operates to the complex propositions it contains for OE-typing and
object-level theoremhood— providing all the details needed in advance of our
explanation of calculational logic inference, given in the next chapter.
In general, our implementation is a reflection of the data language in chap-
ter 3, capturing the same essential features of calculational logic. That chapter
gave only a theoretical outline of how one could formalize the predicate logic in
[GS93b], however, not a description of an actual implementation. Because of
the constraints of a practical context, our Nuprl implementation differs from
the theoretical outline in several ways, ranging from different display forms
for operations mentioned in chapter 3 to additions of new operations to the
data language. At the conclusion of this chapter, we hope readers will be
comfortable with our Nuprl definitions and display conventions —even those
that differ from chapter 3— in preparation for their use in the formalization of
Leibniz inference that follows. In addition, we made several design decisions as
system developers that significantly shaped our implementation, and we hope
readers will be comfortable with this aspect of the Nuprl implementation as
well. One of these design decisions, organizing definitions around the notion
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of a user level, affects several of our definitions, so we discuss the user level
before getting to the implemented data language.
5.1.1 The user level
One of our considerations was to distinguish the definitions intended to aid
us in developing the system from those intended for direct use in expressing
the mathematics of [GS93b]. Some of our implemented definitions are on the
developer-level (or system-level), and some are on the user level. For example,
in some contexts, we have several closely related definitions —such as different
OE-typing predicates, one defined on a single OE and another defined on a
list of OEs — that are all part of our implementation. We want to distinguish
user-level constructs, those intended for users of our calculational logic system,
from those intended only as auxiliary, behind-the-scenes elements.
For this purpose, we consider a user of our system to be someone who
wants to use our formalized data language and inference tactics to state and
reason about the calculational predicate logic in [GS93b]. People whose aim
is to develop the data language or implement calculational logic inference
procedures (whether tactics or simply plain ML code) are not considered users.
So it is not necessarily the most fundamental elements of our implemented
language, the ones on which our definitions are based, that are considered
“user-level”. Indeed, we must choose elements that are general enough to
handle all the intended uses. For instance, in the OE-typing example in the
preceding paragraph, the OE-typing predicate on a single expression would
not handle necessary list-cases —it is natural to state propositions such as
() P, Q, R :: bool in the data language of [GS93b]— so that would not
suffice for the user level of OE-typing predicates. So, we decided that the
list-based OE-typing predicate would be the only one for users of the system;
users must state all OE-typing propositions using this list-based form. This
avoids over-populating the user level, making a cleaner system for users and
system developers alike.
In this chapter, we explicitly point out which elements of the data language
are considered user-level, when it may be ambiguous. This is particularly
relevant for OE quantification, OE textual substitution, and propositions on
OEs .
5.2 Nuprl Types for Calculational Logic
As with any typed language, the foundation for our data language is its types.
We implemented Nuprl types for concepts such as object expressions (OE),
object variables (OV), and object-level type expressions (OTS). As discussed
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in chapter 4, we carried out these definitions in Nuprl’s existing type system.
Some of our design choices were necessitated by the Nuprl environment, while
others were made primarily to simplify the implementation.
5.2.1 Notes on object expressions and object variables
For perspective on some of these definitions, it is helpful to consider what
we mean by an object expression, i.e., what objects we want the class OE
to contain. As a first (very rough) approximation, OE can be described by
the following grammar, where IDENT represents a class of identifiers that we
temporarily take as object language variables:
OE := IDENT | false |OE(OE) |OE ⇒ OE |OE = OE | ∀ IDENT. OE(5.1)
As a refinement of this, we decided to conceptually separate object vari-
ables: for us, an object expression is either an object variable or a function
on object expressions. (We consider false a constant function.) Implementing
this required using Nuprl’s disjoint union type T1 + T2 in our definition. A
second approximation to the definition of OE would be
OE == IDENT + (some recursive structure in OE)(5.2)
where the recursive structure captures the syntax expressed in (5.1). We give
the exact details of the recursive structure shortly, after presenting further
preliminaries.
Having decided upon this form for object expressions, considerations arose
about defining our class of object variables. In particular, it seemed natu-
ral that the class OV of object variables would be a subtype of OE . We
could not, however, simply use IDENT as OV . Within the above framework
of equation (5.2), members of IDENT are not members of OE ; members
of a Nuprl type A + B have one of two forms, inl(a) or inr(b) , where
a ∈A , b ∈B , and inl and inr are tags to represent which argument of
the union type to consider. Thus, terms inl(id : IDENT) are elements of
OE , and we base OV on them. We defined the object variable construc-
tor Ovar(id : IDENT) to be just inl(id) and the type of object variables
OV to be {Y :OE ∃id:IDENT. Ovar(id) = Y } . We chose this formulation
particularly to highlight the subtyping relationship OV ⊆ OE .
In many treatments of logical languages, these notions of object variable
and identifier appear to be the same. Our Nuprl types of OV and IDENT
are different, but they are also easily identified with each other, with Ovar
injecting identifiers into object variables in the obvious way. For the sake of
computational simplicity, we sometimes exploit this structural identity, defin-
ing some operators that conceptually relate to object variables by specifying
their actions on identifiers.
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5.2.2 Important Nuprl types for calculational logic
In this section, we present some of the more important Nuprl types that are
introduced in our implementation. In a way, they provide an overview of the
whole project by highlighting the key concepts. This list is thorough, but
not absolutely complete —some simple, application-specific definitions will be
delayed until forthcoming sections when they become relevant.
Along with the types, we discuss related constructs, such as auxiliary func-
tions (e.g., the update functions for type expression assignments) and type-
specific constructors and destructors that make the language easier to use. We
omit straightforward or otherwise uninteresting details —for instance, we also
implemented decidable equalities on types such as IDENT and OV and used
them in mundane ways in our development.
identifiers We defined IDENT == Atom×N . Thus, identifiers are character
strings followed by (i.e. paired with) some natural number. The pres-
ence of N is central to our methods for creating fresh variables, used in
implementing capture-avoiding substitution. We also implemented the
obvious constructors and destructors on IDENT: Operators ident1 and
ident2 are projections of the atom and number of an identifier, respec-
tively; operator identform(a : Atom, n : N) constructs 〈a, n〉:IDENT .
object variables Recall that OV is {Y :OE | ∃id:IDENT.Ovar(X) = Y } .
As support, we implemented the straightforward destructor function
identofovar:(OV → IDENT) and two varieties of recognizer functions,
respecting Nuprl’s use of the mathematical distinction between Boolean
values and propositional values: is a ovar(oe:OE) , which is just an alias
of Nuprl’s isl function, returns a value of type B ; IsOvar(oe:OE) ,
which uses the set-type definition of OV given above, returns a value of
type P .
We also implemented OV-constructor ov lit to create OV-literals: for
any character string, it creates the OV consisting of that string (treated
as an element of IDENT) paired with the number 0. When the N ar-
gument in an OV is 0, we typically elide it, so ov lit(p) displays as p.
OV-literals do not play a big role in our implementation of calculational
logic —character strings are not object variables, they are metalinguis-
tic expressions that stand for object variables— but sometimes [GS93b]
implicitly suggests that readers treat letters as object variable literals.
To permit this direct reading, constructor ov lit is a necessary part of
formalizing the conventions of [GS93b] in Nuprl. Still, it is atypical to
escape the metalinguistic basis of calculational logic in this way. In fact,
we did not use any OV-literals in the examples we created to test our
definitions and develop our model of calculational logic inference.
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OPIDS As mentioned in chapter 4, each Nuprl term has an opid that desig-
nates the operator from which that term was formed. We use a similar
system, implementing the five-element type OPIDS to identify the five
fundamental operators in object language syntax. Following common
Nuprl practice for such finite types, we define OPIDS as N5 , and we re-
fer to its elements by constants opid false , opid ap , opid imp , opid eq ,
and opid all , where a term with opid opid false is the object language
constant for false, a term with opid opid ap is an object language func-
tion application, etc. There is no ambiguity between Nuprl opids and
the opids we implemented for our object language.
NonOV An object expression that is not an object variable is character-
ized by the presence of an opid and a subterm-function. To capture
this class, we defined the set type NonOV == {Y : OE |¬(∃X :
IDENT.Ovar(X) = Y )} , the complement of OV with respect to OE .
We defined the NonOV constructor mknonov(opid, fn of OE) to be
inr 〈opid, fn of OE〉 , the composition of the Nuprl inr tag and the
pairing operator; an example of its use is given in the discussion of type
OE that follows.
object expressions Type OE is implemented as the recursive type
OE == rec(OE. IDENT+
(i : OPIDS× (j : Noesbtms(i) → OE× PossBV (i; j))))
(5.3)
As previously discussed, elements of Nuprl type OE are either members
of OV , with the form Ovar(id) , or elements of NonOV , constructed
by mknonov(opid, subterm-function) . The subterm-function portion is
a function from a finite type with as many elements as there are OE
subterms of a term with opid opid —represented by Noesbtms(i) in the
definition of type OE— to the subterms themselves.
The return type of this subterm-function is actually OE×PossBV (i; j) ,
which merits a brief explanation. In case the term is a quantifier (∀x.P ) ,
it will have both a subterm P and a variable x bound in that subterm,
and this function will return the pair 〈P, x〉 . In other cases, there will
be no binding variable, and the pair returned will be 〈subterm, ·〉 , where
placeholder · indicates the absence of a binding variable for this subterm.
Further details on PossBV follow in subsection 5.3.2.
We frequently use the fact that any element of OE is also in type
IDENT+(i : OPIDS× (j : Noesbtms(i) → OE×PossBV (i; j)))) , which
follows from one unrolling of the recursive definition of OE. We capture
that fact in straightforward theorems relating the types: each type is a
subtype of the other, and terms equal in one type are equal in the other.
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object-level type expressions As Nuprl terms, all object expressions have
Nuprl type OE. As discussed in chapter 3, however, there is also a dif-
ferent kind of typing for object expressions. Given a class of individuals,
an object expression stands for exactly one of the following: an individ-
ual, a boolean value, an individual-valued function, or a boolean-valued
function. We designed object type expressions that refer to the classes of
values for which an OE can stand; we then defined a Nuprl type OTS
whose members are these object type expressions. Here are the defini-
tions that support Nuprl type OTS:
object-level ground types We introduced a two-valued type OGT =
{INDO, BO} , where INDO and BO are atomic constants repre-
senting the types of individual-valued and boolean-valued object
expressions.
Nuprl type OTS Type OTS of object type expressions is defined to
be OGT × N ; we defined the OTS -constructor (n:N)gt:OGT as
simply the pair 〈gt, n〉 . The N element is used to represent the
functional arity of terms. To illustrate, a boolean-valued function
with four arguments would have type expression (4)BO , and an
individual would have type expression (0)INDO .
object type expression assignments We use the name type expres-
sion assignment (we may abbreviate it to type assignment, when
unambiguous) for a structure of type OV → OTS that represents
the assignment of type expressions to variables. As discussed in
chapter 3, even though type assignments are defined on OVs , we
think of type assignments as specifying type expressions for all ob-
ject expressions.
Typically, type assignments are not fully specified; proofs and defi-
nitions are implemented by quantifying over type assignments. To
specify values for particular variables, we use type assignment up-
dates, which we discuss fully below. If necessary, we treat type as-
signments as total functions by having a default mapping of OV s
to (0)BO unless otherwise specified.
type assignment updates We specify type assignment functions by
updates: xτ specifies that x is assigned type expression τ and all
other variables are the same as in  . There are three kinds of type
assignment updates, used in different practical contexts.
• One type assignment update takes a single object-variable x
and a type expression τ , updating x to type expression τ .
Because of its specificity and simplicity, we as system develop-
ers adopt this as our standard form when creating tactics to
reason about updates. We have implemented tactics to rewrite
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the other two kinds (described immediately below) to this one
in straightforward ways.
Although we prefer it as developers, this is not a user-level
construct: in normal practice, there are many instances where
a list of object variables is updated, and this update cannot
accommodate that operation in a simple way. This illustrates a
concrete difference between user-level and developer-level goals.
• A second type assignment update takes a list x of object vari-
ables and a single type expression τ , updating all the variables
on x to τ . We defined it in the straightforward way from the
preceding (single-OV) update.
This is the user-level update. It can easily be used to express
the same information as in the single-variable case by using
singleton lists, but it is also general enough for its other impor-
tant uses: For instance, if the quantifier (∀X R : P ) (where
X:OV List ) is assigned bool under  , the natural typing infor-
mation to infer about R is (Xind ) R :: bool , using precisely
this kind of type assignment update.
• The other type assignment update takes a list x of object vari-
ables x and a list τ of type expressions. We defined this one,
too, in the straightforward way from the single-OV update.
This kind of update emerged as a useful concept for simplify-
ing certain aspects of our reasoning as developers of inference
methods, and in chapter 6 we discuss its use in instances where
the other two kinds of update would be inadequate. The extra
degree of abstraction gained by taking lists τ is of no benefit
in representing the mathematics in [GS93b], however, so we do
not complicate matters by introducing it to users.
type assignment agreement We implemented a predicate to capture
the concept of two type assignments agreeing on an object variable:
(, ′ agree on x) holds exactly when type assignments  and ′
assign the same type expression to x:OV . This structure is useful
in reasoning about OE-typing: if two type assignments agree on all
free variables in an E:OE , then they assign the same type to E .
We return to this idea in chapter 6, when we describe our methods
for solving OE-typing proof goals.
{ ind , bool } Due to the polymorphism of object-language equality over
booleans and individuals, { ind , bool } is a particularly important type.
We often use it when proving properties involving equality, and since the
three Leibniz rules are about object-level equality, it comes up frequently
and prominently. We use Nuprl’s set type to define it as a subtype of
OTS in the straightforward way.
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environments For a type T , an environment env(T ) == (IDENT×T ) List
associates identifiers with values of T . We use environments to manage
the lists used in implementing textual substitution of calculational logic.
We implemented two functions to support environments:
lookup lookup env(id:IDENT, env:env(T )) is a general lookup function
for environments of any type T , returning an element of T +Unit .
( Unit is a Nuprl type for which · is its only member. We use it
here only to indicate lookup failure.) It is a simple list-recursive
function on env , finding the first pair on env for which the first
element is id , say 〈id, t〉 , and returning inl(t) . If no such pair
exists, it returns inr(·) .
update Because lookup env always returns the first match (if any), the
environment update functions simply add to the head of an envi-
ronment. We have both a general updates env(l:env(T ), T :env(T ))
function that prepends one environment to the head of another and
a specific update env(var:IDENT, val:T, env:env(T )) function for
updating by one element, defined for any type T .
zip For any type T , function zip env(I:IDENT List, L:T List) creates
a T -environment by joining the two lists: element i of the envi-
ronment is the pair formed from element i of I and element i of
L .
5.3 The Object Language
Our Nuprl implementation reflects the metalinguistic interpretation of [GS93b]
discussed in chapter 3. In particular, we read proofs and propositions in calcu-
lational logic as being about the object-level theoremhood (or object theorem-
hood) of expressions in an object language. We need only a relatively standard
predicate logic for our object language, although there are some intricacies
in the details of our implementation. In this section, we present the imple-
mentation and some of the auxiliary operators we introduced to increase its
utility.
5.3.1 Object expression constructors
We covered simple object variables and constructor Ovar in the previous
discussion of type OV. We also introduced type OPIDS , the five opid con-
stants that represent the five fundamental functions in OE syntax, and OE-
constructor mknonov . Here, we elaborate on that introduction to object ex-
pressions.
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fundamental OE syntax We introduced OE constructors for the five fun-
damental elements of the syntax of object expressions: ofalse, obap(p,q),
oimp(p,q), oeq(p,q), and oforall(x,p); we display them as f , p(q) , p ⇒ q ,
p = q , and (∀x : p) , respectively. As an example of an OE constructor,
consider
p ⇒ q ==
mknonov(opid imp, λ posn. If posn = 0 then 〈p, ·〉 else 〈q, ·〉).
(5.4)
It contains an opid , a subterm-function, and the mknonov operator.
Other OE constructors are similar; we note differences later, where ap-
propriate.
OE false The OE constant for false, f , is mknonov(opid false, λposn.0) .
The subterm function λposn.0 may seem odd, but, in fact, because
its intended domain Noesbtms(opid false) = N0 is empty, any choice of
subterm function would suffice.
OE universal quantification The OE constructor for the basic universal
quantifier form (∀p : q) is mknonov(opid all, λposn.〈p, q〉) . Similarly
to the case for f , by using type Noesbtms(opid all) = N1 as a guard in
applications, we are free to implement its subterm-function as a constant
function. In addition, recall what the pair 〈p, q〉 as the return value in
the subterm-function indicates: the variable represented by p is bound
in the OE represented by q .
There is significantly more complexity to our implementation of quantifi-
cation, reflecting the usage and conventions of calculational logic. Due to
the necessary detail, we discuss the implementation of general quantifier
forms in the next section.
defined elements of OE We build the rest of our object language from the
fundamental object language syntax, defining the OE constructors t ,
¬ , ∨ , ∧ , ∃ , and ≡ in straightforward ways.
5.3.2 Quantification
We have previously described universal and existential quantification in the
calculational logic of [GS93b] and our metalinguistic interpretation of it. Based
on that description, we implemented our term constructors for universal and
existential quantifiers of the object language in the expected way.
In addition, recall that there are added complexities to the treatment of
quantification in [GS93b]. In chapter 3, we described the generalization of
standard predicate logic quantifiers to a general form (?MX R : P ) , which
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can accommodate accumulator operations such as
∑
and
∏
as well as the
quantifiers ∀ and ∃ . (Recall, too, that X is a list of dummy variables; it may
be a singleton list.) Our description, however, covered only the general form
and the two standard quantifiers, because our goal was an implementation of
predicate logic that could be readily extended to other areas of the discrete
mathematics in [GS93b]; we did not formalize an implementation of those other
areas. Using a two-element type Qind of quantifier indices (and constants ∧
and ∨ to refer to those indices), we implemented quantification according to
that description. We present the details here.
For a foundation, we used the fundamental OE -constructors for universal
and existential quantifiers to implement (?
b:Qind x:IDENT : p:OE) , defined
by cases on b : (?∧ x : p) = (∀x : p) ; (?∨ x : p) = (∃x : p) . This is more
specific than the general form in two ways: the binding slot is restricted to a
single identifier instead of a sequence of dummies, and there is no expression
R restricting the range of the quantifier, corresponding to R = t . It is not
intended for the user level; it is used solely in defining the general (user-level)
quantification.
From this, (?
b:Qind X:IDENT List R:OE : P :OE) is defined by induc-
tion on X :
((?b X R : P ) =
{
base(b, R, P ) if X is the empty list
((?b h : (?b t R : P )) if X = h.t
(5.5)
where base(b, r, p) is also defined by cases on b : base(∧, r, p) = r ⇒ p ;
base(∨, r, p) = r ∧ p . The base construct is not intended for the user-level.
It is simply an auxiliary form for the general definition of quantification.
We use this general, user-level quantifier form (?b X R : P ) to define
specific OE quantifiers: in concept and in Nuprl display, (?∧ X R : P ) is
(∀X R : P ) and (?∨ X R : P ) is (∃X R : P ) . As mentioned in chap-
ter 4, the 3-ary user-level universal and existential quantifiers are essentially
just display forms of the general 4-ary quantifier.
To represent the cognate binary operators and relevant identity elements,
we use the infix operator (P :OE) ?
(b:Qind) (Q:OE) and u(b : Qind) , re-
spectively. They are defined in the expected way by cases on b ; for instance,
P ?∧ Q = P ∧ Q and u(∧) = t . These definitions are direct reflections of
the mathematics previously given.
It should be reasonably clear how to extend this system of definitions to
mathematics beyond predicate logic; for instance, Qind could be extended to
a 4-element type, adding the constants × and + , etc.
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5.3.3 Object expression destructors and related func-
tions
fundamental OE destructors Recall that, if an object expression is in
NonOV , it is essentially an opid and a subterm-function. The OE -
destructor opid of OE(oe:NonOV) returns the opid of an object expres-
sion oe ; fn of OE(oe:NonOV) returns its subterm-function.
number of subterms of OE s The N -valued function oesbtms(opid) is the
number of subterms of an OE with opid opid:OPIDS . This is commonly
used in a type Noesbtms(opid) to specify a property P for all subterms
of any object expression: e.g., ∀opid:OPIDS, posn:Noesbtms(opid). P .
This Noesbtms(opid) type comes up frequently in Nuprl well-formedness
subgoals. To prove properties about definitions of OE-constructors, we
often need to prove something about subterms, such as how many sub-
terms a given OE-constructor has. Thus, this oesbtms function is very
important to us as developers, though not to users.
subterms of OE s The OE-valued function nthsbtm(oe:NonOV, n) returns
subterm n of oe . The restriction of oe to type NonOV ensures that
oe has a subterm-function; we treat requests for the subterms of OVs
as ill-typed. There is also a type restriction on n — n must be in
Noesbtms(opid of OE(oe)) — to ensure that n is actually a value for which
expression oe has a subterm. For instance, asking for the fifth subterm
of an object-level implication would be considered ill-typed.
bound variables The N -valued function oebv(opid:OPIDS, posn:N) returns
the number of variables that become bound in subterm position posn in
an OE with opid opid. In our language so far, oebv returns only 0 or
1. Like quantification and some other implemented features, its syntax
accommodates extensions to a more general language than the one we
use.
Type-valued function PossBV (opid:OPIDS, posn:N) calls oebv to de-
termine if a binding slot is associated with position posn of an object
expression with opid opid . (We use the singular —“a slot”— because
oebv returns only 0 or 1.) If so, PossBV returns the type of that vari-
able, which in our application is always IDENT ; if not, it returns Unit.
The primary use of PossBV is in the return type of subterm-functions
of OE s, OE× PossBV (i; j) .
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5.4 Substitution
Capture-avoiding textual substitution on OEs is central to calculational logic.
We cannot simply use Nuprl’s native substitution to perform this, because OE
terms have a wholly different binding structure. In this section, we discuss the
capture-avoiding substitution on OE that we implemented, both the general
idea behind its design and the details of its implementation.
Calculational logic often uses capture-avoiding simultaneous substitution,
so we defined the general substitution and then defined the common spe-
cial case of the substitution of one expression for one variable as a special
case of it, using singleton lists. In broad terms, our approach to computing
the capture-avoiding substitution of P :OE List for V :IDENT List in E:OE ,
written E[V := P ] , is as follows:
• Identify a number n so that, for any id:IDENT , ident2(id) > n implies
both that Ovar(id) does not occur free in E or P and that Ovar(id)
does not appear on V .
• Rename the identifiers in bound variables of E to new identifiers for
which ident2 is greater than n ; call the result of the renaming E ′ .
• Having now eliminated the possibility of capture, perform a capture-
permitting simultaneous substitution of P for V in E ′ This is done
by a straightforward recursive descent through E ′ , rewriting any free
variable with identifier in list V to the corresponding expression in list
P .
Here are the operations we implemented to support this capture-avoiding
substitution on OEs .
greatest-number computations The N -valued function hnum aux(x:OE)
returns the greatest number that appears in any identifier (in free or
bound variables) of x . Using this, we defined the N -valued function
hnum(L:OE List) , which returns the highest identifier-number that ap-
pears in a list of OE s. Similar functions on IDENT Lists and other types
were defined in straightforward ways, culminating in the N-valued func-
tion big ident num(E:OE, V :IDENT List, P :OE List) , which computes
the number to use as a lower bound for fresh variables with respect to
E, V, P in the substitution E[V := P ] .
renaming variables OE-valued function rename bd vars(E, n, rewrites) re-
turns a copy of E:OE in which all bound variables have been renamed
so that their ident-numbers are greater than n:N . Its initial call is
with rewrites:env(IDENT ) = [ ] , and it performs a recursive descent
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through E . If it comes across a quantifier subterm (∀〈x, m〉 : P ) ,
where 〈x, m〉 ∈ IDENT , it returns (∀〈x, n + 1〉 : rename bd vars(P, n +
1, 〈〈x, m〉, 〈x, n + 1〉〉 · rewrites)) . The rest of the descent behavior is
straightforward, with variables rewritten according to the (perhaps up-
dated) correspondence rewrites .
capture permitting substitution OE-valued textual substitution function
capture ok subst(E:OE, env:env(OE)) performs a recursive descent on
E , returning a copy of E in which each variable whose IDENT is on
env is replaced by the corresponding OE , using lookup env . It protects
against rewriting bound variables by updating env during the descent:
if it encounters (∀x:IDENT : P :OE) , env is updated by 〈x, Ovar(x)〉 ;
thus, bound variables are left unchanged.
capture-avoiding substitution Using the functions described above, we
implemented a general capture-avoiding substitution function on E:OE ,
V :IDENT List , and P :OE List :
E[V := P ] = capture ok subst(rename bd vars(E, N, [ ]), env) ,
where N = big ident num(E, V, P ) and env = zip env(V, P ) . We also
implemented a commonly used, restricted variant on V :IDENT and
P :OE , using the general case and a singleton list constructor. We also
display this variant as E[V := P ] .
Typically, only one form of an operator is intended to be a user-level
construct. This case is an exception: because substitution on lists and
substitution on single variables are both quite common operations in
the calculational logic of [GS93b], both the list-based and variable-based
substitution operators are user-level. This caused extra complications
for us as developers —all our user-level tactics pertaining to substitution
had to accommodate both forms instead of just one normal form (c.f.
type assignment updates)— but it was a convenient way to capture the
actual practice of [GS93b].
5.5 Propositions on Object Expressions
From the perspective of modeling calculational logic inference, propositions
on OEs are close to the heart of the data language. Some are simple and do
not require further discussion, such as equality on OEs . In this section, we
describe our implementation of the other important predicates on OEs (and
OE lists), used to express properties such as whether an object variable occurs
free in an object expression, whether an OE is an object-level theorem, or
whether an object expression is assigned a particular type expression by a
given type assignment. Before proceeding, we remind readers of the notion of
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user level introduced in subsection 5.1.1. Many of the definitions that follow
are not intended for the user level; they are only auxiliaries in service of the
primary definitions. In cases of complex definitions, we explicitly note which
are intended for the user level.
5.5.1 List-based propositions
Lists are not quite as important in the Nuprl implementation of the data
language as they are in the formalized language in chapter 3. Before, we
avoided cluttering our simple type system with function types, so we used
lists to represent type expression assignments. Now, we are no longer using
a simple type system, we are using Nuprl, so we no longer substitute lists for
functions that way.
Lists are still important in other areas: the dummy-variable argument to a
quantifier is a list; the arguments to the textual substitution operator may be
lists; arguments to the user-level free-variable-occurrence predicate are lists;
assumptions (in the context of object-theoremhood judgments) are represented
by lists. We use Nuprl’s native functions for the cons operation, the empty
list, etc. to create terms of list types. Not all the list functions we need,
however, were pre-implemented in Nuprl. For instance, we implemented our
own function zip:(T1 List×T2 List) → (T1×T2) List ; it is similar to function
zip env described in the context of environments on page 63, only generalized
for any two list arguments.
We also implemented our own list-membership function, onlist, parameter-
ized by the list type: A onlist(T ) L holds when T is a Nuprl type, L:T List ,
and A is on list L . We used the straightforward recursive definition, which
effectively treats L as if it were a set, testing membership without regard for
where in the list an element falls. This way, we can reason about collections
of assumptions for theoremhood judgments (for example) as if they were sets.
(See Figure 6.1 and lemmas (6.8) and (6.9) for examples of the use of onlist.)
In addition, we defined other list predicates of lesser significance. Predicate
all elts diff holds exactly when all elements on a given OE list are different;
this is useful when reasoning about lists in the context of textual substitution,
where we typically require that, say, all variables on a list for simultaneous
replacement be distinct. Predicate not on list holds exactly when a given ele-
ment does not appear on a given OE list; this is used both as an independent
predicate and as a step in the definition of all elts diff. These are also defined
in the straightforward recursive way.
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5.5.2 Free variables on the object level
We implemented several different varieties of determiners of free occurrences
of object variables. Recall that this is about free occurrences according to the
binding structure of our object language, not that of Nuprl.
free variables in expressions Predicate Ofree(V :OV, E:OE) is “V occurs
free in E ,” defined in the expected way by recursive descent on E .
Recall that ∀O is the only form of OE with any binding variables.
Predicate vsoccurs(Vs:OV List, E:OE) is “some variable on Vs occurs
free in E,” recursively applying Ofree(V, E) to all V in Vs. It is used
only to avoid a direct, doubly recursive definition for predicate occurs.
User-level predicate occurs(Vs,Es) is “some variable on Vs:OV List oc-
curs free in some expression on Es:OE List ,” implemented by recursively
applying vsoccurs(V s, E) to each E in Es . It is the commonly negated
guard against one of a list of variables occurring free in any of a list of
expressions. We display it as “(some Vs occur free in Es).”
We implemented several other related definitions that are not intended
for users. For instance, predicate occurs is recursively defined on the
OE List argument; when proving properties of occurs, it is sometimes
convenient to compute on the OE List argument, and the definition fa-
cilitates this. However, it is sometimes more convenient to compute on
the OV List argument —perhaps the property to be proved is best ex-
pressed recursively on the variables of occurs— so we also implemented
another version of “(some Vs occur free in Es)” defined recursively on
Vs. The details of this definition are irrelevant to users.
alpha-equality on OEs We implemented predicate Oalpha eq(t1, t2, corr)
to determine if OEs t1 and t2 are equal modulo renaming of bound
variables. It is used to implement the change of bound variables clause
in the definition of object-level theoremhood, and it is essential for rea-
soning about theoremhood involving capture-avoiding substitution and
quantification (where we must respect equality modulo change of bound
variables). In the initial call, corr:(IDENT×IDENT) List is [ ] ; it is up-
dated during the computation of the function. Essentially, corr is main-
tained as a one-to-one correspondence between IDENT and IDENT ;
the empty list represents the trivial correspondence of every variable to
itself.
We implemented this alpha-equality as a recursive descent through both
t1 and t2 , as long as their term-structure is equal; if it is unequal, the
terms are not alpha-equal. When descending through quantifier sub-
terms, say (∀x1 : P1) in t1 and (∀x2 : P2) in t2 , corr is updated
by 〈x1, x2〉 . When reaching variables in t1 and t2 , say v1 and v2 , it
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examines the current corr . If neither v1 nor v2 has been updated on
corr —i.e., there are no pairs of either the form 〈v1, Y 〉 or 〈Z, v2〉 on
corr — then Oalpha eq requires that v1 = v2 . If some pair 〈v1, Y 〉 or
〈Z, v2〉 is on corr , then Oalpha eq requires that the most recent update
to corr of either form must be 〈v1, v2〉 .
5.5.3 Typing of object expressions
Predicate Owfdelt(E:OE, s:OTS, :OV → OTS) determines if a single object
expression E is “well-formed” on the object level, i.e., is assigned type expres-
sion s under type assignment  ; its implementation follows the description of
type-expression assignment in chapter 3. Built upon this, user-level predicate
Owfd(L:OE List, s:OTS, :OV → OTS) determines if all elements in L have
type expression s under  ; a singleton list is used for a typing proposition
about only one OE. In Nuprl, Owfd is displayed as () L :: s .
Note that actual typing is a relation: the empty list can have many types,
the domain of individuals D could equal B, and under anticipated extensions
to our typing system, such as adding N and Z, the phenomenon extends.
By definition, however, type expression assignments are functions on object
variables. Now, consider the object expression x(x) . It cannot be assigned a
type. Thus we arrive at an interesting observation about our system of type
expressions: some expressions permitted under data language syntax cannot
be assigned type expressions. Though type expression assignments are total
functions on variables, they are partial functions on object expressions.
5.5.4 Object theoremhood
We implemented Othm(exp, , A) to capture the determination of object the-
oremhood — exp:OE is an object theorem under assumptions A:OE List and
type expression assignment  — according to the definition previously given.
This is a complex recursive definition in many clauses; each individual clause
refers to the theoremhood of expressions, which in turn depends on that clause.
For this reason, we do not implement Othm directly. We first implement an
auxiliary predicate Othmaux , using two devices to manage the subtleties:
passing recursive calls as arguments to the implemented clauses and parame-
terizing theoremhood by a straightforward notion of proof depth.
Othmaux(exp, , A, n:N) is essentially a large disjunction with a guard on
it; it holds exactly when the object theoremhood of exp under A and  can be
“proved” according to this recursive definition, with recursive depth at most
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n . (For short, we say exp is a “depth n provable” object theorem under A
and  .) To illustrate, consider a part of the Othmaux definition:
Othmaux(exp, , A, n) == (0 ≤ n ∧
[ . . .
∨ (∃e, f :OE. modus ponens clause(exp, f,
Othmaux(e ⇒ f, , A, n− 1),
Othmaux(e, , A, n− 1)))
∨ . . .])
(The elided disjuncts in Othmaux , above, correspond to the other clauses in
the definition of object theoremhood given in chapter 3.) The clause in the
theoremhood definition that is present, modus ponens clause , is separately
defined to be:
modus ponens clause(exp:OE, f :OE, rec call1:P, rec call2:P) ==
exp = f ∧ rec call1 ∧ rec call2
Jointly, these fragments show that by modus ponens, exp is a “depth n
provable” object theorem under  and A if, for some e, f :OE , exp = f
and both e and e ⇒ f are “depth n− 1 provable” object theorems under 
and A . By extending this in the obvious way, implementing the other object
theoremhood clauses, we complete Othmaux .
With this, Othm(exp, , A) is simply ∃n:N.Othmaux(exp, , A, n) .
Before leaving this discussion of object theoremhood, we briefly note our
convention for representing assumptions in calculational logic proofs. Instead
of implementing an actual definition of the “ assuming( ∈α)a, b ” construct
given in the data language in chapter 3 —which basically was just a compo-
sition of list-membership and implication (see the data language semantics in
section 3.6.3)— we represent assumptions explicitly using the “onlist” pred-
icate and Nuprl implication. That is, to represent that some P :OE is an
assumption in a statement of object theoremhood () α ` Q , we would say
(P onlist α) ⇒ () α ` Q (where ⇒ is logical implication, not an OE-
constructor). This is a comfortable practice; a statement that an expression is
on an assumption list is treated like any other antecedent proposition, becom-
ing a hypothesis when the proof is carried out. Because of this, and because
such assumptions in proofs are used very infrequently in [GS93b], there was
no need to implement an explicit, self-contained “assuming” construct.
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5.6 Conclusions
5.6.1 Properties of the implemented data language
Our implemented data language generally follows from the content in chap-
ter 3, in which we outlined the standards for our approach to a language for
calculational logic. To help ensure that the Nuprl data language was correct
—both internally correct and correctly reflecting those initial standards— we
proved several properties of our defined expressions. For example, we proved:
• Every OE corresponds to the correct number of subterms and binding
variables. (E.g., an object-language ⇒ term has two subterms and no
binding variables, a ¬ term has one subterm and no binding variables,
etc.)
• The renaming function used in textual substitution preserves the opid
of an OE, so E[V := P ] and E have the same opid.
• Functions onlist and lookup env relate correctly: lookup env returns a
non-failure value only if the key element is actually on the environment
list.
• List predicates such as onlist and all elts diff compute correctly.
• The free variable occurrence predicate behaves as expected on singleton
lists of object variables: for v, x:OV , (some v occur free in x) iff v =
x ∈OV .
These are clearly necessary properties of a correct data language. We
proved them all as part of an effort to make sure that our basic definitions
were error-free and behaved the way we intended. For many higher-level prop-
erties, however, we took a faster approach to avoid direct computation with
complicated definitions such as the OE-typing or object-theoremhood predi-
cates. Instead of directly computing on the definition each time, we stated
desired properties (e.g., the definition of Owfd unrolls the way we expect it to
on an OE implication) as lemmas. Then we established the lemmas once, and
we did not need to refer to the definitions directly again; many of the lemmas
given in tables in chapter 6 were introduced for this purpose. Citing lemmas in
proofs instead of actually unrolling complicated definitions is of great benefit
to both the person doing the proof and anyone reading the proof afterward.
To further speed our development, we often used Nuprl’s Fiat tactic to
avoid formally proving these properties in Nuprl; this is essentially equiva-
lent to stating and using a lemma without proof. We were comfortable with
this practice when the risk of error in stating a property seemed small —
although we employed Fiat, we still type-checked each lemma according to
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Nuprl typing— and we often used the lemma promptly, where important er-
rors would emerge from practice. This “state-and-use” practice seemed natural
and was a source of significant savings to us as developers.
This practice also has other implications. For instance, we essentially did
not formally employ the definitions of object-theoremhood and textual sub-
stitution in modeling calculational logic inference; we simply stated and used
lemmas as we needed them. So, statements such as premises to Leibniz steps
and properties of textual substitution on complex object expressions were not
proved in Nuprl. (They were quickly analyzed by hand. Recall that our aim
is to prototype the method rather than completely ground its application.) If
errors exist in our Nuprl formalization of calculational logic, they may well
have been introduced through this practice, but we do not believe there are
any such errors.
5.6.2 Possible extensions
One of our important design goals was to establish a formalized framework for
the calculational approach to discrete mathematics in [GS93b]. We focused
our efforts on calculational predicate logic, but extensions to a wider range of
topics affected several facets of our implementation. That is, many of our data
language definitions may seem unnecessarily general for an account of predicate
logic —indeed, they are— but they achieve our goal of ready extendibility: we
can extend the mathematics we cover without re-defining many of our essential
constructs. Here, we discuss a few example constructs of our data language
that are intended to accommodate future extensions.
First, consider the Nuprl type OE, upon which so many of our other im-
plemented definitions depend. Because we restricted ourselves to calculational
predicate logic, our object-level syntax required only logical operators, and
right now, we have essentially only six kinds of expressions in OE: object
variables, object-level false, object-level implication, etc. If we were to ex-
tend our implementation to other areas of mathematics (e.g., arithmetic), we
would need to admit other kinds of object expressions (e.g., addition, multipli-
cation). By using a general syntactic structure in OE, we could accommodate
these added operators without changing its definition (recall the definition of
OE on page 60). In fact, OE is extremely general: it can accommodate object-
language terms with any number of subterms/arguments, due to the dependent
type construct that lets us define the number of subterms it has in terms of its
opid; similarly, it can accommodate general binding structure because depen-
dent types let us abstractly define whether any given subterm marks a variable
to be considered bound in the term. Thus, no matter what sort of operator we
wish to include in the future, our definition of OE can remain unchanged and
many facts about it (e.g., the inclusion of OV in OE, the mutual inclusion of OE
and the type IDENT+(i : OPIDS×(j : Noesbtms(i) → OE×PossBV (i; j)))) )
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need not be restated. We would need only to change auxiliary definitions
(OPIDS, PossBV , etc.) to accommodate the new syntactic elements.
Similarly, our general treatment of quantification could accommodate arith-
metic accumulator operations such as summation (
∑
) and product (
∏
) with-
out significant alteration. This represents one of the interesting, non-standard
observations exploited in [GS93b], that with certain restrictions, accumulators
and quantifiers can be treated uniformly. Our uniform treatment permits easy
extendibility to common arithmetic accumulators without redefining the fun-
damental form (?b X R : B) . We would, of course, need to extend the index
type Qind to accommodate the new forms, and we would need to augment
some existing cognate definitions, but the central definition and many facts
about it could remain unaltered for the extended object language.
Our treatment of object-level typing also reflects our anticipation of possi-
ble extensions. Object expressions currently have only one type under a given
type assignment (we stay faithful to the object language semantics given in
chapter 3), and for the most part, we could have reasoned about typing using
an OE-typing function. Instead, we implemented the more general object-
typing relation () L :: s , which permits an expression to be associated with
more than one object-level type. As we briefly mentioned before, this formal-
ization would remain robust even if we extended our language to arithmetic
and incurred the expected type polymorphisms that arise from having both
N and Z in a type system. This general typing relation supports a general
framework for the calculational approach to discrete mathematics in [GS93b]
in a way that a more restrictive typing function would not.
This is not a complete list of ways in which we as developers anticipated
extending our system, but it does illustrate the sorts of steps we took to
accommodate future extensions. Other such “over-generalized” definitions in
our implementation can be similarly justified as part of a more robust system,
anticipating applications (e.g., to lists, function symbols, or an extended type
system) that we do not describe.
5.6.3 Closing remarks on the data language
When we use the phrase “data language,” we refer to the portion of Nuprl
that we defined or otherwise shaped to be recognizable as support for the
calculational predicate logic of [GS93b]. That is, we consider the data lan-
guage to include both user-level operations (e.g., OE-based textual substitu-
tion) and constructs implemented purely to support those operations (e.g.,
capture-permitting textual substitution). The user level as presented in this
chapter should feel familiar to readers; with few exceptions, it corresponds
directly to the data language syntax presented in chapter 3. The major ex-
ceptions are the inclusion of two kinds of OE-based capture-avoiding textual
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substitution (OV-based and OV list-based) and using functions instead of lists
for type assignments (we used lists in chapter 3 only to simplify its seman-
tics). Other useful elements of the data language not mentioned in chapter 3
—such as the type assignment agreement proposition, list-related predicates
other than membership, and alpha equality— might be considered part of the
user level if users wanted to state and reason about properties not directly
covered in [GS93b], but they are not truly on the user level for our current
application.
Despite the fact that they are an essential part of our implementation,
we tend to consider high-level elements such as Nuprl’s definition mechanism
as being outside the data language. We can address an illustrative segment
of calculational logic to explain theoremhood and inference without involving
definitions, and we designed our data language without complicating matters
further. Thus, this conception of the data language is convenient for us, but
it is not necessary. Indeed, the data language could potentially become all of
Nuprl. If we wanted to model the way [GS93b] makes definitions, for instance,
we would include a definition mechanism in our data language. Moreover, we
would probably use Nuprl’s definition mechanism, adopting it whole or with
some modification but not building a new one ourselves.1 In general, if we
wished to extend our data language or otherwise innovate in some way, we
could simply use Nuprl’s established methods and conventions.
Consider one interesting possible extension: we could in principle develop
our data language to the point where it could express arguments that establish
assertions called “Metatheorems” in [GS93b]. (Recall that our data language
is already adequate to express many “metatheorems” that are not labeled as
such in [GS93b].) Such an extension is certainly possible. Nuprl can certainly
handle such inferences, and our data language is potentially unlimited within
the loose confines of Nuprl’s capacity to formalize mathematics. From a practi-
cal standpoint, the simplicity and flexibility of such extensions is a significant
benefit to developing our system in Nuprl and adopting its methods rather
than truly starting from scratch.
In general, Nuprl has permitted us to implement a concrete data language
that is very similar to the abstract data language blueprint of chapter 3. Of
course, there are some differences. Some of them are due simply to the fact
that we needed to make our definitions concrete; we can no longer simply
say that something exists, we must now say what it actually is. Some are
auxiliary constructs that are too unimportant to mention individually; this
chapter is not a full account of everything we implemented to support the
data language. Others are due to our commitment to Nuprl’s semantics; we
1If there were some psychological theory about how people make definitions that we
wanted to simulate or explore from the perspective of cognitive modeling, we might build a
whole new definition mechanism. Other than the mere fact that this is possible in Nuprl,
however, this is not a primary concern for us at this stage of development.
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gave meanings to data language expressions by defining them in terms of previ-
ously defined Nuprl constructs rather than by implementing a direct semantic
function (such as Dsem in chapter 3). For instance, the logical implication
(not the OE-constructor) A ⇒ B —notated as if A then B in giving its
semantics on page 32— would not have a meaning if B had no meaning; in
our implementation, if A were false, A ⇒ B would have a meaning whether
B had a meaning or not. Such discrepancies are of academic interest, but
they do not directly affect users of the system. Indeed, except for some largely
irrelevant display form issues, we have previously mentioned all the user-level
differences. Our concrete data language is a good representation of the abstract
one presented in chapter 3 and, as we mentioned then, that data language is
a good representation of the language used to express calculational predicate
logic in [GS93b].
Chapter 6
Implementing Calculational
Logic Inference
6.1 Introduction
In formalizing and implementing a data language for calculational logic, we
exposed many details that were not clear from the textbook [GS93b]. The
same is true for calculational logic inference: in this chapter we describe our
implementation of a formalized, tactic-based explanation of the fundamental
inferences of calculational logic,1 and once again, we expose many details that
were not apparent in [GS93b].
Gries and Schneider intended [GS93b] to be a college-level textbook, so it
is no surprise that they presented a simplified version of actual calculational
logic inference. They omit significant material, correctly presuming that their
readers will be able to fill in those gaps that arise in applications. Nuprl has no
such gap-filling capacity, so we must make the essential propositions explicit,
even ones that may seem too obvious to mention in a textbook. In addition,
they provide few or no explicit instructions for reasoning about free variable
occurrence, typing, and many other calculational logic inferences. They em-
phasize the process of Leibniz inference, making sure students are comfortable
with the machinery of that most-important inference form, but in general they
let people figure out on their own what inferences are necessary. Once again,
Nuprl has no innate capacity to figure out such things, so we fill in the details
in our tactic implementation of calculational inference.
Since Leibniz is the central inference form of calculational logic, a corre-
sponding Leibniz tactic, Leib tac, is the central tactic in our implementation;
all our other tactics and auxiliary ML procedures are in some (perhaps indi-
rect) way performing some component sub-task of Leibniz inference. Taken
1By “inferences,” we do not mean only the patterns described by inference rules; in-
stead, we refer to the general logical/mathematical inferences people make in carrying out
calculational logic proofs.
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together, our tactics and ML programs are our explanation of calculational
logic inference.
Above, we mentioned that the explanation in [GS93b] was somehow sim-
plified and incomplete. Our tactic implementation is also simplified and in-
complete, but in a different way. It is a thorough, formalized account of the
fundamental inferences with all the components explicitly included, but it is
based on heuristics, and it does not work in all the cases that may come up in
the book. In that way, it is like a possible description of the cognitive infer-
ences of a newcomer to the calculational approach, one who knows only a few
of the simplest methods and may well be stumped by some of the problems in
[GS93b]. Just as a novice could be taught, our tactics could be extended, and
we discuss some of those possible extensions in the course of this chapter. Even
our simplified version of calculational inference, however, can handle many of
the cases that arise in practice.
6.2 Representing Leibniz Inference in Nuprl
We once again motivate our technical development by considering the proof
of Theorem Change of Dummy from [GS93b, page 151], a chain of seven
equalities. (It is presented verbatim in Figure 3.1 of chapter 3.) Each equality
is established by an instance of one of the three related inference rules called
Leibniz; such Leibniz steps are the basis for all calculational logic proofs. The
remainder of the proof is simply applications of inference rule Transitivity,
inferences that are substantially more straightforward than typical Leibniz
steps.
Our main goal in this chapter is to describe Leibniz inference, formalizing
and implementing it to expose details not apparent from the presentation in
[GS93b]. Consider the first Leibniz step in the proof of Theorem Change of
Dummy, presented here exactly as in [GS93b]:
(?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y])
= 〈One-point rule (8.14)
—Quantification over x has to be introduced. The One-
point rule is the only theorem that can be applied at first.〉
(?y R[x := f.y] : (?x x = f.y : P ))
(6.1)
(We chose this as an example simply because it was the first step; we had
no mathematically significant reason to choose it.) It encodes the inference
that expression (?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) = (?y R[x := f.y] :
(?x x = f.y : P )) is an object-level theorem, the conclusion of one of the
three “substitution of equals for equals” inference rules named “Leibniz” in
[GS93b]. The name “One-point rule” in angle brackets refers to the premise
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theorem, an instance of which is the premise of that instance of Leibniz. In
[GS93b], this premise theorem is given as:
One-point rule: (?x x = E : P ) = P [x := E](6.2)
This is the book-style presentation of One-point rule. Our formalization of it
(see chapter 3, page 35) contains significant details that are not present in the
book. In general, our explanation of Leibniz inference will be in terms of our
detailed formalizations, not the versions in [GS93b].
In Nuprl, we formally implemented a Leibniz inference tactic Leib tac
such that a single call of Leib tac corresponds to a single Leibniz step in
[GS93b]. The user-supplied arguments of Leib tac are essentially the same
as the information explicitly given in a “hint” (in angle brackets) in a book-
style Leibniz step. As seen in chapter 2, in general, a hint consists of some
reference to the premise theorem —perhaps its name, perhaps a statement
of the theorem expression itself— and information about how to instantiate
the premise theorem for the present instance of Leibniz. Therefore, Leib tac
takes two arguments: a reference to the premise theorem and a list that pro-
vides information on how to instantiate it. Figure 6.1 shows our sequent-style
representation of the inference in example (6.1).
In Figure 6.1, the Leibniz application tactic is Leib tac, the indented ex-
pression beginning with Thm* refers to the premise theorem One-point rule,
and the list of terms that follows (within the Tms:[...] construct) is the
instantiation information. (The little ...w that follows represents the appli-
cation of Nuprl’s Auto tactic to handle Nuprl wf subgoals; it is part of the
standard Nuprl utilities for inference.) The instantiation list contains one ex-
pression for each variable of the One-point rule, given in the order in which
the variables are quantified. Guided by it, the instantiated One-point rule is
sufficient to prove:
∀x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α:OE List, R,P:OE, ∈:OV→OTS, b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |t_o:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈[[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈) α :: bool &
¬(some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬x = y &
¬(some [x; y] occur free in α) &
¬x = f &
(∈[[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈[[y]← ind]) α ` (*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P)
=
(P)[x := f(y)]
(6.3)
This is the premise needed for this particular Leibniz inference.
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1. x : OV
2. y : OV
3. f : OV
4. f
 
: OV
5. α : OE List
6. R : OE
7. P : OE
8. ∈ : OV→ OTS
9. b : Qind
10. (∀ [x; y] |t_o:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α
11. (∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool
12. (∈ ) α :: bool
13. ¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P])
14. ¬ x = y
15. ¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α )
16. ¬ x = f
17. (∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] : (P)[x := f(y)])
=
(*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P))
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ x:OV, E:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :OV→ OTS, b:Qind, P:OE.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [E]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [E] :: ind &
(∈ [x← ind]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | x = E : P) = (P)[x := E]
Tms:[x ; f(y) ; α ; ∈ [[y]← ind] ; b ; P] ...w
Figure 6.1: Sequent-style inference using Leib tac. The theorem argument to
Leib tac is given here in its long form, showing its full content. In practice,
we can use a more concise display, just showing the theorem name.
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This is a brief example of how Nuprl’s representation of Leibniz inference
relates to the presentation of Leibniz in [GS93b]. In general terms, it shows
that our Leibniz tactic uses previously proved object-theoremhood judgments
to establish unproved object-level theorems. As suggested by the hypotheses
of the sequent in Figure 6.1 and the antecedent of the formalized One-point
rule, however, Leibniz inference involves more than just object-theoremhood
propositions. In the course of a single Leibniz step, several important kinds
of propositions that occur in the data language expressions above —including
OV-inequalities, statements about variables not occurring free in object ex-
pressions, and OE-typing— frequently affect the inference, often becoming
intermediate proof goals that our tactic must automatically solve. In the
following sections, we discuss our methods for manipulating and making in-
ferences about these propositions before describing how we combined these
methods in the overall Leibniz tactic.
6.3 Inferring That Two OVs Are Not Equal
Although non-negated OV-equality propositions are rare in our account of the
calculational logic in [GS93b], OV-inequalities are extremely common. Recall
that, because we interpret [GS93b] as using a formalized metalanguage instead
of a typical object language, OV expressions stand for object variables but are
not object variables themselves.
The conventions in [GS93b] involving OV-inequalities are somewhat incon-
sistent. People working with the book realize that different letters can refer
to the same variable or expression when matching theorems; for instance, it is
clear that the expression for Theorem Symmetry of Equivalence p ≡ q ≡ q ≡ p
can be used to justify the theoremhood of A ≡ A ≡ A ≡ A for any A:OE .
Typically, however, when not in the context of pattern-matching or instanti-
ating expressions, people working with [GS93b] will also assume that different
letters refer to different variables when it becomes relevant. For instance, af-
ter instantiating Theorem Symmetry of Equality to get A ≡ B ≡ B ≡ A
(for A, B:OV ), someone working with calculational logic would convention-
ally presume that ¬(A = B ∈ OV) ,2 even though the fact that A and B are
not identical letters is not logically sufficient for that conclusion.
Therefore, to reason about OV-inequalities, we cannot simply rely on con-
vention. Further, since there is not typically an environment that gives explicit
values to the Nuprl variables P, Q:OV , we cannot typically compute from a
proposition ¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) whether that proposition is true. So, we must
reason from hypotheses. In our implementation, we insist that users explic-
itly include the hypotheses that certain OVs are unequal, even though such
2The user probably “knows” ¬(A = B ∈ OV) before instantiation, even if it is unproved,
and carries that knowledge after the instantiation as well.
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propositions are frequently omitted in [GS93b].3
6.3.1 Methods used to prove OV -inequality judgments
For this first, heuristic implementation of calculational logic inference, we im-
plemented only two methods for solving OV -inequalities. We do not mean to
suggest that other approaches would be uninteresting or ineffective, but the
design issues in extending the current account quickly become complicated.
(For example, we could try to reason from type expressions, but the simplest
approach —that OVs having different type expressions stand for different ob-
ject variables— would not work if we added N and Z to our type expressions.)
In addition, it is not clear how much such extensions would add to the infer-
ential power or descriptive value of the tactics we have already implemented.
We discuss these issues further in section 6.3.2.
Our tactic for solving OV -inequalities is called solve noteqOV. On a proof
goal ¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) , it does the following:
• If ¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) , ¬(Q = P ∈ OV ) , ¬(some P occur free in Q) , or
¬(some Q occur free in P ) is a hypothesis, it proves the goal from hy-
potheses. (Other tactics, which we describe later, analyze more complex
hypotheses into the above forms before solve noteqOV is invoked.)
• If not, it fails.
Note that for P, Q:OV , ¬(some P occur free in Q) implies ¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) .
Thus, the tactic also accounts for symmetry of OV-equality in its methods.
6.3.2 Discussion
OV-inequalities are pervasive in calculational logic; they are relevant to almost
every important inference. Therefore, despite the simplicity of solve noteqOV,
it is not surprising that many design issues in OV-inequality reasoning apply
to our implementation in general. For instance, our tactics must account for
the fact that the variables on which they act are actually metavariables. As
developers, we must also decide how much information we require a user to
provide to the system —e.g., we require users to explicitly give OV-inequality
hypotheses rather than trying to infer some of them with tactics— and how
we explain our heuristics in light of the overall goal of implementing Leibniz
inference. Many issues that complicate all areas of our tactic development are
present to some extent in this seemingly simple inference.
3Even for us as developers, one of our most common errors in formalizing of the theorems
of [GS93b] is the omission of such information. The automated exposure of such errors is
one of the virtues of our system.
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Our design for OV-inequality reasoning also reflects the heuristic nature of
our overall Leibniz implementation; it is not intended to be exhaustive, and
there are many possible extensions to nearly every aspect of it. For instance,
one possible extension to solve noteqOV would be to look for hypotheses of the
form ¬(X = Y ∈ OE) where X and Y are also declared to be of type OV in
the hypotheses. With the subtyping in our calculational logic data language,
we could conclude ¬(some X occur free in Y ) from these hypotheses. OE-
inequality hypotheses are not generally a part of calculational logic, however,
and such an extension might never become useful.
The simple tactic solve noteqOV is adequate for many examples, given
certain conventions governing what propositions must be supplied in the an-
tecedent of an object-theoremhood statement. (Propositions in the antecedent
become hypotheses in the proof.) Thus, in the division of labor between tactics
and users of the calculational inference system, our design places significant re-
sponsibility for expressing OV -inequalities on the user rather than employing
more powerful tactics for inferring OV -inequalities.
Indeed, readers may notice that the form of the first step of the Change
of Dummy proof given in this chapter in example (6.1) is not the same as
in chapter 3 (page 17). In this chapter, we explicitly provide some hypothe-
ses (i.e., propositions in the antecedent) stating that certain OV s are not
equal. In chapter 3, we did not specify that such information was necessary
—from that theoretical perspective, it seemed possible that more sophisticated
heuristics than the ones we implemented in solve noteqOV might infer those
OV -inequalities. For our initial account of calculational logic inference, how-
ever, it is reasonable to require the user to explicitly supply such information
in theorem statements, as we soon explain.
Some necessary OV-inequalities —e.g., hypothesis 14 in our example infer-
ence in Figure 6.1— could not be inferred from other given information, even
with sophisticated inference methods. We therefore require users to supply all
necessary OV-inequality hypotheses, even if some would be unnecessary with
a more sophisticated tactic solve noteqOV.4 Without this requirement, users
would need to know before entering their data —before receiving automated
support for the problem at hand— which OV-inequalities were necessary to
explicitly provide and which would be inferred by the system. Thus, the anal-
ysis required to support a stronger OV-inequality tactic could become difficult,
and designing more sophisticated tactics would have required a significantly
deeper cognitive study. Since users presumably know what OV-inequalities
are intended, the requirement that users specify all necessary OV-inequalities
adds little cost to the user and avoids added technical complexity for both
user and developer. In light of our primary goal —implementing a prototype
4The simplicity of our tactic is not the only factor that requires user-supplied OV-
inequality hypotheses. If that requirement could be completely automated away, we would
see our imposing it as a significant design flaw, making too many demands on users.
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cognitive model of calculational logic inference— it seems a sensible decision.
Other complications would also emerge if we had decided to strengthen
solve noteqOV. Since we have been mindful of possible extensions of our cal-
culational logic language throughout this project, we would also wish to accom-
modate those in strengthening solve noteqOV, and this could prove difficult
with respect to an extended typing system. There are several interesting and
reasonable ways in which one might extend the typing system in our calcu-
lational logic implementation, such as introducing new types and subtyping
relationships (N and Z, for instance) or introducing complex structures that
would make type inference undecidable. Incorporating heuristics to deal with
all the complications arising from such extensions is beyond the scope of this
project.
Even within the current language, difficulties can emerge in unusual cases.
For instance, it is tempting to use information about type signatures in our
heuristics. We know that signature bool refers to type B, but B is also a permis-
sible domain of the predicate logic; we cannot conclude that ¬(P = Q ∈ OV )
from () P :: bool and () Q :: ind , which is a significant restriction
on how we might incorporate type signature information into OV -inequality
reasoning. It gets worse. The signature bool refers to the expected two-
element type B. Does bool × bool = bool → bool ? Might either of
those equal a signature for the integer subtype [0..3] , if we extended our type
system to account for N? It was particularly tempting to include heuristics
for inferring OV -inequality from type signature-inequalities in our implemen-
tation, because we believe that people use such techniques when working with
[GS93b]. It was not necessary to do so to achieve our goals, however, and we
decided to avoid such complications.
6.4 Inferring That OVs Do Not Occur Free in
OEs
Propositions of the form ¬(some P occur free in Q) —we call them not-occur
propositions for short— are fundamental to calculational logic, exactly the
kind of syntactic property that it is designed to accommodate. Unlike the other
propositions we discuss before describing our Leibniz tactic —OV-inequalities,
OE-typing judgments, and object-theoremhood judgments— not-occur propo-
sitions are explicit in the statements of theoremhood in [GS93b].
There are strong connections between not-occur propositions and OV-
inequalities. As with OV-inequalities, elements of not-occur propositions are
typically metavariables, so we cannot directly compute the truth value of a
proposition from its form. As with OV-inequalities, we must reason from hy-
potheses. Not-occur propositions, however, cause somewhat less confusion: it
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Table 6.1: Lemmas for list-decomposition of not-occur propositions
∀X:OV, Y:OV List, alpha:OE List.
¬(some X.Y occur free in alpha)
⇐⇒
¬(some [X] occur free in alpha) &
¬(some Y occur free in alpha)
(6.4)
∀X:OV, Y:OV List, E:OE.
¬(some X.Y occur free in [E])
⇐⇒
¬(some [X] occur free in [E]) &
¬(some Y occur free in [E])
(6.5)
∀X:OV List, E:OE, Y:OE List.
¬(some X occur free in E.Y)
⇐⇒
¬(some X occur free in [E]) & ¬(some X occur free in Y)
(6.6)
is tempting to interpret P and Q as object variable literals in the notation
¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) but perhaps less tempting to make that interpretation in
the notation ¬(some P occur free in Q) . We usually talk about variables oc-
curring free in expressions, so it is easy to believe that Q is intended to range
over expressions.
The arguments to not-occur propositions generally have more complex
structure than OVs, so reasoning about not-occur propositions is more com-
plex than reasoning about OV-inequalities. Bluntly comparing proof goals to
hypotheses is not sufficient. By decomposing not-occur propositions on the
list-structure and OE-structure of their arguments before comparing hypothe-
ses and proof goals, our tactics are capable of performing all the inferences
needed for a first implementation of Leibniz inference.
6.4.1 Decomposition of not-occur propositions
The decomposition of propositions on the structure of their arguments is essen-
tial to our calculational logic tactics. We use this approach on both hypotheses
and conclusions, and it is as important to OE-typing judgments as to not-occur
propositions. As an introduction, we discuss it here in the context of not-occur
propositions; the main ideas also apply elsewhere.
The fundamentals of decomposing a not-occur proposition are the same for
hypotheses and proof goals. If a complex not-occur proposition is a hypothesis,
we analyze it into several separate hypotheses that state all the atomic propo-
sitions it entails by decomposition (using the lemmas in Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
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Table 6.2: Lemmas for OE-structure-decomposition of not-occur propositions
∀X:OV List, P,Q:OE.
¬(some X occur free in [P ≡ Q]) ⇐⇒
¬(some X occur free in [P]) & ¬(some X occur free in [Q])
(Similarly for OE-constructors =, ∧ , ∨ , ⇒ ,¬ and function application
P(Q)).
(6.7)
Recall the unified treatment of quantification. Hence, lemmas (6.8) and (6.9)
apply to both existential and universal quantifiers. Lemma (6.8) is for decom-
posing propositions in proof goals, while lemma (6.9) is used for decomposing
hypotheses.
∀V:OV, b:Qind, Y:OV List, R,B:OE.
(¬V onlist(OV) Y ⇒
¬(some [V] occur free in [R]) &
¬(some [V] occur free in [B]))
⇐⇒
¬(some [V] occur free in [(*_b Y | R : B)])
(6.8)
∀V:OV, b:Qind, Y:OV List, R,B:OE.
V onlist(OV) Y ∨ ¬V onlist(OV) Y &
¬(some [V] occur free in [R]) &
¬(some [V] occur free in [B])
⇐⇒
¬(some [V] occur free in [(*_b Y | R : B)])
(6.9)
∀X:OV List, b:Qind, P,Q:OE.
¬(some X occur free in [P *_b Q])
⇐⇒
¬(some X occur free in [P]) & ¬(some X occur free in [Q])
(6.10)
∀X:OV List, b:Qind. ¬(some X occur free in [u_b])
(Similarly for OE constants t o, f o.)
(6.11)
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1. A : OV
2. B : OV
3. P : OE
4. Q : OE
5. R : OE
` ¬(some [A; B] occur free in [P; Q ⇒ R])
by Not_OccCD ...w
\
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [P]) by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬(some [B] occur free in [P]) by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [Q]) by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [R]) by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬(some [B] occur free in [Q]) by <TACTIC>
---
` ¬(some [B] occur free in [R]) by <TACTIC>
(6.12)
Figure 6.2: Example decomposition of not-occur propositions
Similarly, if a complex not-occur proposition is a conclusion, we can solve it by
decomposing it into atomic propositions and solving each of those individually.
(We discuss our tactics for solving not-occur proof goals in section 6.4.2.)
We wrote two tactics to decompose complex not-occur propositions into
atomic component not-occur propositions: Not OccHD analyzes hypotheses;
Not OccCD analyzes conclusions. For an example, see (6.12) in Figure 6.2
(page 88), which demonstrates Not OccCD decomposing a not-occur proposi-
tion in a conclusion; as we briefly elaborate later, Not OccHD would have acted
analogously on a hypothesis by adding new hypotheses. By decomposing on
both list structure (of both arguments) and OE-structure of complex expres-
sions, it analyzed the conclusion into not-occur subgoals whose arguments had
no structure supporting further decomposition. The lemmas used for such
decompositions are given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Some complexities arise when decomposing quantifiers. Lemma (6.8) in
Table 6.2 is used to analyze both existential and universal quantifier forms in
proof goals, resulting in a new onlist hypothesis. For an example, see (6.13) in
Figure 6.3. Relatedly, analyzing hypotheses using lemma (6.9) results in a case
split with a new onlist hypothesis on each branch. (The case split is on the
disjunction in the antecedent of the lemma. The proposition V onlist(OV) Y
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1. A : OV
2. P : OE
3. X : OV
4. Y : OV
5. Q : OE
6. R : OE
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [(∀ [X; Y] | P : Q ∧ R)])
by Not_OccCD ...w
\
7. ¬A onlist(OV) [X; Y]
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [P]) by <TACTIC>
---
7. ¬A onlist(OV) [X; Y]
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [Q]) by <TACTIC>
---
7. ¬A onlist(OV) [X; Y]
` ¬(some [A] occur free in [R]) by <TACTIC>
(6.13)
1. A : OV
2. P : OE
3. X : OV
4. Y : OV
5. Q : OE
6. R : OE
7. ¬(some [A] occur free in [(∀ [X; Y] | P : Q ∧ R)])
` False by NotOccHD 1 ...w
\
8. A onlist(OV) [X; Y]
` by <TACTIC>
---
8. ¬A onlist(OV) [X; Y]
9. ¬(some [A] occur free in [P])
10. ¬(some [A] occur free in [Q ∧ R])
11. ¬(some [A] occur free in [Q])
12. ¬(some [A] occur free in [R])
` by <TACTIC>
(6.14)
Figure 6.3: Decomposition of not-occur propositions on quantifiers. Exam-
ple (6.13) illustrates Not OccCD on proof goals; example (6.14) illustrates
Not OccHD on hypotheses. In both cases, new onlist hypotheses are added.
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is one disjunct; the other disjunction, which is a conjunction, also includes an
onlist proposition.) For an example, see (6.14) in Figure 6.3.
The new onlist hypothesis on the branch in which the not-occur proposi-
tion is not decomposed typically results in obvious contradictions with other
hypotheses that arise in the proof. For example:
1. x : OV
2. y : OV
3. a : OE
4. b : OE
5. ¬(some [x] occur free in [(∀ [y] |:a ∧ b)])
` ¬(some [x] occur free in [(∀ [y] |:b ∧ a)])
by NotOccHD 1 ...w
\
6. x onlist(OV) [y]
` by Not_OccCD ...w
\
7. ¬x onlist(OV) [y]
` ¬(some [x] occur free in [b]) by Trivial
---
7. ¬x onlist(OV) [y]
` ¬(some [x] occur free in [a]) by Trivial
---
6. ¬x onlist(OV) [y]
7. ¬(some [x] occur free in [a ∧ b])
8. ¬(some [x] occur free in [a])
9. ¬(some [x] occur free in [b])
` by <TACTIC>
(6.15)
The calls to tactic Trivial prove the contradiction between hypotheses 6
and 7.
Because of pragmatic differences between analyzing hypotheses and proof-
goals, we have both Not OccCD and Not OccHD as top-level decomposition tac-
tics. The recursive Not OccHD tactic works as follows:
• Each call of Not OccHD is on some hypothesis i ; the initial call is on
i = 1 . If i is greater than the number of hypotheses in the proof,
terminate the recursion by calling Nuprl’s identity tactic Id.
• If hypothesis i is a not-occur proposition with structure that can be de-
composed, add the results of the decomposition step to the end of the hy-
pothesis list. For instance, on hypothesis ¬(some [x] occur free in [(P ∧
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R) ⇒ Q] , the propositions ¬(some [x] occur free in [P ∧ R]) and
¬(some [x] occur free in [Q]) would be added at the end of the hypoth-
esis list.
• Recursively call Not OccHD on hypothesis i + 1 . This way, propositions
added to the end of the hypothesis list will eventually be analyzed by a
later recursive call.
Note that Not OccHD adds the results of decomposition steps to the end of
the hypothesis list without overwriting or thinning intermediate hypotheses.
This increases the possibility that we could solve a proof goal directly from
hypotheses before decomposing it with Not OccCD. (As described in section 6.5,
we use a similar add-to-end process for hypothesis decomposition of OE-typing
propositions, as well.)
The recursive Not OccCD tactic works similarly:
• If the current proof goal is a not-occur proposition with structure that
can be decomposed, perform a decomposition step. All list-structure
decomposition must be completed before OE-structure decomposition
begins.
• Each decomposition step results in some number of new not-occur proof
subgoals. Recursively call Not OccCD on each such subgoal until no fur-
ther decomposition is possible.
Except for a few complexities that arise in list decomposition (which we dis-
cuss later in section 6.4.3), both Not OccHD and Not OccCD are simple, straight-
forward implementations of the decomposition procedure described above.
6.4.2 Methods for solving
As previously mentioned, we cannot generally solve not-occur proof goals by
direct computation, we must reason from hypotheses. For this reason, decom-
posing expressions is the biggest part of solving not-occur proof goals: essen-
tially, we simply decompose the proof goal and hypotheses into their atomic
propositions and perform some simple inferences to finish the proof. We en-
coded some of those auxiliary inferences in tactic solve not occ via noteqOV:
on a not-occur proof goal ¬(some V occur free in X) , it checks if there is a
hypothesis ¬(V = X ∈ OV ) or ¬(X = V ∈ OV ) ; if so, it proves the goal
from hypotheses; if not, it fails. In some ways, it is the inverse of some of
the reasoning encapsulated in tactic solve noteqOV for solving OV-inequality
subgoals.
Tactic solve not occ concl for solving not-occur proof goals works as
follows:
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• Call Not OccHD on hypothesis 1.
• Try to prove the goal from hypotheses; if that fails, call Not OccCD.
• On each goal produced by Not OccCD: Try to prove the goal from hy-
potheses; if that fails, call solve not occ via noteqOV.
To prevent our tactics from diverging, we wrote the tactic code to invoke
solve not occ via noteqOV only on an OV-inequality hypothesis that will
solve the proof goal. That way, there is no loop of trying to prove not-occur
goals using OV-inequalities, which we might in turn try to prove using not-
occur goals, etc.
Essentially, solve not occ concl simply matches the proof goal against
not-occur and OV-inequality proposition hypotheses. The thorough not-occur
decomposition tactics enable such a straightforward approach.
6.4.3 Discussion
Lists
The major complication in tactics Not OccCD and Not OccHD comes in the list-
structure decomposition steps. Because we wanted to reason directly about
both the OV List and OE List arguments of a not-occur predicate, we imple-
mented two different, equivalent recursive definitions of ¬(some L1 occur free
in L2) ; one permitted direct manipulation of L1 , the other was directly in
terms of L2 . We then proved lemmas asserting the equivalence of the two
forms. All this is hidden from users of the system, but as developers we
needed to take care with list decomposition.
We also needed to account for meta-levels and multiple representations
of lists. Users think of L1 and L2 in ¬(some L1 occur free in L2) as lists,
and they do represent lists on the object-language level. To Nuprl, they are
ordinary terms (of types OV List and OE List, respectively), not lists of terms.
In fact, they may not have any explicit list structure to them at all. They may
simply be variables declared to have a list type, not terms with opid cons
(the expected list-forming operator for Nuprl terms). Therefore, we cannot
simply stop list-decomposition when both list arguments have the structure
of singleton lists (i.e., a single element cons’d with the nil list). If a list
argument is a Nuprl variable, it cannot be further decomposed even though
it is not a singleton list (and may not stand for one). In tactics Not OccCD
and Not OccHD, we decompose only on the structure visible to Nuprl, not on
object-level structure not explicit in our data-language expressions.
Similar issues involving lists also appear in other contexts, such as the
list arguments to the object-expression typing predicate and the construct
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that represents updates to type expression assignment functions. We handled
these cases analogously to this not-occur case, and we will not mention it in
other contexts.
Possible extensions
The most natural extension we could make to tactic solve not occ concl
would be to extend the decomposition tactics to accommodate the textual
substitution operators of calculational logic. It was not necessary to imple-
ment such decomposition steps for our test cases, so we avoided the more
complicated tactics that this would require. We do not, however, foresee con-
ceptual difficulties in making such an extension in the future.
Despite the simplicity of solve not occ concl, it is not clear that there
are other extensions to it worth making. The fact that the arguments of
not-occur propositions typically contain only metavariables means that direct
computation of the truth values of not-occur propositions is not a strategy
worth pursuing. This, in turn, significantly limits our options for extensions.
Because ¬(some P occur free in Q) reduces to ¬(P = Q ∈ OV ) in cases
where P, Q ∈OV , the adequacy of our not-occur inference methods follows to
some extent from the adequacy of our OV-inequality inference methods. Most
not-occur inference improvements would likely come solely from improvements
to tactic solve noteqOV, which we discussed in section 6.3.
6.5 Type Inference on OEs
Two kinds of typing affect our Nuprl implementation of calculational logic:
Nuprl typing and object expression typing. Nuprl typing is the standard asso-
ciation of Nuprl types with Nuprl variables, such as a Nuprl variable P having
type OE, the type of object expressions described in chapter 5. In addition,
the object expression typing described in chapter 3 also applies; expressions
with Nuprl types OE or OV have an object-level type (more precisely, a type
expression) under a type assignment  in a model.
For the most part, reasoning about Nuprl typing is handled automatically
by Nuprl in well-formedness subgoals (recall the ...w in the Nuprl inference
shown in example (6.1) in section 6.2). It affects our calculational system
primarily by permitting us to check the type-correctness of the lemmas and
definitions we implement. Our tactics do not attempt to solve well-formedness
subgoals. We presume that our calculational logic inference tactics will be
invoked inside the Nuprl ...w wrapper, which solves typical well-formedness
subgoals. Unproven well-formedness subgoals are frequently evidence of user
error, such as declaring a variable to be of type OE instead of type OE List; it
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Table 6.3: Lemmas for decomposition of OE-typing hypotheses
∀expn:OE, ∈:OV→OTS, L:OE List.
(∈) L ` expn ⇒ (∈) L :: bool
(6.16)
∀L:OE List, A:OE, sig:OTS, ∈:OV→OTS.
(∈) [A] :: sig & (∈) L :: sig ⇐⇒ (∈) A.L :: sig
(6.17)
∀Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ∈:OV→OTS, E:OE.
(∈) Es :: sig & E onlist(OE) Es ⇒ (∈) [E] :: sig
(6.18)
would be a disservice to users if our tactics obscured such errors. We do not
discuss Nuprl-typing further in this chapter.
Object expression typing is not native to Nuprl, so we implemented tactics
expressly to perform OE typing inference under type assignments. OE typing
is pervasive and essential to calculational logic inference: e.g., an OE must
be a boolean to be a theorem; both arguments to an equality must have
the same type for the equality to have a value; and for the result of a textual
substitution E[V := P ] to have a type, there are constraints on how the types
of V and P may be related. For our first heuristic account of calculational
logic, we implemented a few heuristics that effectively perform typical OE-
typing inferences.
6.5.1 Decomposing OE-typing hypotheses
We implemented tactic OwfdHD to derive OE-typing information from hypothe-
ses. Like Not OccHD for not-occur propositions, it performs essential prepro-
cessing to support OE-typing inferences. It is quite simple; see Table 6.3 for
the lemmas that correspond to OwfdHD decomposition steps. OwfdHD works as
follows:
• First, it uses lemma (6.16) to draw OE-typing information from OE-
theoremhood hypotheses. After this step, all OE-typing information is
represented by propositions of the form () L :: τ , where L:OE List ,
although some of those propositions may be further decomposable.
• Using lemma (6.17), OwfdHD decomposes OE-typing hypotheses on the
structure of the OE List argument.
• Using lemma (6.18), OwfdHD derives all possible OE-typing information
from matching OE-typing hypotheses and hypotheses of the form E
onlist(OE) Es .
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We decided not to decompose hypotheses on the structure of their OE
arguments. This puts only a slightly increased demand on system users —
instead of giving the types of compound expressions, they must give the types
of individual variables, as in example (6.1) in section 6.2— and the practice
seems natural and unobtrusive.
6.5.2 Guessing OE types
Sometimes, solving an OE-typing proof goal () E1 :: sig requires instanti-
ating a lemma with the type of another E2:OE . Rather than exhaustively
testing every possible type for E2 , our tactics use a cheap heuristic method
to guess a type for E2 . ML procedure OE sig guess performs the OE type
guessing: (OE sig guess E  H ) guesses the type of expression E under
local type expression assignment function  and Nuprl proof hypothesis list
H . Although the guess might be incorrect, possibly resulting in false OE-
typing subgoals for E1 or E2 , our tactics would not be able to prove those
false subgoals; the correctness of our OE-typing tactics is independent of the
type-guessing procedure.
OE-valued expressions built from ∧ , ∨ , ⇒ , ≡ , etc. must have type
signature bool if they have any type signature at all, independent of hypotheses
or the type expression assignments. This significantly simplifies OE sig guess.
The only other kinds of expressions are variables, OE function applications,
and textual substitution.
For a variable E , (OE sig guess E  H ) guesses a type from OE-typing
propositions on H and the updates that may be explicitly present on type as-
signment  . Except for minor details involving those type assignment updates,
the process is very straightforward.
For function application, OE sig guess uses a significant simplification: it
only returns the range type of the function, ignoring the number of arguments
and their types. For instance, to guess the type of F (A)(B) , OE sig guess
recursively guesses the type of F ; if it guesses (k)τ for F , it returns (0)τ
for F (A)(B) without further considering A or B .
The only remaining cases to consider are the two substitution operators,
which are handled in the expected recursive manner. For single-variable sub-
stitution, (OE sig guess E[(V :OV) := (P :OE)]  H ) is (OE sig guess E
′ H ), where ′ is a copy of  with V updated to (OE sig guess P 
H ). For list-replacement substitution, OE sig guess works similarly: it re-
turns a type expression list when given an OE List for its argument, using
an update construct VP defined for lists V and P . Then, (OE sig guess
E[(V :OV List) := (P :OE List)]  H ) is (OE sig guess E ′ H ), where
′ is a copy of  with list V updated to the list (OE sig guess P  H ).
As mentioned above, OE sig guess handles the complexities that come from
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Table 6.4: Lemmas for decomposition of OE-typing proof goals
∀P:OE, ∈:OV→OTS, Q:OE.
(∈) [P] :: bool & (∈) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈) [P ≡ Q] :: bool
(Similarly for OE-constructors ∧ , ∨ ,¬, ⇒ .)
(6.19)
∀P:OE, r:{ind, bool}, ∈:OV→OTS, Q:OE.
(∈) [P] :: r & (∈) [Q] :: r ⇒ (∈) [P = Q] :: bool
(6.20)
∀P,Q:OE, ∈:OV→OTS.
(∃r:{ind, bool}. (∈) [P] :: r & (∈) [Q] :: r) ⇒
(∈) [P = Q] :: bool
(6.21)
∀b:Qind, X:OV List, R,P:OE, ∈:OV→OTS.
(∈[X← ind]) [R] :: bool & (∈[X← ind]) [P] :: bool ⇒
(∈) [(*_b X | R : P)] :: bool
(6.22)
∀P,Q:OE, b:Qind, ∈:OV→OTS.
(∈) [P] :: bool & (∈) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈) [P *_b Q] :: bool
(6.23)
∀b:Qind, ∈:OV→OTS. (∈) [u_b] :: bool
(Similarly for OE constants t o, f o.)
(6.24)
dealing with lists in the updates. In addition, because the type assignment
update on two lists is not part of the user-level data language, we are careful
to rewrite to an equivalent chain of single-variable updates before returning
the type assignment to a user.
6.5.3 Decomposing OE-typing proof goals
As with other propositions, part of solving a complex OE-typing proof goal is
decomposing it into subgoals and solving each of them independently. We im-
plemented tactic OwfdCD to do this decomposition. Unlike OE-typing hypothe-
ses, OE-typing proof goals can be decomposed on OE-structure, so OwfdCD is
significantly more complex than OwfdHD. See Tables 6.4 and 6.5 for a list of
the key lemmas used in OwfdCD.
OwfdCD performs decomposition on list structure followed by decomposi-
tion on OE-structure. The list-decomposition and most of the OE-structure
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Table 6.5: Lemmas for substitution-decomposition in OE-typing proof goals
Lemmas (6.25) and (6.26) are for single-variable OE-substitution.
∀P:OE, T:OTS, V:OV, tau:OTS, env:OV→OTS, E:OE.
(env[V← tau]) [P] :: T & (env) [E] :: tau ⇒
(env) [(P)[V := E]] :: T
(6.25)
∀b:Qind, sig:OTS, V:OV, E:OE, ep:OV→OTS.
(ep) [u_b] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [(u_b)[V := E]] :: sig
(Similarly for OE constants t o, f o.)
(6.26)
Lemmas (6.27) and (6.28) are for list-based OE-substitution.
∀Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, Sigs:OTS List, P:OE, T:OTS
, env:OV→OTS.
Distinct_elts(Vs,OV) & ||Vs|| = ||Es|| & ||Sigs|| = ||Es|| &
(env[Vs← Sigs]) [P] :: T &
(∀ESigpair:OE×OTS.
ESigpair onlist(OE×OTS) zip(Es,Sigs) ⇒
(ESigpair/E,Sig.(env) [E] :: Sig))
⇒
(env) [P[Vs := Es]] :: T
(6.27)
∀b:Qind, Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ep:OV→OTS.
(ep) [u_b] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [u_b[Vs := Es]] :: sig
(Similarly for OE constants t o, f o.)
(6.28)
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decompositions are straightforward rewrites. Here are details of the less-
straightforward cases:
• In the case of a single-variable textual substitution P [V := E] , OwfdCD
generally calls OE sig guess to guess the type of E , instantiating tau in
lemma (6.25) with that guess to do the decomposition. The propositions
in the antecedent of lemma (6.25) then become new proof goals. OwfdCD
then recursively decomposes the two new proof goals.
• For the list-based substitution operation P [V := E] , OwfdCD first checks
if V and E are singleton lists, attempting to reduce it to the simpler
single-variable substitution case. Assuming it is not reducible, OwfdCD
generally calls OE sig guess to guess the list R of types of expressions
on E , that is, the list R such that element i is the guessed signature
of element i of E . Then, OwfdCD instantiates lemma (6.27) to do the
decomposition; the five conjuncts in the antecedent of the lemma become
new proof goals. In the case of the complex conjunct
∀ ESigpair:OE× OTS.
ESigpair onlist(OE× OTS) zip(Es,Sigs)
⇒ (ESigpair/E,Sig. (env) [E] :: Sig)
the system reduces it to the equivalent proof goal
E:OE, Sig:OTS, 〈E, Sig〉 onlist(OE× OTS) zip(Es,Sigs)
` (env) [P[Vs := Es]] :: T
Tactic OwfdCD then recursively decomposes this new subgoal.
The non-OE-typing antecedents of lemma (6.27) that become proof goals
in this textual substitution decomposition contain linguistic elements
that do not typically occur elsewhere in our calculational logic imple-
mentation, such as list length equality and the property that all elements
on a list are distinct. We implemented auxiliary tactics to solve these
proof goals in straightforward ways; OwfdCD simply calls these auxiliary
tactics. Users do not encounter these constructs.
• Due to the polymorphism of object-language equality, we cannot de-
compose a proposition () A = B :: bool without knowing the types
of A and B . So, OwfdCD calls OE sig guess to guess their types and
then backchains through lemma (6.20) from Table 6.4, instantiating the
lemma’s type argument with the guessed type. If that strategy does
not lead to a complete proof —which would happen if the guesses of
OE sig guess were wrong, for instance— OwfdCD backchains through
lemma (6.21) without guessing any OE-types. This results in an ex-
istential quantification over the possible types of A and B ; the user
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would need to instantiate that quantifier by hand to complete with the
proof.
The use of two conceptually different approaches to decomposing object-
language equalities, embodied by lemmas (6.20) and (6.21), illustrates
both the heuristic nature of our implementation and the division of labor
between the system and its users. We automated enough detail for a
simple explanation of Leibniz inference, but more sophisticated guessing
is beyond the level of expertise we intended to embody in our tactics.
6.5.4 Solving OE-typing proof goals
We implemented two general approaches to solving OE-typing proof goals.
One is a simple simulation of direct computation, which works as follows:
• We use a boolean predicate to determine if the proof goal is a good
candidate for solution by direct computation. It takes a type assignment
function, a Nuprl variable, and a type from a proof goal; it checks type
assignment updates (nothing else) to see if that Nuprl variable is assigned
that type by that type assignment. If so, that proof goal can be solved
by direct computation simulation.
• The solve-by-direct-computation tactic is called only on proof goals that
satisfy the above predicate. It either solves the proof goal directly us-
ing lemma (6.29) ((ep[x← sig]) [x] :: sig) or it unrolls one vari-
able from the type assignment updates using lemma (6.30) (¬ x = y ⇒
(ep) [y] :: sig2 ⇒ (ep[x← sig]) [y] :: sig2) and calls it-
self recursively on the new OE-typing subgoal. In the update-unrolling
case, an OV-inequality subgoal also emerges; tactic solve noteqOV is
called to solve it. This solve-by-direct-computation tactic fails unless it
completes the proof (except for Nuprl well-formedness goals).
The key lemmas used in this method are given in Table 6.6. All the type
assignment updates are single-variable updates. In our tactics, we will have
rewritten all updates to the single-variable kind before applying this method.
This is normal practice for us: typically, we develop tactics to work on single-
variable updates, and we are responsible for ensuring that the data is in the
correct form.
Our second approach to solving these proof goals is based on the obser-
vation about type assignments represented by lemma (6.31) in Table 6.7: if
we know (′) E :: τ and we know that  and ′ assign the same types to
all variables that occur free in E , then we can conclude () E :: τ . Solving
by type assignment agreement is significantly deeper than solving by direct
computation; Table 6.7 contains the key lemmas used in this approach.
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Table 6.6: Lemmas for solving OE-typing proof goals by direct computation
∀x:OV, sig:OTS, ep:OV→OTS. (ep[x← sig]) [x] :: sig(6.29)
∀x,y:OV, sig2:OTS, ep:OV→OTS, sig:OTS.
¬x = y ⇒ (ep) [y] :: sig2 ⇒ (ep[x← sig]) [y] :: sig2
(6.30)
Table 6.7: Lemmas for solving OE-typing proof goals by type assignment
agreement
∀E:OE List, ∈1,∈2:OV→OTS, sig:OTS.
(∀x:OV. (some [x] occur free in E) ⇒ (∈1,∈2 agree on x))
⇒
(∈1) E :: sig ⇒ (∈2) E :: sig
(6.31)
∀x:OV, L:OE List, ∈:OV→OTS, sig:OTS.
¬(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(∀y:OV.
(some [y] occur free in L) ⇒ (∈,∈[x← sig] agree on y))
(6.32)
∀x:OV, L:OE List, ∈:OV→OTS, sig:OTS.
¬(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(∀y:OV.
(some [y] occur free in L) ⇒ (∈[x← sig],∈ agree on y))
(6.33)
∀ep:OV→OTS, x:OV. (ep,ep agree on x)(6.34)
∀L:OE List, ep1,ep2:OV→OTS, v:OV, sig:OTS.
(∀x:OV. (some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (ep1,ep2 agree on x))
⇒
(∀x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(ep1[v← sig],ep2[v← sig] agree on x))
(6.35)
∀x,y:OV, L:OE List, t,sig2,sig1:OTS, ep:OV→OTS.
¬x = y ⇒
(ep[x← sig1][y← sig2]) L :: t ⇒
(ep[y← sig2][x← sig1]) L :: t
(6.36)
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To solve a proof goal () E :: τ , our type assignment agreement tactics
need to identify a hypothesis of the form (′) E :: τ to match the pattern of
lemma (6.31). Then, upon instantiation, (′) E :: τ and (′) E :: τ ⇒ () E ::
τ are both true by hypothesis, and the desired proof goal follows directly.
This instantiation also results in a new proof goal: ∀x:OV.(some [x] occur
free in e) ⇒ (, ′ agree on x) . Thus, solving proof goals of this form becomes
an essential task, and tactics based on lemmas (6.32)-(6.34) are devoted to this
purpose. Instantiating these lemmas either solves the proof goal or reduces it
to a not-occur proposition, which is solved by tactic solve not occ concl.
We also implemented two tactics to expand the cases that can be handled
with this method. On a type assignment agreement proof goal, rewriting
by lemma (6.35) can reduce it to a previously described case. On an OE -
typing proof goal, rewriting by lemma (6.36) can make a goal solvable using
type assignment agreement methods; solve noteqOV solves the OV -inequality
proof goal that comes from such a rewrite. These are simple ways of making
the basic OE -typing proof methods more intelligent. There are certainly more,
but these often suffice in practice; for instance, there are rarely more than two
updated variables in a type assignment in the cases from [GS93b].
Our tactic for solving OE-typing proof goals, solve Owfd, uses the methods
described above. After decomposition steps OwfdCD and OwfdHD (if necessary),
it does the following:
• It checks if the proof goal is one of the hypotheses. Recall that OwfdHD
does not overwrite or thin intermediate steps in the decomposition, which
increases the likelihood of this simple solution.
• If it has not yet succeeded, it tries to solve the proof goal by direct
computation.
• If it has not yet succeeded, it tries the more complicated approach of
solving by type assignment agreement.
It is somewhat surprising that these simple methods account for so many
cases. From a cognitive modeling perspective, they correspond to a novice
user of calculational logic who knows only basic techniques. Note that this
hypothetical mathematician (or math student, perhaps) gets quick results in
his learning process, not needing complex techniques to work through the
proofs in [GS93b]. Other, more expert mathematicians/students would be
modeled with more deeply developed tactics.
6.5.5 OE-typing discussion
One deficiency of our current implementation is that we lack lemmas to work
effectively with variables over type OTS. For instance, we could not infer that
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V = bool from a hypothesis (  ) True:: V . Reasoning with such variables
could be an important part of calculational logic inference —for instance, rea-
soning about the typing of OE-equalities might result in a hypothesis that an
expression is of some incompletely specified OE-type, which would be repre-
sented by a variable. We avoided such issues in this first-level implementation.
Considerable complexities might arise in automating methods for this kind
of inference, so our system currently requires assistance from users in such
contexts where OE-type variables need to be further specified.
Our lack of knowledge about complications that might arise from eventual
extensions to our system also manifests itself in other ways. For instance, our
OE-typing relation (based on the clauses for OE type assignment in chapter 3)
is not a true definition: the clauses are implications, not equivalences. We do
not, however, use the definition of the OE-typing relation in our tactics. That
is, we do not unfold the definition to get at its computational innards; instead,
we use lemmas that state properties about that definition. This is sensible for
our system, which anticipates as-yet-unspecified extensions. Closing a defini-
tion at this level, only to rework it to accommodate the extensions we troubled
to allow, would take considerable effort while yielding little information about
the inference process itself.
6.6 Inferring Othm Judgments
Calculational logic relies primarily on inference rule Leibniz to establish the
theoremhood of object expressions. Still, some simple object theoremhood
inferences are needed as components of Leibniz. For instance, one of the
antecedents of each Leibniz rule is an object-theoremhood predicate, so by
instantiating the Leibniz lemma as part of a calculational logic proof step, we
generate an object-theoremhood proof goal. Typically, this is an easy goal to
solve, following directly from the instantiated premise theorem, but we must
still manage Othm judgments as part of our Leibniz tactic.
We need only two methods for solving the auxiliary Othm subgoals gen-
erated by Leib tac. One method establishes the theoremhood of expressions
of the form A = B when A and B are of OE type bool and equal modulo
associativity of ≡ . This was essential to accommodate associativity of ≡ in
our implementation. It was the minimal concession to automatic inference
about associativity of binary OE-operators (as in the method in [GS93b]) that
we could reasonably make.
The other method establishes object-theoremhood proof goals from hy-
potheses, modulo symmetry of OE-constructor =. This is a commonly needed
auxiliary to Leibniz steps; in standard practice, users of calculational logic
expect a premise theorem instantiated to A = B to match both proof goals
A = B and B = A . Since instantiations of premise theorems become Nuprl
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Table 6.8: The Gries/Schneider representations of Leibniz rules
P = Q
E[z := P ] = E[z := Q]
(6.37)
P = Q
(?x E[z := P ] : S) = (?x E[z := Q] : S)
(6.38)
R ⇒ P = Q
(?x R : E[z := P ]) = (?x R : E[z := Q])
(6.39)
hypotheses in our implementation, we needed to match against hypotheses
modulo symmetry of = .
In contrast to our approaches to solving OV-inequality and OE-typing
goals, we do not have a tactic solve Othm or some similar wrapper to au-
tomatically choose which method to use in a given situation. The object-
theoremhood strategies needed as preliminaries to a simple Leibniz tactic are
easy to manage, and there is no situation when both might apply. Each of the
two methods is designed for a specific purpose. There is no greater sophistica-
tion in our implementation. The above paragraphs describe the full extent of
our development involving object-theoremhood judgments, not including the
Leibniz tactic itself.
We have not yet implemented the definition of object-theoremhood pre-
sented in chapter 3. In general, we are concerned primarily with proving
object theorems from other object theorems, not basing every single object-
theoremhood judgment formally in the definition each time. Therefore, we
used Nuprl’s Fiat tactic to establish the object-theoremhood of premise the-
orems such as the One-point rule, which is used in the first Leibniz step of the
proof of Theorem Change of Dummy. We are confident that we could prove
it directly from an implementation of our definition, but doing so would not
illuminate the primary cognitive inferences that we are trying to model.
6.7 The Leibniz Tactic
The three Leibniz rules that encode substitution of equals for equals are the
most important inferences in calculational logic. (See Table 6.8 for the repre-
sentations of these rules as given in [GS93b].) Typically, we consider a calcu-
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lational proof to be a chain of some number of equalities; the Leibniz rules are
the means by which users establish the component equalities. Calculational
proof steps typically correspond to single applications of Leibniz; calculational
logic is essentially structured around Leibniz rules.
On a given proof goal, our Leibniz tactic first decides which of the three
Leibniz rules to apply. Each rule is embodied in a Nuprl lemma; see Table 6.9
for the three theorems. After identifying which lemma to use, it instantiates
the lemma with arguments chosen specifically for the purpose of justifying that
proof goal. Then, with this framework established, it performs the inferences
needed to complete the proof step.
Our past development, however, is not sufficient for this task. Although
we can choose a Leibniz lemma, and we can solve all the proof goals that come
from applying it by calling previously described tactics, intelligent instantia-
tion and application of the chosen Leibniz lemma can be quite complex. In
particular, the two textual substitutions operations replacing Z in the con-
clusion of the Leibniz lemmas in Table 6.9 (we call these substitutions Leibniz
substitutions to distinguish them from others) must be properly managed.
For an example, we return to the first step in the Change of Dummy
proof (Figure 6.1). Presume that Leib tac has correctly identified Leibniz
lemma (6.42) as the proper one for the step. Consider what else is involved in
arriving at the proper instantiation for that lemma.
The object-theoremhood proposition in the antecedent must directly follow
from the premise to Leib tac, and the conclusion of the Leibniz lemma must
be the proof goal. Inspection reveals, however, that the textual substitution
sign for Leibniz substitution in Leibniz lemmas is not intended to match a tex-
tual substitution sign in the proof goal. Indeed, it is intended in calculational
logic that the expressions resulting from the Leibniz substitutions match the
proof goal.
This has several ramifications. Our tactics must be able to carry out these
Leibniz substitutions. For that, we will want to instantiate Z with a fresh
variable, so that no capture-related complications arise. In addition, we will
also need to instantiate other variables (such as P, R, A, B ) using methods
that are more complicated than simply pattern-matching against Nuprl terms
in the proof goal: simple pattern-matching could not possibly work correctly
until the tactics performed the Leibniz substitutions, and they cannot perform
the Leibniz substitutions without instantiating the lemma. Because of this,
our Leibniz tactics use heuristics to guess instantiation values and then sepa-
rately verify their correctness (if possible). In this chapter, we describe those
heuristics and other aspects of carrying out a Leibniz proof step using tactics.
It is useful to have names for the component expressions of a textual substi-
tution, so when talking about a substitution expression E[V := P ] in which a
single expression P is to be substituted for a single variable V in E , we call
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Table 6.9: The three Leibniz lemmas in Nuprl
The simple case.
∀E,A,B:OE, ∈:OV→OTS, α:OE List, r,r’:{ind, bool}, Z:OV.
(∈) α ` A = B & (∈) [A; B] :: r &
(∈[[Z]← r]) E :: r’ ⇒
(∈) α ` (E)[Z := A] = (E)[Z := B]
(6.40)
For substitution into quantifier ranges.
∀b:Qind, Xs:OV List, R:OE, Z:OV, A,P,B:OE, ∈:OV→OTS
, α:OE List, r:{ind, bool}.
¬(some Xs occur free in α) &
(∈[Xs← ind]) α ` A = B &
(∈[Xs← ind]) [P] :: bool &
(∈[Xs← ind]) [A; B] :: r &
(∈[Xs← ind][[Z]← r]) [R] :: bool
⇒
(∈) α ` (*_b Xs | (R)[Z := A] : P)
=
(*_b Xs | (R)[Z := B] : P)
(6.41)
For substitution into quantifier bodies.
∀Xs:OV List, α:OE List, R,A,B:OE, ∈:OV→OTS,
r:{ind, bool}, P:OE, Z:OV, b:Qind.
¬(some Xs occur free in α) &
(∈[Xs← ind]) α ` R ⇒ A = B &
(∈[Xs← ind]) [A; B] :: r &
(∈[Xs← ind][[Z]← r]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈) α ` (*_b Xs | R : (P)[Z := A])
=
(*_b Xs | R : (P)[Z := B])
(6.42)
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E the substitution body, V the substitution variable, and P the substitution
formula. When clear, we may omit the word “substitution” from all three
terms.
6.7.1 A simple Leib tac
We started by creating a simple tactic Leib tac that we thought could perform
most basic Leibniz steps. Although we expected that this implementation
would not embody enough knowledge to handle all the steps in the Change of
Dummy proof, we discovered that only two of the proof steps required more
advanced inferences. In this section, we describe the simple Leib tac. In the
next section, we describe the few extensions needed to make it sufficient for
the entire Change of Dummy proof.
Instantiating the Leibniz substitution
As previously mentioned, the substitution variable in a Leibniz substitution
must be a fresh variable. Finding a fresh variable is a familiar procedure from
contexts other than calculational logic, but our metalinguistic implementation
case brings a depth to the task that may not be immediately apparent. We do
not explicitly find a new object variable that does not occur in some explicitly
given object expressions. Instead, we operate on metavariables —variables in
our data language— that range over object expressions; we don’t even explic-
itly know the object expressions in which we need our fresh object variable
not to occur. So, instead of identifying a particular fresh object variable, we
find a new Nuprl variable V :OV and introduce an assumption to the effect
that V refers to a new object variable. Thus, there are two senses in which a
new variable is being “found”: V is a new metavariable that hypothetically
stands for a new object variable.
The key lemma that our tactics use to generate the fresh variable is 5
∀L:OE List. ∃x:OV. ¬(some [x] occur free in L)(6.43)
We instantiate the OE List argument with a list (with duplicates removed)
of all the data-language variables that stand for object expressions in which we
need to guarantee that our fresh variable does not occur; this instantiation of L
results in a hypothesis of the form ∃x:OV.¬(some [x]occur free in L′) . Then,
5Interestingly, this lemma is itself a proposition of the data language, not at some meta-
level above it. This is consistent with the fluid integration of the items called “theorems”
and “metatheorems” in [GS93b]. The data language in which the “theorems” are written is
expressive enough for “metatheorems” as well; no linguistic barrier prevents their integration
in a coherent account of calculational logic.
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we let Nuprl instantiate the resulting existential quantifier in that hypothesis;
we use the witness it generates as V , the substitution variable for our Leibniz
substitutions. After a call to Not OccHD, any fresh-variable property we need
for our proof goal is expressed in the hypotheses as a not-occur proposition on
V and some other data-language variable.
Having found a name for the new substitution variable, our tactics can
now use it in an attempt to guess the expression for the substitution bodies in
the Leibniz lemma. (In all three Leibniz lemmas, there are two substitutions,
and the expression for the body is the same in both.) Typically, the body
will include the new substitution variable; vacuous Leibniz substitutions are
uncommon.
To arrive at an expression for the substitution body, we implemented a
heuristic method that corresponds to a simple but frequently sufficient case for
Leibniz steps: our tactic will not guess an expression in which the substitution
variable appears more than once. Although this commonly occurring case
suffices for all the proof steps in the Change Of Dummy proof, there are
cases for which it is not adequate. For instance, to prove (C ∧ A ≡ C ∨
A) = (C ∧ B ≡ C ∨ B) from premise theorem A = B using Leibniz, one
would choose C ∧ V ≡ C ∨ V for the substitution body, where V is the
Leibniz substitution variable. Variable V occurs twice, however, so for this
case our substitution body-guessing tactic would make an incorrect guess and
our Leibniz tactic would be unable to prove this instance of Leibniz correct.
Although calculational logic novices might make an erroneous guess in the
above case, experts certainly would not, and we could certainly build tactics
that would demonstrate more expert behavior. Indeed, the structure of our
existing tactic would readily accommodate such an extension. We discuss the
matter of simplifications in substitution-body guessing at greater length in
subsection 6.7.3.
Our simple procedure to guess the components of Leibniz substitutions
exploits the restriction of substitution body guesses to expressions without
multiple occurrences of the substitution variable. To guess the substitution
components needed for Leibniz to establish the theoremhood of an equality of
the form A = B , our ML procedure Leib subst guess essentially performs
a simultaneous recursive descent on the structures of A and B . Note that
it guesses the substitution body and the two substitution formulas simulta-
neously; it is provided the name of the fresh variable for use in constructing
the substitution body (we use the name V in the description below). In the
general case, Leib subst guess L R V works as follows, where L and R, re-
spectively, are the current components of the expressions on the left and right
of the proof-goal OE-equality:
• If the outermost operators of L and R differ, or if L and R differ in more
than one subterm, let the body guess be V , the left substitution formula
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letrec mk_assoc_sbtm_list opid term≡
if opid_of_term term=opid
then let [subterm1;subterm2] ≡ subterms term in
append (mk_assoc_sbtm_list opid subterm1)
(mk_assoc_sbtm_list opid subterm2)
else [term] ;;
letrec form_list_for_AC_guess_V1 L1 L2 L3≡
if L1=[] or L2=[] then L1,L2,L3
else if hd L1=hd L2
then form_list_for_AC_guess_V1 (tl L1) (tl L2) (hd L1).L3
else L1,L2,L3 ;;
Figure 6.4: ML functions used in Leibniz substitution-body guessing
guess be L, and the right substitution formula guess be R.
• If L and R are equal, return L as the body guess. (This guess may well
be a recursively determined component of the guess returned by a call of
Leib subst guess on expressions for which L and R are corresponding
subterms.) Because L and R are the same, we do not expect the Leibniz
substitution to alter this part of the term structure, so it is not surprising
that V does not occur in the body guess. In this case, no guesses for
substitution formulas are necessary.
• If L and R are identical except for exactly one immediate OE subterm
—say L1 from L differs from corresponding subterm R1 from R, but all
other corresponding subterms match— let the body guess be a copy of L
with L1 replaced by the body guess of Leib subst guess L1 R1 V . For
the left and right substitution formula guesses, return the corresponding
guesses from Leib subst guess L1 R1 V .
This describes Leib subst guess in the normal case. The exception is for
operator ≡ , because we need to accommodate its associativity. (Accommo-
dating commutativity of ≡ would have resulted in a more complex strategy
than we intended our prototype explanation of cognitive inference to model.)
If L were A ≡ (B ≡ C) and R were (A ≡ B) ≡ D , we would not want to fol-
low the above procedure, which would return V as the body guess (because L
and R differ in both corresponding subterms). Instead, the body guess should
be A ≡ B ≡ V . As a more complex example, if L were (A ≡ B) ≡ (C ≡ D)
and R were A ≡ (E ≡ D) , the body guess should be A ≡ V ≡ D . Therefore,
we have an auxiliary procedure Leib subst guess for AC ops for this case.
Leib subst guess for AC ops L R V works as follows:
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• First, using ML procedure mk assoc sbtm list with opid representing
≡ (see Figure 6.4 for its ML code), form ≡ -subterm lists of L and
R. For example, mk assoc sbtm list A ≡ ((B ≡ (C ∨ D)) ≡ E) is
[A; B; C ∨ D; E] . For purposes of this description, let Ls and Rs be
mk assoc sbtm list L and mk assoc sbtm list R respectively.
• (In the following, note that rev is the ML list-reversing function.) Then,
using ML procedure form list for AC guess (see Figure 6.4 for its
ML code), form four lists from Ls and Rs: Let Ls’, Rs’, Lts be
form list for AC guess Ls Rs []; let revLg, revRg, Rts be the re-
turn values of form list for AC guess (rev Ls’) (rev Rs’) [], and
let Lg and Rg be rev revLg and rev revRg, respectively. Then,
– Lts is a list of the subterms that match from the heads of Ls and
Rs
– Rts is a list of the subterms that match from the the terms that
from the tails of Ls and Rs
– Lg is the list L with the matches from its head and tail deleted.
– Rg is the list R with the matches from its head and tail deleted.
• (In the following, ML procedure mk assoc term from subterm list is
the inverse of mk assoc subterm list: given the opid of ≡ , it creates an
≡ -term from a term list.) Unless the four lists formed in the above step
satisfy a boundary condition, we use mk assoc term from subterm list
and the four lists to create guesses. The body-guess is the ≡ -term
created from the list Lts @ (V .Rts), where @ and . are the ML list-
append and cons operators, respectively. The guesses for the left-side
and right-side substitution formulas are the ≡ -terms created from Lg
and Rg, respectively.
• One boundary case we catch is if either Lg or Rg are empty as the result
of one of L or R completely matching the other from either the head
or the tail. For instance, consider what would happen if we used this
guessing procedure on proof goal (A ≡ B) = (A ≡ B ≡ C) , where
V was the name for the new variable. (Such a case could occur if the
position of C in the example above is occupied by expression t.) Our
substitution-body guess would be A ≡ B ≡ V , and our right-formula
guess would be C , but our left-formula guess would be nil, indicating
a bad body guess. We handle such a boundary case by extending both
formula guesses by the term immediately next to the variable. In this
case, we would change our body guess to A ≡ V , with the right-formula
guess becoming B ≡ C and the left-formula guess becoming B .
• The other boundary case we currently handle is Lg and Rg both of size
1 when they are constructed. In this case, we have a single subterm
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from L and a corresponding subterm from R, and there may be more
term structure to consider. For instance, consider the case where L is
A ≡ (P ∧ Q) ≡ B and R is A ≡ (P ∧ R) ≡ B . After their construction,
Lg and Rg would be [P ∧ Q ] and [P ∧ R ], and the body guess would
be A ≡ V ≡ B . A smarter guess, however, results from continuing the
body-guessing procedure through the structure of the terms in Lg and
Rg. Leib subst guess recursively calls itself on those terms, arriving
at a body guess of A ≡ (P ∧ V ) ≡ B , with left-formula guess Q and
right-formula guess R .
Our implementation of these procedures is somewhat more general than
it needs to be. It is designed to accommodate a general theory of asso-
ciative/commutative operators, as are procedures mk assoc sbtm list and
mk assoc term from subterm list ; for instance, to account for other asso-
ciative operators, we would simply need to alter a list in Leib subst guess
that right now contains only ≡ . In section 6.7.3, we further discuss the role
of associative/commutative operators in implementing calculational logic.
Putting it together and cleaning up
Given a procedure that can guess the elements of the Leibniz substitutions,
the rest of the main Leibniz tactic Leib tac is reasonably straightforward. As
previously described, Leib tac is designed to establish the object theoremhood
of expressions of the form A = B . It takes two arguments, the name of
a lemma to use as the premise (after instantiation) and a list of terms to
use when instantiating the premise. By analyzing the structure of object
expressions A and B , it chooses one of the three Leibniz lemmas to use. Then,
it instantiates that lemma by matching against the proof goal and using guesses
of the components of the Leibniz substitutions as provided by the procedures
described in the previous section.
One of the results of instantiating a Leibniz lemma is that its conclusion
becomes a hypothesis to use when proving the original proof goal. To put the
hypothesis in the proper form, Leib tac carries out the Leibniz substitutions
by recursively rewriting the expressions using the lemmas in Table 6.10. If the
substitution guesses are good enough, this instantiation will solve the desired
proof goal. There are a few subtle points to this Leibniz rewriting, but they do
not affect the overall flow of Leib tac, so we postpone consideration of them
until subsection 6.7.3.
The other proof goals resulting from the Leibniz lemma instantiation cor-
respond to the propositions in its antecedent. One of those is an object-
theoremhood goal, which should follow (using our simple solve Othm tactic)
from instantiating the user-supplied premise theorem with the user-supplied
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Table 6.10: Lemmas used in carrying out Leibniz substitution
∀P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] ≡ (Q)[V := E] = (P ≡ Q)[V := E]
(Similarly for OE-constructors ∧ , ∨ ,¬, ⇒ , =.)
(6.44)
∀f,x:OE, V:OV, E:OE.
(f(x))[V := E] = (f)[V := E]((x)[V := E])
(6.45)
∀b:Qind, P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] *_b (Q)[V := E] = (P *_b Q)[V := E]
(6.46)
∀b:Qind, V:OV, E:OE. u_b = (u_b)[V := E]
(Similarly for OE constants t o, f o.)
(6.47)
∀x:OV, E:OE. (x)[x := E] = E(6.48)
∀X:OV, P,E:OE.
¬(some [X] occur free in [P]) ⇒ (P)[X := E] = P
(6.49)
term list; in the case of Leibniz lemma (6.42), an additional backchain through
the following lemma
∀P:OE, ep:OV→OTS, Q:OE, alpha:OE List.
(ep) [P] :: bool & (ep) alpha ` Q ⇒ (ep) alpha ` P ⇒ Q
(6.50)
may be necessary if the premise theorem is an equality instead of an implica-
tion. If the premise instantiation is somehow not correct, tactic solve Othm
will not be able to solve the Leibniz proof goal. We consider this case a user
error, since the user specifies both the premise and the terms to use in instan-
tiating it, and we make no effort to correct it.
Leib tac must also solve the proof goals corresponding to the propositions
in the antecedents of the Leibniz lemma and the premise theorem that were
instantiated. We call solve not occ concl, solve Owfd, solve noteqOV and
preprocessing tactics (Not OccHD, OwfdHD, etc.) when needed to handle them.
We do not know in advance exactly what new proof goals might appear from
the premise instantiation, so we must call all our possibly useful tactics to
solve them. We use a more structured approach for proof goals that result
from Leibniz lemma instantiation and other such cases where we can hardwire
into the tactic knowledge of the lemma being instantiated.
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6.7.2 Extending the simple Leib tac
Recall that Leib tac as described above can perform all but two of the Leibniz
steps in the proof of Theorem Change of Dummy from [GS93b]. In this sec-
tion, we describe the few, straightforward extensions needed to make Leib tac
adequate for that entire proof. These are extensions to the implementation
already described; the notes, descriptions, etc. above continue to apply to the
completed Leib tac.
The two steps Leib tac could not handle were:
(?x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈Substitution (3.84a) —R[x := f.y] must be removed
at some point. This substitution makes it possible.〉
(?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
(6.51)
and
(?x R : (?y x = f.y : P ))
= 〈x = f.y ≡ y = f−1.x —This step prepares for the
elimination of y using the One-point rule.〉
(?x R : (?y y = f−1.x : P ))
(6.52)
(See page 35 for “Substitution” and “One-point rule.”) The steps in (6.51) re-
quired significant additions to Leib tac in two major areas: instantiating the
Leibniz substitution and solving OE-typing goals by type assignment agree-
ment.
We enhanced our heuristic for finding the Leibniz substitution body by
adding a check to the recursive procedure described above to keep it from
making too deep a descent. Consider a case where, at some point in its recur-
sive descent, the procedure identified potential substitution formulas Lg and
Rg that were exactly the sides of the object-level equality established by the
premise theorem. Then, it would not continue the search to instantiate the
Leibniz lemma; the premise theorem proves Lg and Rg equal, and it would not
prove the equality of any corresponding subterms. For example, for proof step
(6.51), our original heuristic guessed (?b x, y V ∧ x = f.y : P ) as the Leibniz
substitution body, but that was incompatible with the premise theorem:
Substitution (3.84a): E[z := f ] ∧ (e = f) = E[z := e] ∧ (e = f)(6.53)
With this new check added, the procedure stopped when it had Lg and Rg
as R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y and R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y , which matched the
instantiated premise.
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Table 6.11: More lemmas for proving type assignment agreement
∀x:OV, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→OTS).
ep[x← sig][x← sig] = ep[x← sig]
(6.54)
∀L:OE List, e1,e2:(OV→OTS), v:OV, sig:OTS.
(∀x:OV. (some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (e1,e2 agree on x)) &
(∀x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (e2,e2[v← sig] agree on x))
⇒
(∀x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (e1,e2[v← sig] agree on x))
(6.55)
∀∈:(OV→OTS), x:OV, f:(OV→OTS).
(∈,f agree on x) ⇐⇒ (f,∈ agree on x)
(6.56)
We implemented this extension in the straightforward way. It encodes an
obvious cognitive strategy: keep the premise in mind, and stop looking when
you find what you’re looking for. It was not in our simpler Leib tac, because
it required keeping the premise in mind; the previous strategy required no
outside information, not even the premise.
The other major changes needed for this proof step are improvements in
proving type assignment agreement goals. Because this step requires reasoning
inside both quantification (with two dummy variables) and textual substitu-
tion, the type assignment updates are more complex than for other inferences.
To accommodate this, we implemented the following (see Table 6.11):
• A way to reduce complexity by eliminating duplicate updates, using
theorem (6.54).
• A simple way of generating intermediate subgoals to prove a goal, using
theorem (6.55).
• Symmetry regarding type assignments, using theorem (6.56). The sim-
pler Leib tac used so few theorems that we didn’t need a general sym-
metry theorem. Now that we anticipate more complex inferences, we
include this symmetry theorem.
114
The only other significant addition was to make solve not occ concl
smarter when solving not-occur proof goals, using the lemma
∀V:OV, P,E:OE.
¬(some [V] occur free in [P]) ⇒
¬(some [V] occur free in [(E)[V := P]])
(6.57)
and a similar lemma for list-based substitution. Jointly, all these additions
make Leib tac sufficient for proof step (6.51).
The simple Leib tac failed on proof step (6.52) for entirely different rea-
sons. In that step, the Leibniz substitution is nested inside two levels of
quantifications; we replace the range of a quantifier that is itself the body of
another quantifier. The Leibniz rules only permit substitution through one
level of quantification, however, and no rule directly justifies this proof step.6
In general, Leibniz substitution into quantifiers requires iterated applica-
tion of a Leibniz rule, one iteration per level of nested quantification. The
simple Leib tac only handled the special case where only one Leibniz appli-
cation was necessary. For this proof step, we extended Leib tac by enabling
iterated Leibniz inference for arbitrary nesting depth.
It is straightforward to determine the depth of quantifier nesting from the
instantiation of the Leibniz substitution. In our extended Leib tac imple-
mentation, if the quantifier depth is 0 or 1, we perform the inference exactly
as described in section 6.7.1. If repeated Leibniz applications are needed, we
instantiate modus ponens to set up the necessary iterations. For instance, to
prove the object theoremhood of (?b1 x R1 : (?b2 y R2 : P )) = (?b1 x R1 :
(?b2 y R3 : P )) from some premise theorem, we would instead do the follow-
ing:
• Using Leibniz steps, prove the object theoremhood of (?b2 y R2 :
P ) = (?b2 y R3 : p) from the given premise theorem. This may
require more than one iteration of Leibniz rules, so we recursively use
this iteration/modus ponens framework.
• Prove that the object theoremhood of (?b2 y R2 : P ) = (?b2 y R3 : p)
implies the object theoremhood of (?b1 x R1 : (?b2 y R2 : P )) =
(?b1 x R1 : (?b2 y R3 : P )) . This follows from a single application of
Leibniz; no further iteration is needed for this goal.
From modus ponens, the above two goals establish the original desired
theorem. Of course, all of this is done with respect to the appropriate type
assignments and assumptions for the object-theorem predicates.
6Although not mentioned in [GS93b], Gries [Gri] suggests using a different, capture-
permitting substitution for Leibniz substitution. This would permit substitution through
nested quantifiers. Our explanation avoids the logic difficulties with capture-permitting
substitution and uses only the rules presented in [GS93b].
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Implementing this iteration strategy in Leib tac is straightforward. It
does require a different programming structure from the simple Leib tac —
we pass different arguments between component subtactics and several of the
component tactics that were previously disjoint must be made mutually re-
cursive to support the iteration— but the only major conceptual addition is
modus ponens.
6.7.3 Discussion
The Leib tac augmented by the strategies in subsection 6.7.2 handles many
common cases in calculational logic inference, including all those in the proof
of Change of Dummy. Still, many important extensions have not yet been
explored. For instance, we have not developed user/system interactivity. We
anticipate that this calculational logic system could come to be used as an
interactive assistant for users of the calculational method. As such, it might
try to guess the correct instantiation for a Leibniz lemma and, if it failed, it
might prompt the user for assistance as needed. Such an improved interface
could add a new dimension to our tactics as a cognitive model —the interaction
between novice and expert, perhaps— but they are not our main focus at this
stage of development.
In the remainder of this section, we examine other issues in extending and
improving our current system.
The heuristic nature of Leib tac
Tactic Leib tac is central to both our formalized account of calculational logic
and our cognitive model of calculational inference. It encompasses a consid-
erable amount of interesting human inference, such as the decision-making
and logical deductions that occur in instantiating the necessary lemmas for
the particular context at hand. If we expanded our conception of Leib tac
to what an extended version might accomplish —e.g., a future version might
actually search a lemma library to find an appropriate premise lemma and its
correct instantiation— it becomes still clearer that it is the most sophisticated
part of our cognitive model. For this reason, it is quite sensible that compo-
nents of Leib tac be heuristic rather than necessarily correct. Modeling ideal
inference is not our primary goal; we want instead to model human inference,
and people are sometimes incorrect.
Because our Leib tac tactic must be heuristic, there was no reason not to
accept simple heuristics in this initial implementation of our tactic/model. For
instance, we now require that users supply a full list of terms to instantiate the
premise lemma given to Leib tac. In a weak way, this is consistent with the
practice in [GS93b]: in the textbook, typically only the instantiations that are
116
somehow tricky to figure out would be supplied in a term list. Indeed, the list
is often empty (and omitted). So, right now our tactic model corresponds to
a user who finds every instantiation tricky, which is (we hope!) not a typical
practitioner.
In addition, our heuristics for instantiating Leibniz lemmas correspond to a
simple strategy —one that a novice student of calculational logic might use—
of only finding a match in which the fresh Leibniz variable encompasses all the
unequal subterms in the expressions we are trying to match. Consider a case
where two unequal subterm positions are not contiguous, as with the terms
a ≡ b ≡ c ≡ d ≡ e and a ≡ f ≡ c ≡ d ≡ g , where b 6= f and e 6= g .
Our guess for a substitution body would be a ≡ Z , because we don’t accom-
modate the symmetry of ≡ reasoning that would permit the more intelligent
guess a ≡ c ≡ d ≡ Z . This is consistent with our general approach to asso-
ciative/commutative operators —our heuristics account only for associativity
of equivalence— but there is clearly room for improvement.7
In general, we are aware that future variants of the heuristics are likely,
but the underlying procedures should not require alteration. Therefore, we de-
signed the tactics so that, as much as possible, they were “roughly modular” in
terms of their heuristics. For instance, we would not have to rewrite the entire
tactic to incorporate a new heuristic for implementing a Leibniz lemma or a
new structure for what inferences involving associative/commutative operators
(we abbreviate to AC operators) are to be handled automatically. Instead, we
would replace one ML procedure by another; assuming the interface between
procedures remained the same, there would be no need for further change.
Carrying out Leibniz substitutions
Our tactic for carrying out Leibniz substitutions —a part of the process of
verifying the correctness of a guess for instantiating a Leibniz lemma— rewrites
only substitutions that replace the particular fresh variable generated to be the
Leibniz substitution variable. It cannot simply rewrite all textual substitutions
in the Leibniz substitution according to these lemmas. If it did, it would try
to rewrite away the textual substitution operations that we intend to keep in
our example proof step (first step in Change of Dummy proof). We kept the
Leibniz substitution tactic focused.
In Table 6.10, no lemma addresses the issue of rewriting a Leibniz substi-
tution through another textual substitution operator. The textbook [GS93b]
7Our not including automatic reasoning about symmetry of equivalence does not restrict
the class of theorems we can prove. We would, however, need to make such symmetry
reasoning explicit, instead of making it implicit in the tactics. This is consistent with the
behavior of a novice student; in teaching from [GS93b], we encourage some students to make
even simple symmetry inferences explicit until they are comfortable leaving them implicit
in other, bigger inferences.
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does not directly address whether such a move is even permissible, and we did
not attempt to accommodate it. Doing so would have involved a more sophisti-
cated treatment of textual substitution and would not have added significantly
to our understanding of calculational logic inference.
One of our Leibniz lemmas is technically redundant: lemma (6.41) can be
derived from lemma (6.42). (Both lemmas are given on page 105.) We keep
all three lemmas in our system to avoid doing Leibniz substitution through
quantifications. Without lemma (6.41), we would need to substitute into a
quantifier expression, which could result in bound variable changes. By passing
substitution inside the quantifier in the inference rule instead of doing it as a
Leibniz rewrite, we avoid the need to reason about changes of bound variables.
Obvious inference and AC-operators
Our tactics automatically work modulo symmetry of equality in the context of
matching to solve object-theoremhood proof goals; that is, we automatically
prove () α ` A = B from () α ` B = A . As previously mentioned, the
only associativity/commutativity property we accommodate is associativity
of ≡ , but extensions of our system will also need to handle properties for
other AC-operators.
Consider a proof goal () α ` P = Q where P and Q are equal terms
modulo some notion of associativity and commutativity of operators. Assum-
ing correct typing, we consider the theoremhood of P = Q to be obvious;
as described below, we automated that inference as part of Leib tac. We do
not explicitly try to prove it from the provided premise —in fact, any premise
would suffice.8
We automated this obvious Othm -inference using an ML predicate to de-
termine term equality modulo some notion of what properties of AC-operators
are obvious. If that predicate determines that P and Q are term-equal, we
backchain through the following lemma:
∀A,B:OE, ∈:(OV→OTS), α:OE List.
equal_mod_AC_props(A;B) & (∈) [A = B] :: bool &
(∈) α :: bool
⇒
(∈) α ` A = B
(6.58)
The equality determination of the ML predicate is represented by the Nuprl
relation equal mod AC props; if it holds for P and Q (and if necessary ex-
pressions are type correct), our tactic will prove the object theoremhood goal.
8To see why any premise would suffice, instantiate the Leibniz substitutions with a
substitution body in which the fresh Leibniz variable does not occur, so components of the
premise do not get substituted into the conclusion.
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Just as our ML predicate is intended to generally represent the properties
of AC-operators that are considered obvious in a given student model, our
relation equal mod AC props is intended to be general, to match that ML
predicate. For example, as of this writing, both represent only the property of
associativity of ≡ . To accommodate different notions of which AC-properties
are obvious, we would have to alter the ML predicate and any lemmas or other
properties relating it to equal mod AC props. Lemma (6.58) above would re-
main unchanged, however, as would the tactic that backchains through it.
To simplify implementation, we declared equal mod AC props as a primi-
tive Nuprl operator instead of defining it to directly encode equality modulo
some AC-properties. Correspondingly, there is no definition to use in proving
the equal mod AC props subgoal that results from the backchaining; we im-
plemented a tactic that essentially invokes Fiat to handle that subgoal.9 Had
we wished to be more complete, we could have implemented a definition of
equal mod AC props and a tactic that used that definition for a full proof, but
the additional labor would not have have significantly improved our cognitive
model. Our ML predicate assures us that P and Q are term equal; we do not
prove it. In this way, we represent the ML determination of term-equality in
our tactics. By not applying the major machinery of Leib tac to the original
subgoal, we represent the equality of P and Q as obvious with respect to
Leibniz reasoning.
Our handling of AC-operators also serves as an illustration of the extent
to which we succeeded in maintaining modularity in our implementation of
calculational logic inference. If we were to change our predicate of term-
equality modulo associativity and commutativity, Leib tac would expand its
notion of obvious theoremhood accordingly without having to rewrite or alter
any tactic; in this way, Leib tac is modular. If we changed the predicate to
account for symmetry of ≡ and we wanted our procedure for instantiating
Leibniz lemmas to change accordingly, however, we would need to re-code the
instantiation/guessing procedure.
6.8 Formalizing a Full Calculational Proof
6.8.1 Inference rule Transitivity
To show how Leib tac works in the context of a full calculational proof, we
formalized the entire proof of Theorem Change of Dummy in Nuprl. This
required formalizing not just Leibniz inference but Transitivity inference as
well.
9We use Fiat frequently to admit lemmas without formal proof, but this is the only
place in our tactics where we directly call Fiat.
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Recall that the proof of Change of Dummy is a chain of equalities. In-
ference rule Transitivity allows the desired conclusion from those component
equalities. Here is the Gries/Schneider representation of Transitivity:
X = Y, Y = Z
X = Z
(6.59)
As with the representations of Leibniz in [GS93b], the expression X = Y
is a statement of object-level theoremhood. Thus, the transitivity captured
in this rule is the transitivity of object-level equality in object theorems. We
capture this in the Nuprl theorem on which we base our Transitivity tactic:
∀p,p1:OE, ep:(OV→OTS), a:OE List, q:OE.
(ep) a ` p = p1 & (ep) a ` p1 = q ⇒ (ep) a ` p = q
(6.60)
Inference rule Transitivity is typically used in a generalized form, justifying
a conclusion based on an arbitrary number of equalities, not just two. In our
calculational logic transitivity tactic CL trans tac, we capture that standard
usage. CL trans tac takes a term list that specifies the intermediate steps
desired for a calculational proof of an object-level equality, and it results in
subgoals corresponding to the intermediate equalities. This small example
illustrates its usage:
1. A : OE
2. B : OE
3. C : OE
4. D : OE
5. ∈ : OV→OTS
6. α : OE List
` (∈) α ` A = D by CL_trans_tac Tms:[B ; C] ...w
\
` (∈) α ` A = B by <TACTIC>
---
` (∈) α ` B = C by <TACTIC>
---
` (∈) α ` C = D by <TACTIC>
(6.61)
The implementation of CL trans tac is straightforward, recursively instanti-
ating theorem (6.60) until the term list argument has been exhausted.
6.8.2 The formalized Change of Dummy proof
Figure 6.5 contains our (several page long) Nuprl formalization of the Change
of Dummy proof in [GS93b].
120
1. x : OV
2. y : OV
3. f : OV
4. f
 
: OV
5. α : OE List
6. R : OE
7. P : OE
8. ∈ : OV→ OTS
9. b : Qind
10. (∀ [x; y] |t_o:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α
11. (∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool
12. (∈ ) α :: bool
13. ¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P])
14. ¬ x = y
15. ¬ y = f
16. ¬ x = f
17. ¬ y = f
 
18. ¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α )
19. (∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] : (P)[x := f(y)])
=
(*_b [x] | R : P)
by CL_trans_tac
Tms:[(*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P)) ;
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := f(y)] ∧ x = f(y) : P) ;
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := x] ∧ x = f(y) : P) ;
(*_b [x; y] | R ∧ x = f(y) : P) ;
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | x = f(y) : P)) ;
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | y = f
 
(x) : P)) ;
(*_b [x] | R : (P)[y := f
 
(x)])] ...w
Figure 6.5: Nuprl formalization of Change of Dummy proof. This first page
shows the application of our calculational logic transitivity tactic. The figure
is continued on the following pages, showing the resulting subgoals and the
applications of Leib tac that solve them.
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Figure 6.5 (Continued)
\
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] : (P)[x := f(y)])
=
(*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P))
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ x:OV, E:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind
, P:OE.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [E]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [E] :: ind &
(∈ [x← ind]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | x = E : P) = (P)[x := E]
Tms:[x ; f(y) ; α ; ∈ [[y]← ind] ; b ; P] ...w
---
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P))
=
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := f(y)] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ y:OV, R:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P,Q:OE
, x:OV, b:Qind.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [R]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [P; Q; R] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ Q : P)
=
(*_b [y] | R : (*_b [x] | Q : P))
Tms:[y ; (R)[x := f(y)] ; α ; ∈ ; P ;
x = f(y) ; x ; b] ...w
---
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Figure 6.5 (Continued)
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := f(y)] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := x] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), e,f:OE, r:{ind, bool}
, E:OE, z:OV.
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ ) [e; f] :: r &
(∈ [[z]← r]) [E] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (E)[z := f] ∧ e = f
=
(E)[z := e] ∧ e = f
Tms:[α ; ∈ [[x; y]← ind] ; x ; f(y) ;
ind ; R ; x] ...w
---
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := x] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x; y] | R ∧ x = f(y) : P)
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List, E:OE, x:OV.
(∈ ) α ` (E)[x := x] = E
Tms:[∈ [[x; y]← ind] ; α ; R ; x] ...w
---
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | x = f(y) : P))
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ y:OV, R:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P,Q:OE
, x:OV, b:Qind.
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [P; Q; R] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ Q : P)
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | Q : P))
Tms:[y ; R ; α ; ∈ ; P ; x = f(y) ; x ; b] ...w
---
123
Figure 6.5 (Continued)
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | x = f(y) : P))
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | y = f
 
(x) : P))
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∀ [x
; y] |t_o:x = f(y) ≡ ...) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α )
⇒
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) α ` x = f(y) = y = f
 
(x)
Tms:[x ; y ; f ; f
 
; α ; ∈ ] ...w
---
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | y = f
 
(x) : P))
=
(*_b [x] | R : (P)[y := f
 
(x)])
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ x:OV, E:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind
, P:OE.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [E]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [E] :: ind &
(∈ [x← ind]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | x = E : P) = (P)[x := E]
Tms:[y ; f
 
(x) ; α ; ∈ [[x]← ind] ; b ; P] ...w
---
` (∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (P)[y := f
 
(x)])
=
(*_b [x] | R : P)
by Leib_tac
Thm* ∀ α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P:OE, r:{ind, bool}
, x:OV, E:OE.
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [P] :: r &
¬ (some [x] occur free in [P])
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (P)[x := E] = P
Tms:[α ; ∈ [x← ind] ; P ; bool ; y ; f
 
(x)] ...w
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Note that our formalization has eight component equalities, instead of the
seven in the presentation in [GS93b]. This is because the fourth step in the
Gries/Schneider presentation is actually a composition of two separate Leibniz
steps.
(?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈R[x := x] ≡ R; Nesting, ¬occurs(“y”,“R”)
—Now we can get a quantification in x alone.〉
(?x R : (?y x = f.y : P ))
(6.62)
Our formalization represents each of the Leibniz steps separately, making both
subgoals explicit.
Each of the eight subgoals in Figure 6.5 is solved by a single application
of Leib tac, demonstrating its adequacy for the calculational inferences nec-
essary for this proof.
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter describes our tactic-based explanation of calculational logic in-
ference and, more generally, our approach to formalizing inference methods.
We identified the essential kinds of propositions upon which calculational
logic is built —OV-inequalities, not-occur propositions, OE-typing judgments,
and object-theoremhood judgments— and created tactics to carry out the
most common, important inferences in proving each kind of proposition.10 In
Leib tac, we combined all these component tactics into a single, complex, and
often modular explanation of the key inferences in calculational logic.
We have not attempted to list all the ways in which our implementation is
incomplete or otherwise simplified. Our system is a work in progress, and an
exhaustive list of incompletenesses and simplifications is beyond the scope of
this project. Any omissions, however, neither inhibit the ability of our system
to express and prove calculational logic assertions nor detract significantly
from the value of our tactics as an explanation of calculational predicate logic.
It is not surprising that [GS93b] did not give a detailed description of all
the simple manipulations that people might make. Its goal is to teach, not to
overwhelm with detail, and leaving many details implicit makes it successful.
It uses some simplifying conventions —e.g., the one whereby different letters
of the alphabet stand for different variables— without explicitly mentioning
10On rare occasions, list membership propositions expressed using the data language
onlist form also occurred in our calculational logic proofs. We simply used Nuprl tactic
Hypothesis to prove them. We mention this to complete our account of all the data language
propositions that occurred; it merits no further discussion.
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them, but its audience generally understands the text anyway, without needing
to be burdened by such details. This is an example of how our formalized
implementation highlights points of pedagogy. Indeed, we believe that the
ways in which our system is more explicitly detailed than [GS93b] and the
ways in which we have accomplished so much with such incomplete heuristics
may correspond to pedagogical insights. We discuss this further in chapter 7.
Students using [GS93b] may ask for help from a teacher or other expert
in doing a calculational proof. In essence, they express that they are unable
to successfully accomplish a certain task and request guidance from outside.
This corresponds to an implementation functionality that we have not yet
developed but which might be promising for our system: our tactics might
output informative error messages to improve interactivity with users. We
envision a system in which the failure of a tactic may be accompanied by a
request to the user for assistance. For instance, if the tactic could not correctly
instantiate a Leibniz lemma, it could ask the user to provide a full list of terms
to use for the instantiation. Such extensions to our system would improve it
in two ways, making it a better pedagogical partner as well as an interactive
theorem prover. It would also add a new dimension to its cognitive modeling,
treating the inference task as a process that could be influenced by interaction
with outsiders.
We began this chapter by emphasizing the fact that our account of calcu-
lational logic inference differed from the one in the book that first described
it [GS93b]. We have described many of those those differences, ranging from
the high-level inferences that were left omitted from [GS93b] to the low-level
details of how to carry out those inferences. The Gries/Schneider text pre-
sented a description from which people might learn inference techniques; we
presented a possible model of the inference techniques people might learn. It
is no wonder our two accounts differ in the details.
Chapter 7
Observations on Pedagogy
This text attempts to change the way we teach logic to begin-
ning students. Instead of teaching logic as a subject in isolation,
we regard it as a basic tool and show how to use it. We strive to
give students a skill in the propositional and predicate calculi and
then to exercise that skill thoroughly in applications that arise in
computer science and discrete mathematics.
We are not logicians, but programming methodologists, and
this text reflects that perspective. We are among the first gen-
eration of scientists who are more interested in using logic than
studying it. With this text, we hope to empower further genera-
tions of computer scientists and mathematicians to become serious
users of logic.
David Gries & Fred Schneider [GS93b, preface]
7.1 Introduction
The primary goal of our research was to implement a tactic-based model
of a method of inference that people actually used. Choosing calculational
logic for that central inference method, we worked substantially from the
undergraduate-level textbook that presents it, “A Logical Approach To Dis-
crete Math” [GS93b]. Aside from the student modeling that necessarily re-
sulted from our choice, it was not our intent to make pedagogical criticisms of
that textbook or otherwise contribute significantly to pedagogy. Nonetheless,
our work led to a few pedagogical observations about the text, and we came
to believe that our overall approach to modeling could contribute similarly to
pedagogical criticism about other methods and other textbooks. We comment
on [GS93b] as an illustration of how our approach can help elucidate aspects
of pedagogy.
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As is common with textbooks, [GS93b] is not completely formalized. It
draws from an approach that is actually used in programming methodology
research, applying it for the first time to discrete math instruction; in doing
so, it attempts to capture the current state of the still-evolving calculational
approach to mathematics, which was not completely formalized for this new
context. Furthermore, a full formalization might not have been consistent
with the authors’ stated goals: it might well have overwhelmed or intimidated
beginning students.
The differences between our formalized account of calculational logic and
the incomplete formalization in the textbook are the source of our pedagogical
criticisms. By exposing, identifying, and understanding what is not explicit in
the text, one can explicitly discuss aspects of pedagogy that might otherwise
remain hidden: whether the authors understand the skill level of their readers;
whether the demands of the textbook are appropriate for novice students;
whether more detailed instruction should have been given on points that might
be considered obvious; whether decisions to omit details from the text were
good ones. In the sections that follow, we demonstrate how our formalized
modeling approach can improve understanding of issues such as these.
7.2 Implicit Metalogic
The calculational approach to logic emerged over time from research that em-
ploys logical techniques to reason about program correctness; [GS93b] reflects
this history, mentioning textual substitution and Hoare triples1 before boolean
expressions. The purpose of [GS93b] is to introduce the calculational approach
and demonstrate that it is also applicable to discrete mathematics topics such
as predicate logic, set theory, and the theory of integers. The authors par-
tially formalized their method of reasoning to make it clearer, more concise,
and more syntactic, in keeping with the principles of general calculational
methods.
When considering its intended applications (e.g., reasoning about textual
substitution and free variable occurrences), it seems sensible that calculational
logic can best be understood as a formalized metalogic. Typically, such a
metalogic would be used and taught informally. Indeed, many discrete math-
ematics or logic textbooks have sections containing propositions about logical
expressions (e.g., typical presentations of theorems about duals of boolean ex-
pressions). An informal or vague use of metalogic in textbooks may not be
pleasing to strict logicians, but it is an established part of pedagogy. The use
of meta-level reasoning in teaching logic is not a novelty of [GS93b].
1Hoare triples are a formalism used to reason about program execution (see [GS93b, page
17]). They are not typically elements of a discrete mathematics course.
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What is unusual about the “Logical Approach” text [GS93b] is that its
authors embraced the idea of treating metalogic more formally and apply-
ing it to the topics of discrete mathematics. According to student comments
reprinted in [GS93a], this metalogical approach to discrete math seemed to
help the authors achieve their goal of teaching students to be comfortable
with rigorous, syntactic, calculational reasoning, which they stated was one of
their primary objectives. They did not, however, explicitly state in [GS93b]
that they were teaching and utilizing a metalogic in their approach. (This
was the novelty of chapter 3, our recognition and demonstration that the text-
book could be explained without semantic oddities as a formalized metalogic.)
Further, they did not completely formalize their metalogic in presenting their
predicate logic. This was a sensible decision; a full formalization would surely
have overwhelmed their novice audience, and the authors could always make
their presentation more precise if it became necessary later in the text. Per-
haps more importantly, such added detail would not have improved the way
the book reflects the ideas stated in its preface (quoted at the beginning of
this chapter). The primary goal of the authors was not to teach logic per se
but to teach their method of reasoning, and it is much more difficult to explain
metalogic than syntactic manipulations.
By formalizing meta-reasoning, the authors extended the scope of their
calculational approach without resorting to higher-order logic, combining ped-
agogically valuable formality with the informal, de facto meta-level reasoning
that is common in discrete mathematics texts. Their focus on syntactic, calcu-
lational inference and formalized-looking notation was fully in service of their
primary goal. Precise formalization and fully detailed explanations were not
the point, and in fact were frequently omitted. The significant differences
between the account in chapter 3 and [GS93b] are clear indications of this.
Such informality and omissions may well have made the basic syntactic
manipulations of the calculational approach more accessible to students. We
doubt, however, that students fully grasp the meta-level meanings of the no-
tations; they learn the moves of the calculational approach without fully un-
derstanding the subject to which they apply those moves. This can cause
difficulties when the moves come under greater scrutiny. As seen in chap-
ter 3, the “formulas” established as theorems by calculational logic cannot
coherently be considered boolean formulas in the traditional sense; the met-
alinguistic intent upon which calculational logic is based prohibits it. Even
for formulas that could be read as object-level formulas, object-level meanings
are only indirectly relevant —through the claim that object theorems are valid.
Students may fail to appreciate this.
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7.3 Omissions from the Text
As part of formalizing [GS93b], we exposed omissions from the text, iden-
tifying and filling those gaps to arrive at a full formalization for our tactic
model. We can think of those omitted elements as components that the au-
thors felt readers would already have mastered to the degree required for the
immediate applications. That is, the authors felt those components —be they
propositions left implicit or inference methods left undescribed— were obvi-
ous.2 Recall that [GS93b] is a textbook, not a journal article, and it is not
a forum that demands expert inference on the part of its readers. Therefore,
the omissions can be construed as part of the authors’ theory of obvious infer-
ence —the kinds of inference that would be obvious to readers and hence not
worth explicitly detailing— in the context of the textbook and the applications
contained within.
This does not mean that every element of our data language that did
not appear in [GS93b] is obviously constructed and used by readers. Their
omission, however, indicates that the major propositions and inferences on
them must be considered obvious to the authors (according to the under-
standing they had when they wrote the text). We consider two examples:
OV-inequalities and OE-typing.
Proving the inequality of object variables is a particularly important, per-
vasive aspect of calculational logic inference. Since [GS93b] is not thoroughly
explicit in acknowledging its metalogical foundations, it is correspondingly
vague in acknowledging the sophistication necessary to prove OV-inequalities;
because variables in the text are typically metavariables, the mere fact that
variables of type OV are different letters does not mean they are unequal as
elements of OV. In proofs presented in [GS93b], however, a simplifying conven-
tion is frequently used and essentially un-mentioned: different metavariables
are tacitly assumed to stand for different elements of OV. (This is not al-
ways true —different metavariables can be instantiated with the same object
variable— but it is common enough to be taken as convention.) Students
pick up on this convention as obvious (things that look different are different,
what could be simpler?) and are given enough examples to understand when
and how to apply it. The authors of the text provide no further direction for
proving OVs unequal.
Indeed, this seems like the right decision. Including needless detail about
such obvious inference is unnecessary and might overwhelm students. More
2What if the authors (Gries & Schneider) did not omit such elements because they
consciously decided they were obvious but instead omitted them simply because they failed
to consider them? In that case, the authors must have understood the subject they were
teaching without consciously considering the omitted elements. For those elements that are
a part of calculational logic, they were not unused or ignored. They were simply too obvious
for conscious consideration.
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open to criticism is the convention itself, which reflects the fact that the book
is an incomplete formalization. Students often do not realize they are working
with a metalogic, much less a metalogic to which this convention applies. Still,
the inferences they make are adequate for the tasks at hand.
This bears repeating: although students may not appreciate the logic in-
volved, the inferences they make are sufficient for the immediate applications.
If it were important to teach metalogic in a discrete mathematics course, the
book could be refined to do so. In the view of the authors of [GS93b], how-
ever, no such refinement is necessary, and the obvious, informal, and somewhat
oversimplified inference methods the students already make are sufficient.
The case regarding typing of expressions of type OE is similar. The authors
of [GS93b] explicitly acknowledge types in the book but do not present a formal
type-inference method. Clearly, they feel the type inferences necessary for the
demands placed on their students are obvious. Throughout the book, types are
either explicitly provided or simply inferred; no significant instruction on type
inference is provided in the textbook, and for the most part, none is needed.
Students understand and perform some kind of obvious type inference without
such inference methods being explicitly taught in the textbook.
These areas (solving OV-inequalities, establishing OE-typing) were salient
aspects of calculational inference for which our treatment is complementary
to that of [GS93b]. From a cognitive perspective, our model is a significant
advance over [GS93b] in previously unelaborated areas like these. Our model
has significant modules for both of these kinds of inference, and the textbook
provides little or no prescriptive guidance for how the inferences should be car-
ried out. This merits emphasis: our tactics model people, not merely methods
given in a book.
As such, some tactics perform inferences that are not explained in [GS93b]
but on which people nonetheless succeed. In this way, such tactics can be
construed as identifying and explaining obvious inferences (in the context of
tasks presented to students using [GS93b]). The correctness of this notion of
obvious inference and our model of it are certainly debatable. If we could not
identify and model a notion of obvious inference, however, we could not even
begin to debate it.
This reflects a significant virtue of our cognitive modeling method, which
could potentially contribute in two areas. Clearly, an investigation of which
inferences are obvious and which are not is of benefit to the psychology of
inference. In addition, a computational model or theory of obvious inference
can provide benefits in the computer science field of automated reasoning.3 For
3We refer readers to McAllester’s paper [McA91] for an interesting approach to a com-
putational theory of obvious inference. We do not propose our own theory of obvious
inferences; we suggest a methodological criterion for identifying inferences implicit in a ped-
agogical presentation, and we suggest that such inferences may accurately be considered
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instance, automated mathematical assistants become significantly more useful
when they prevent users from spending time on obvious inferences; indeed,
this is the major use of the Auto tactic in Nuprl.
7.4 Simple Inference Methods
Any introductory-level textbook should strive for simplicity, taking care not
to be too demanding on students. In the context of the calculational approach
taught in [GS93b], our focus on developing a detailed cognitive model gives us
an atypical perspective on the pedagogical issue of simplicity. In particular,
we have a formal, computational perspective on how simple the methods used
by students really are, and we can discuss simplicity in a formal, well-specified
framework instead of as a vague notion.
As they state in [GS93a], Gries and Schneider want their students to be-
come quickly familiar and comfortable with formal calculational methods. In-
deed, from the very beginning of [GS93b], they provide examples and exercises
on which students can quickly succeed without learning many complex proce-
dures. The fact that simple inference methods are sufficient for the book’s full
treatment of calculational predicate logic, however, was not initially apparent.
Our modeling approach permits us to now discuss in detail the ways in which
the pedagogical approach of [GS93b] permits students to succeed after learning
only a few simple inference methods.
As previously mentioned, [GS93b] does not fully describe or formalize all
the inference methods actually used by students. In contrast, our tactic model
exposes a collection of inference methods sufficient for understanding a signifi-
cant body of calculational logic proofs in minute detail. This formalization led
to an unexpected result: there are not many such methods in our tactic model.
We had not anticipated that so many of the examples in [GS93b] —including
the steps of the Change of Dummy proof— could be explained with only six
basic kinds of inference: list membership judgments, solving OV-inequalities,
free variable judgments, OE-typing, object theoremhood judgments, and Leib-
niz inference.4 At the user level, we did not need to directly reason about
constructs like object type expressions or type assignment updates in much
detail, but there was no a priori reason to believe this would be unnecessary.
The fact that so few user-level inference forms are sufficient is an indication
of the simplicity and accessibility of the pedagogical approach of [GS93b], one
that might not be clear without a formalized model on which to base such an
observation.
“obvious”.
4Leibniz inference does establish object theoremhood, but because it has so much unique
detail, we consider it separately from the other methods we implemented for object theo-
remhood judgments.
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Our tactics that model the major user-level inference forms embody only a
few assumptions and simple machinations; the fact that such simple methods
were sufficient was another unexpected result. For example, after general-
purpose pre-processing, our tactics prove OV-inequalities by straightforward
matching against either an OV-inequality hypothesis or a free variable not-
occurrence proposition; as described in chapter 6, the strategies involved are
direct and simple in both cases. The examples in the book might have required
far more sophisticated techniques, perhaps involving reasoning about type
expressions, but none were needed.
This observation that simple methods suffice also applies to the other major
user-level inference forms. In our model, it even extends beyond tactics to the
simplicity of the type guessing and Leibniz instantiation heuristics that we
demonstrated were sufficient for the examples in the book. All of this further
supports our observation that [GS93b] is designed to facilitate quick success
from the students who use it. We found it genuinely interesting and somewhat
surprising that tactics as simple as ours were so effective on the material in
the book.
Our perspective as model developers also brought another specific instance
of simplification to light. There are three inference rules called Leibniz in
[GS93b]. (Their Gries/Schneider representations are in Table 6.8; for conve-
nience, we repeat them here.)
P = Q
E[z := P ] = E[z := Q]
(7.1)
P = Q
(?x E[z := P ] : S) = (?x E[z := Q] : S)
(7.2)
R ⇒ P = Q
(?x R : E[z := P ]) = (?x R : E[z := Q])
(7.3)
From a logic-based perspective, one of them is redundant: rule (7.2) follows
from rule (7.3). Indeed, we were tempted to streamline our computational
model by including only two Leibniz rules, omitting the redundant one. We
did not, however, because we found a significant computational and cognitive
reason to keep all three: rule (7.2) permits Leibniz instantiation into the range
of a quantifier expression without requiring a change of bound variables (and
the accompanying alpha-equality reasoning). Were it not for this rule, proofs
would be significantly more complicated, with every Leibniz instantiation into
a quantifier range requiring the use of some alpha-equality rule as well. This
would be both a computational burden for our model and a cognitive burden
for students who might not be comfortable with alpha equality yet. Thus,
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the reason we elected to include that “extra” Leibniz rule corresponds to yet
another pedagogical simplification in [GS93b].
Overall, our tactic-based model was unexpectedly rewarding from the per-
spective of reflecting the pedagogically motivated simplicity in [GS93b]. One
of the compelling features of tactics in any context, not just this one, is that
they can capture high-level, even human-level inferences. We see the simplicity
of our tactic model as reflecting the design of [GS93b] to teach without being
too demanding on students; we modeled the cognitive inferences of a student
who has not needed to learn much extraneous methodology to achieve success
at calculational proof. This correspondence between the goal of the textbook
[GS93b] and our tactic model is satisfying and encouraging.
Lastly, analogous to a virtue of our method in the context of obvious infer-
ence, our model provides a detailed basis for discussing the role of simplicity
in the pedagogy of [GS93b] that might not otherwise exist. It is not necessary
to discuss pedagogical simplifications abstractly, without concrete elements to
which one can point for examples. With the framework that results from our
modeling approach, we can present concrete areas for discussion; we can list
particular inference methods before asking if they are the right ones to teach
or if more sophisticated methods should be included. Once again, it is not our
primary goal to opine on this topic of pedagogy (although it does seem that
the goal of Gries and Schneider of allowing their students early, encouraging
success is a good one). We instead wish to emphasize that the increased un-
derstanding of calculational logic that emerges from our modeling method can
support contributions to the discussion of pedagogy.
7.5 Concluding/General Remarks
As a basis for understanding the philosophy of Gries and Schneider and for
evaluating the effectiveness of their book, we present here some of their peda-
gogical goals, taken from points of emphasis in the teachers’ guide [GS93a].
• Demonstrate that the calculational approach to logic is useful.
• Instill confidence in syntactic manipulation.
• Dispel the fear of mathematics.
• Provide quick success with the new approach.
In some ways, our formalization and model suggest that the authors have
indeed achieved their goals. They apply logical methods in an interesting way,
presenting an incompletely formalized metalogic that provides a framework
for studying a range of topics in discrete mathematics. Their approach is
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consistent with the ideas behind calculational methods in general; the ma-
jor user-level inference forms would be considered syntax-based judgments
(OV-inequality, free variable occurrence judgments, etc.) by the programming
methodology research community from which calculational methods emerged,
and they can all be performed by relying heavily on syntax-oriented problem
solving methods. Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of pedagogy,
the authors help ensure that students quickly gain comfort with this style of
mathematics. They have presented an effectively calculational approach, and
they seem to effectively teach that approach.5
As an incomplete formalization of a (meta-)logical method, however, the
textbook has significant problems that became clear under the scrutiny re-
quired by our approach to modeling. The concise presentation in the book may
not pay adequate attention to typing concerns. It may acclimate students to
inaccuracies in logic, which may not be a pedagogical virtue. Further, it may
prevent students from becoming comfortable working outside of a metalogical
framework when they are called upon to grasp object logics. For example, stu-
dents may not understand why they cannot use textual substitution as part
of an object logic.
Indeed, the methods taught seem to suffice for the examples in the text-
book, but effective texts teach skills useful beyond their immediate context.
The hidden difficulties in [GS93b] make it less effective in this sense: it seems
successful in teaching the calculational approach and comfort with syntactic
manipulation but less successful in actually teaching logic. Certainly, a fully
formalized metalogic would overwhelm novice students, and it is not required
to make the book effective as a pedagogical tool; in its informality, the ap-
proach in [GS93b] is similar to that taken in established texts such as [HC68].
Nonetheless, in some ways, “A Logical Approach. . . ” might be even more
effective if it explicitly introduced the ideas of object logic and metalogic as
part of its pedagogy.
We understand that the calculational approach to discrete mathematics as
presented in [GS93b] was simply a snapshot of the authors’ understanding of
a still-developing method. It was a method that they had found successful in
actual research, and they saw that it could be valuable to students learning
discrete mathematics. We do not feel that our work is adequate grounds for a
full critique of their approach. We simply feel that it may add something to
the discussion.
As a final remark on our unusual convergence of education and compu-
tational formalized mathematics, we revisit the suggestion that our general
modeling approach could provide analogous pedagogical insights if applied to
a different textbook. By no means is one example a conclusive demonstration
of broad applicability, but we believe that the particular insights presented
5See the student comments reprinted in [GS93a] for further support.
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here can be interpreted in a larger context as support for the effectiveness
of a general technique. Considering the details of this chapter, it does not
appear that there is anything unique about calculational logic that permits
formalized inference modeling to support pedagogical insights. Suppose, for
instance, that the same overall approach had been applied to a logic with
different inference rules: certainly, the specific pedagogical results might be
different (e.g., there might not be a “redundant” Leibniz rule), but analyzing
the differences between a formalized model and an informal textbook could
still yield interesting insights (e.g., relative simplicity of inference methods,
whether a textbook is sufficiently explicit in teaching its subject matter). We
believe that detailed, algorithmic modeling of inference methods people actu-
ally use can provide benefits not only to psychology and computer science but
to critical study of pedagogy as well.
Chapter 8
Insight via Eye Movements
8.1 Introduction
As part of developing our cognitive model of calculational logic,1 we are in-
terested in applications of psychology to theorem proving, an interface largely
unexplored by past research. Frequently, the psychology of inference has fo-
cused on very specific tasks, such as categorical syllogisms or card selection
tasks (e.g., [WJL72]), or on broad ranges of behavior that have led to corre-
spondingly broad projects such as the SOAR cognitive architecture [New90].
Some important models of logical inference fall between these two extremes,
such as PSYCOP [Rip94] and the logic-oriented portion of the Mental Models
theory from Johnson-Laird [JL83], but they are not truly models of theorem
proving.
Some research, however, has applied psychological methods to study theo-
rem proving, such as the work of Melis [Mel94] on deriving useful information
for automated theorem provers by analyzing mathematicians’ written proofs
and their verbal recall of the proving process. We take a different approach, ex-
ploring the moment-by-moment computations that subserve theorem proving.
To truly reflect and simulate human cognitive behavior, we must consider not
only macrocognition on the level of “What are people writing?” but also mi-
crocognition2 such as “What are people thinking when (or before) they write?”
or, more specifically, “Where is attention directed while people search to decide
the next proof step?”
By recording and analyzing the eye movements of people while they con-
structed calculational proofs, we investigated some of our microcognitive ques-
1Readers of this chapter should be familiar with the introduction to calculational logic
in chapter 2.
2We adapt the notion of microcognition —the microstructure of cognition— from Rumel-
hart, McClelland, et al.[RM + 86]. Roughly, in their context of distributed representations,
microcognitive structures correspond to components of a larger cognitive structure.
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Figure 8.1: Diagram of the ISCAN headmounted eyetracker
tions. Although untested in the area of theorem proving, eyetracking methods
have helped experimenters in many fields of study glean unique insight into
information processing in general and into the real-time microcognition of in-
ference in particular. (For recent demonstrations of the wide applicability of
this methodology, see [BHP95, ES96, HMG92, TSKES95].)
We began our explorations with some primary questions about the process
of theorem proving, particularly focusing on attention during search, i.e., the
extent of attention paid to various features during visual search. Our exper-
iments uncovered information of practical importance for a cognitive model,
verifying expected answers —passing a baseline test, in a way, that eyetrack-
ing results are sensible in this context— as well as pointing to some more
surprising behavior and further interesting questions for future study.
8.2 Method
In our experiment, participants performed calculational proof tasks, unaided,
while we recorded their eye movements. A typical calculational proof task for
a student involves a statement to be proved, a list of premises (i.e., axioms and
previously proved theorems), and whatever procedural knowledge the student
brings to the task. Students are generally given the standard premise list (a
theorem list from the back of the text) and are not required to memorize it.
The theorems are listed in the order of their presentation in the text and are
thus roughly grouped by concept, with simpler theorems for a concept often
presented first. By using heuristics and principles elucidated in [GS93b], in-
cluding pattern matching with the premise list, students decide how to proceed
in constructing their proofs.
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Eye movements were monitored by an ISCAN eyetracker mounted on top
of a lightweight headband (Figure 8.1). The camera provided an infrared
image of the left eye sampled at 60 Hz. The center of the pupil and the
corneal reflection were tracked to determine the orbit of the eye relative to the
head. A scene camera, yoked with the view of the tracked eye, provided an
image of the subject’s field of view. Gaze position (indicated by crosshairs)
was superimposed over the scene camera image and recorded onto a Hi8 VCR
with 30 Hz frame-by-frame playback. Accuracy of the gaze position record was
about one degree of visual angle over a range of +/- 25 degrees. For purposes
of determining fixations —instances where a participant’s recorded glance on
an object lasted long enough to indicate significant attention to that object
and not an insignificant or random eye placement— we used a threshold of
roughly 200ms, or six frames of video playback.
Participants were 15 Cornell students who had completed a course for which
the Gries & Schneider book [GS93b] was the primary text. Group A (n=8) was
given problem 1(a) as their first problem, and group B (n=7) was given 1(b).
(For some results, this distinction was not relevant, and we considered the 15
subjects as a group, undivided by this condition.) The other four problems
given to participants to prove are listed here as numbers 2-5.
1(a). P ≡ P ≡ Q ≡ Q ≡ true
(b). P ≡ P ≡ Q ≡ Q ≡ true ∨ P ∨ Q
2. P ∨ Q ∨ P ∨ R ≡ Q ∨ R ≡ (P ≡ Q) ∨ (Q ∨ R)
3. P ∨ (P ≡ P ∨ Q) ≡ P ∨ Q ≡ P
4. P ∨ (P ≡ Q ∨ Q ≡ P ∨ Q) ≡ P ∨ P
5. true ∧ Q ≡ true ∨ Q ≡ Q
Before wearing the eyetracking equipment, subjects had the option of work-
ing through a warm-up exercise, a proof with no significant overlap with fea-
tures central to the studies. If needed, reminders were given about points of
general technique, such as the order of precedence of operators and definitions
of terminology. When subjects were ready, they sat in front of a whiteboard
with a premise list on its left (see Figure 8.2), and the eyetracking gear was
calibrated for them. They were then read brief instructions: They would be
given five statements (one at a time) to prove, all the necessary premises were
on the list to their left, and they should let the experimenter know when they
were done with a proof.
The experimenter presented the five statements to subjects by writing them
on a whiteboard, erased the board when subjects indicated that they were
ready to proceed, and did not answer any questions while the experiment was
in progress. This is consistent with standard practice on exams about this
material, in an attempt to recreate natural conditions as much as possible.
The experiments were videotaped and later analyzed for data collection. No
audio was considered.
139
(a) Participant’s gaze on Distributivity of ∨ over ≡
(b) Participant’s gaze on Reflexivity of ≡
Figure 8.2: Videotaped images from the headmounted eyetracker. The partic-
ipant is working on a proof he has already started, deciding what premise to
use next. He looks at the one he will eventually use (Distributivity of ∨ over
≡ ), looks at another possibility, returns to Distributivity, and finally writes
his choice. The white crosshairs indicate the particular place on the premise
list (the list on the left, visible in images a, b, and c) or the workspace (the
whiteboard on which he writes in image d) at which the participant is looking
at the moment indicated by the timestamp.
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Figure 8.2 (Continued)
(c) Participant’s gaze returns to Distributivity of ∨ over ≡
(d) Participant writes Distributivity of ∨ over ≡ in the proof step
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(3.2) Symmetry of ≡: p ≡ q ≡ q ≡ p
(3.3) Identity of ≡: true ≡ q ≡ q
(3.4) true
(3.5) Reflexivity of ≡: p ≡ p
(3.24) Symmetry of ∨: p ∨ q ≡ q ∨ p
(3.25) Associativity of ∨:
(p ∨ q) ∨ r ≡ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
(3.26) Idempotency of ∨: p ∨ p ≡ p
(3.27) Distributivity of ∨ over ≡:
p ∨ (q ≡ r) ≡ p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ r
(3.29) Zero of ∨: p ∨ true ≡ true
(3.31) Distributivity of ∨ over ∨:
p ∨ (q ∨ r) ≡ (p ∨ q) ∨ (p ∨ r)
(3.35) Golden Rule:
p ∧ q ≡ p ≡ q ≡ p ∨ q
(3.36) Symmetry of ∧: p ∧ q ≡ q ∧ p
(3.38) Idempotency of ∧: p ∧ p ≡ p
(3.39) Identity of ∧: p ∧ true ≡ p
(3.43a) Absorption: p ∧ (p ∨ q) ≡ p
(3.43b) Absorption: p ∨ (p ∧ q) ≡ p
(3.49) p ∧ (q ≡ r) ≡ p ∧ q ≡ p ∧ r ≡ p
(3.50) p ∧ (q ≡ p) ≡ p ∧ q
Figure 8.3: List of premises, as presented to participants
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The premise list given to them (Figure 8.3) contained 18 theorems taken
from the reference premise list from [GS93b], presented and labeled exactly as
written in that textbook. The given list consisted of theorems about the three
logical operators that appeared in the statements to be proved, presented in
the order in which they appeared in the text, effectively but not explicitly
grouped into theorems about ≡ (equivalence, labeled by numbers (3.2-3.5)),
∨ (disjunction, labeled (3.24-3.31)), and ∧ (conjunction, labeled (3.35-3.50)).
Theorems in a group mentioned only the operator used to classify them and
operators that appeared in preceding groups. There was nothing to lead sub-
jects to divide the premises into groups; the spacing between theorems was
uniform and no verbal cues were given. The list was adequate to prove the
five statements that subjects were given. Although (as teachers know) it is
possible to use almost any premise in an atypically creative proof, we expected
that some of the theorems on the list would serve as distracters, not useful in
any of the five proofs.
8.3 Experiment 1
Clearly, different problems result in different solutions on the level of macrorep-
resentations (e.g., full proofs). We are also interested in microrepresentations
(e.g., syntactic features considered while constructing a proof), however, so
we examined whether different initial problems resulted in different initial mi-
crocognitive behavior.
We compared groups A and B to determine whether the simple but non-
trivial addition of an operator to the initial problem statement would affect the
subjects’ initial search of the premise list or their choice of initial step in that
proof. We compared the number of fixations on Zero of ∨ (3.29), a theorem
useful to group B but not group A, and on disjunction-related theorems in
general (3.24-3.31) by members of each group.
8.3.1 Results
In group A, none of the eight subjects (0%) made recorded fixations on theorem
(3.29) when considering their first step in the proof. In contrast, in group B,
four of the seven subjects (57%) fixated theorem (3.29). We find similar results
when considering all the disjunction theorems (3.24-3.31). In group A, three
out of eight subjects (38%) fixated one or more of the disjunction theorems
during their initial search. In group B, all seven subjects (100%) fixated one
or more disjunction theorems during their initial search.
Notably, this did not result in a greatly increased usage of disjunction-
oriented premises in the first step of the proofs of group B. Only one person in
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group B made an initial step that involved the added operator; the rest used
an equivalence-oriented theorem, a step as viable for group A as for group B.
8.3.2 Discussion
The added operator did significantly alter subjects’ attention during initial
search, empirically answering a fundamental question: we cannot simply as-
sume solvers will weigh all features the same independent of the particular
problem; a cognitive model must take the features of the current problem into
account each time. While this may not seem surprising, reflecting problem-
solving skills we expect the students to have, it is important to understand
the detail in which our observations support this answer. On different prob-
lems, students do not pay attention to the same features and then use them
differently, resulting in a different proof. Instead, students actually attend to
different features. This is an example of the sort of distinction that can be
made only on the microcognitive level.
The observation that these differences did not lead to different choices for
a first proof step also confirms an important assumption behind our research:
this eyetracking paradigm can indeed yield results that are not achievable
merely by examining written proofs. Written proofs alone would not give
enough information to answer the question “Do subjects attend to the dis-
junction operator right away, or do they postpone it?”
8.4 Experiment 2
In this method of proof by rewriting, new symbols may emerge in the course
of a proof, or symbols present at one time may be rewritten away and never
reappear. This variation in the present symbols obviously leads to a variation
in the premises that subjects actually use in their proofs. Does it also alter
their behavior on the microcognitive level, changing attention during searches
of the premise list?
In this experiment, we examined whether the presence or absence of an op-
erator in the current step of a proof had an observable effect on search-space
constraints when constructing the next step of the proof. We considered in-
stances where a subject performed a rewrite step that resulted in the complete
and final elimination of an operator from the proof, such as eliminating the
last ∧ in a statement, and this elimination step was not the conclusion of the
proof. We then compared subjects’ attention during the search immediately
preceding the elimination step to their attention during the search immediately
following it.
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Table 8.1: Percentage of fixations on theorem groups before and after the
elimination of an operator
Elimination of ∧: ≡ ∨ ∧
before 25% 32% 43%
after 35% 65% 0%
Elimination of ∨: ≡ ∨ ∧
before 8% 84% 8%
after 79% 21% 0%
We analyzed all 15 subjects on all their work to see if this operator elimina-
tion affected the range of premises that subjects fixated when considering the
proof step following the operator elimination. We considered only cases where
we could make the necessary determinations with high confidence; due to poor
eyetracking calibrations and similar obstacles, we excluded some proofs from
consideration.
8.4.1 Results
In the proofs, the only operators eliminated by rewrites were ∨ and ∧ , and
we present the results accordingly. We found 19 proof steps in which a subject
eliminated some operator by a rewrite. In one such step, two operators were
eliminated simultaneously, so we consider that operator ∧ was eliminated 8
times and operator ∨ was eliminated 12 times.
In the 8 proofs in which ∧ was eliminated, subjects fixated conjunction
theorems 43% of the time immediately before its elimination and not at all
after its elimination. In the 12 proofs in which ∨ was eliminated, subjects
fixated disjunction theorems 84% of the time before its elimination and 21%
of the time after its elimination (see Table 8.1).
8.4.2 Discussion
The elimination of an operator in a proof step had a notable effect on sub-
jects’ attention during search. This result combines with that of Experiment
1 to support an important answer to a primary question: natural changes in
problem structure, both as different initial problems and as refinements during
a proof in progress, are indeed accompanied by changes in attention during
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Table 8.2: Percentages of proofs in which disjunction theorems were fixated
upon and used
Theorem Fixated Used
3.24 (Symmetry of ∨) 71% 15%
3.25 (Associativity of ∨) 85% 4%
3.26 (Idempotency of ∨) 88% 58%
3.27 (Distrib. of ∨ over ≡) 90% 41%
3.29 (Zero of ∨) 64% 32%
3.31 (Distrib. of ∨ over ∨) 62% 5%
search. (By a “natural change” in problem structure, we mean one that is
not contrived, one that would occur, for instance, in the course of a student’s
doing a typical problem set.) People’s attention during search is not static
over the course of building a calculational proof, and the changes that occur
are related in expected ways to the problems on which they are working.
8.5 Other Results
In addition to the interrelated results presented above, we observed other
patterns in the search behavior. We present one such result here; Aaron &
Spivey [AS98] contains an extended account of our observations.
8.5.1 Fixating Unused Premises
In their coursework, students become aware that some premises are cited fre-
quently and others extremely rarely in proofs. One might expect them to
pay less attention during visual search to the rarely cited premises. Across
all 15 subjects, however, there were many fixations on disjunction premises
(the range on which our eyetracking calibration was most reliable) that were
infrequently cited in proofs (see Table 8.2).
We would not be surprised to see subjects fixating each premise for perhaps
as many as 50% of the proofs. Even given their familiarity with the premise
list before the experiment, we would expect subjects to look at every premise
at least once and very likely twice in the span of the experiment. The fact that
all the percentages of fixations here are higher than 60% suggests to us that
participants paid more than minimal attention to all the disjunction premises,
considering them all potentially useful.
As further background, it should be noted that Symmetry of ∨ , Asso-
ciativity of ∨ , and Distributivity of ∨ over ∨ are cited infrequently during
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calculational logic coursework. Teachers encourage students to use Symmetry
and Associativity implicitly without citing them, and our experiment did noth-
ing to discourage that practice, encouraging natural behavior. Distributivity of
∨ over ∨ is also usually uncited: with expression P ∨ (Q ∨ R) , people gener-
ally (implicitly) use Associativity to get P ∨Q ∨ R ; with (P ∨ Q) ∨ (P ∨ R) ,
people generally (implicitly) use Associativity and Symmetry and (explicitly
use) Idempotency of ∨ to reduce the expression to P ∨ Q ∨ R , entirely
bypassing Distributivity. So, we are not surprised to note that none of these
three theorems were widely used.
We did find the amount of attention paid to these theorems noteworthy,
given their general inutility. This supports the importance of pattern match-
ing on the microcognition of calculational proving to an unexpected extent.
The frequently observed but largely uncited premises in the range (3.24-3.29)
have a strong feature-match with many of the expressions that resulted when
constructing the proofs in this experiment. Premises (3.24) and (3.25) are at
the top of the disjunction section, with (3.24) therefore being the first premise
to feature-match with the disjunction operator in a serial, top-down search
and (3.25) being the first premise to match both disjunction and parentheses,
two common and frequently co-occurring features, in a serial search. Premise
(3.31) may seem an exception to the influence of serial search, but it has a
strong feature match with one of the most useful and frequently used premises,
Distributivity of ∨ over ≡ (3.27), a match extending even to the names of the
theorems (which were present on the premise list). Hence, beyond even the
expected emphasis that calculational methods place on it, pattern matching
appears to play a surprisingly important role in attention during search for
participants at this level of expertise.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
Some of our direct experimental results are satisfying, if not surprising, to
people familiar with calculational logic, confirming for the first time their
intuitions about students’ microcognitive behavior. Other results are more
unexpected, such as the extent of attention paid to premises that are not im-
mediately used or not likely to ever be cited at all. The answers to these
previously unexplored questions jointly serve as a preliminary demonstration
that eyetracking studies can support attempts to incorporate empirically veri-
fied facts about cognitive processing in algorithmic models of logical inference.
If we were to extend our tactic-based model to a more complete problem solv-
ing process (one that included searching the premise list), such a capability
would become quite valuable. As it stands, our eyetracking results are ex-
amples of what could be done to further our understanding of the cognitive
inferences underlying calculational logic.
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In a larger sense, our results also demonstrate that eyetracking studies
can indeed provide insight into the microcognition of theorem proving that
experimenter intuition and studies of written output alone could not provide.
In fact, it directly paves the way for new applications of this experimental
procedure by providing yet another example that, far from being random, eye
movements are closely related to moment-by-moment cognitive processes.
For instance, consider the result about attention to uncited premises. Our
subjects, all of whom were relative novices to calculational methods, gener-
ally paid attention to unused premises. Would experts demonstrate the same
behavior? A method such as ours, capable of microcognitive investigation,
permits the natural continuation from the results in this paper into questions
of expert/novice distinctions. This could prove useful for a cognitive model
of calculational logic —in which we might hope to model different levels of
expertise— but it is also of independent interest to the greater field of cogni-
tive science. We see our application of eyetracking methods as both answering
existing questions and opening up new questions in the psychology of proof.
Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
By applying our general inference-modeling approach to calculational logic,
we achieved results in several specific areas:
• We formalized calculational predicate logic (as taught to students) using
a manageably sized language and conventional semantics.
• In formalizing calculational logic, we uncovered several interesting as-
pects of inference that had previously been hidden.
• We implemented a Nuprl tactic model of calculational logic inference.
As components of that model, we implemented tactics corresponding to
the major user-level inference forms of calculational logic.
• By analyzing the model and the formalization that preceded it, we gained
greater insight into the pedagogy of calculational logic.
• We demonstrated that eyetracking methods can be used to gain greater
insight into the cognition of theorem proving using calculational logic.
We believe that similar results would be achieved when applying the same
general approach to an inference task other than calculational logic and a
tactic development system other than Nuprl. As previously remarked, we
chose calculational logic and Nuprl because they were good systems to use
for establishing the feasibility of this general approach to inference modeling.
Although eyetracking experiments do require a visual component to the high-
level inference being modeled, nothing in our general approach depends upon
particulars of either calculational logic or Nuprl. With this research establish-
ing the feasibility of the approach, we believe it could fruitfully be continued
in two ways: the particular calculational logic model described here could be
extended and improved, and the general approach could be applied to other
high-level inference tasks.
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The approach results in cognitive models of high-level inference with sev-
eral desirable qualities. For instance, the formalization and tactics jointly
ensure that the models are deeply detailed and have a strong mathematical
foundation —two sought-after properties for real-time information processing
models. Eyetracking methods permit verification of descriptive accuracy on
both microcognitive and macrocognitive levels. The models resulting from
our approach are also compositional, so they can be understood component-
wise. Cognitive theories represented in tactics can be tested component-wise:
inadequate or inaccurate components could be improved or replaced without
reconstructing the rest of the model. Models of experts could differ from
models of novices merely by the content of selected tactics.
Models with these same desirable qualities could be constructed from tasks
other than calculational logic, mathematical foundations other than Nuprl’s
intuitionistic type theory, and modeling tools other than tactics. This is thor-
oughly consistent with our research. We intended only to demonstrate the
feasibility of a method for cognitive inference modeling that combines theo-
retical and applied elements of computer science and cognitive psychology to
yield wide-ranging interdisciplinary benefits.
9.1 Tactics As Cognitive Models
As part of our concluding remarks, we interpret our tactics in the cognitive
modeling context described in chapter 1. In so doing, we make explicit a
fundamental premise that has been essentially implicit in this dissertation so
far: a tactic that corresponds to a human-made inference embodies a cognitive
model of that inference, no matter how obviously flawed that model might be.1
The relative flaws or merits of tactics are not important to establish that, in a
general way, tactics can be seen as a notational/computational framework for
representing cognitive models.
In a trivial way, tactics that implement inferences that people actually
make can be interpreted as cognitive models. For some purposes, such models
may be inadequate in important ways —e.g., they might not be descriptively
accurate in reflecting the complexity of an inference or its correct component
steps in terms of actual human mental processing— but for other purposes,
they may be adequate. For instance, consider the fundamental Nuprl tac-
tic Hypothesis, which solves a proof goal if that goal matches a hypothesis.
1In fact, we believe Nuprl tactics are flawed on some level as cognitive models: we doubt
that human inference is actually based in Nuprl type theory. Flawed models, however, are
clearly not sufficient reason to discard a modeling framework. Aristotelean logic, Bayesian
probability, and Johnson-Laird’s mental models [JL83] all yield models seen as “obviously
flawed” by some, but all those frameworks have some value for cognitive modeling of infer-
ence.
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This inference is not actually atomic when people do it —for instance, the
pattern-matching of a proof goal against hypotheses is a complex process—
but for modeling high-level inferences, it may be appropriate to treat it as
if it were. Thus, tactics may be more suitable for modeling high-level logi-
cal/mathematical inferences than low-level cognitive processes.
Another concern about tactics as cognitive models is a discrepancy that
arises from a casual understanding of tactic inference and human inference:
tactics are correct, whereas there are no such guarantees about human infer-
ences. This deserves further consideration. Tactics are indeed correct with
respect to a set of primitive rules; if the rules describe valid inferences, the
tactics also do. In a flexible system such as Nuprl, the fundamental rule set
can be changed, even to introduce invalid rules.2 Therefore, the apparent re-
striction that tactics cannot model incorrect inferences is an illusion. If we
want to model the cognitive inference of a person who consistently makes a
mistaken inference,3 we can contrive a way to do this. From a logician’s per-
spective, this is an unusual and dangerous thing to do —soundness is not a
property logicians easily sacrifice— but the ability of tactics to model false
inference is significant for their viability for cognitive modeling.
9.1.1 The cognitive model embodied by our tactics
Up to this point, when considering tactics, this dissertation has been primarily
concerned with implementation-level details: details of their logical foundation
and how they are used in practice. As our work illustrates, it requires signif-
icant effort on this level to develop tactics representing complex, high-level
inferences.4 High-level investigations with tactic-based models require manag-
ing many low-level implementation details.
Historically, however, tactics are also strongly rooted in cognitive science,
derived from a theory of problem solving as part of an approach to cognition
generally. We exploited this theory and its embodiment in Nuprl to develop
our cognitive inference model. As noted in [CKB84], the ML notion of tactics
(in LCF [GMW79] and descendent systems such as Nuprl) is a formalization of
natural top-down heuristic problem solving.5 This goal-oriented problem solv-
2We employed such an invalid rule in Nuprl: the rule justifying Nuprl’s Fiat tactic.
3We include common, well-studied fallacies like “affirming the consequent” (X implies Y
and Y is true; therefore, X is true) and “denying the antecedent” (X implies Y and X is
false; therefore, Y is false) alongside less easily explained logical failures in our notion of the
mistaken inferences we might want to model.
4It may be tempting to think of writing tactics for this purpose as conceptually no
harder than writing standard algorithms/programs in a standard programming language,
but that perspective overlooks significant details. Creating tactics requires the development
of rigorous, fully detailed (and mechanically checked) proofs about abstract formulas, not
merely formalized methods for manipulating already-instantiated expressions.
5In Nuprl, the tactic mechanism was also extended to allow the study of analogy, using
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ing approach (and the theory of mind it reflects) is a key element in heuristic-
oriented systems like Logic Theorist (LT) [NSS57] and GPS [NS61]. Quoting
Minsky [Min61]:
The LT (Logic Theory) program is centered around the idea of
‘working backward’ to find a proof. . . . The heuristic technique
of working backwards yields something of a teleological process,
and LT is a forerunner of more complex systems which construct
hierarchies of goals and subgoals.
Tactic-based automated reasoning systems such as LCF, HOL [GM93], and
Nuprl are among those that construct hierarchies of goals and subgoals; they
adapted the cognition-oriented ideas of LT and GPS to represent high-level
human inference. As the designers of LCF stated in [GMW79]:
To make sense of the notion of tactic, we further postulate a binary
relation of achievement between events and goals. Many problem
solving situations can be understood as instance of these three
notions: goal, event, and achievement.
Research involving these automated reasoning systems has not directly
explored the connection to the cognitive modeling of their ancestors. This dis-
sertation is a direct (if preliminary) exploration of that connection; it can be
seen as an attempt to validate the ideas of LT and GPS by investigating how
current systems reflect those original ideas. By reaching back in this way, we
open the possibility for significant reward in two distinct but tightly related
ways. Further re-consideration of LT and GPS could, of course, yield fresh in-
sights on the old models. Novel insights into those models could also directly
apply to their descendants (LCF, Nuprl, HOL), spelling out processes for en-
riching the cognitive models of all these systems. This describes an attractive
interdependency: new insights into LT/GPS yielding cognitive improvements
in modern systems, which in turn may yield new insights into LT/GPS, with
the loop potentially continuing. We do not yet have the fully developed con-
nections needed to establish such a loop, but by emphasizing the cognitive
lineage behind our tactic-based approach to inference modeling, we perhaps
take a first step in that direction.
With that introduction, we consider our tactics as a cognitive model of
student behavior when verifying a calculational logic inference. We do not yet
have an established way to describe precisely which implementation properties
are part of the cognitive model (e.g., the division of Leibniz inference into sub-
inferences) and which are not (e.g., the representation of type OE in Nuprl
transformation tactics (that we did not discuss here) as an attempt to capture other natural
modes of cognition in the tactic framework.
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type theory). Nonetheless, we are confident that, after reading the examples
that follow, readers will be able to productively analyze our calculational logic
tactics as a cognitive model. For full details of the tactic implementation,
spelling out all the behavior of the cognitive model, see [Aar].
One aspect of our implementation with cognitive significance is the compu-
tational failure of tactics and ML functions. Major syntax errors often result
in failure, as does running Leib tac on a proof step that it cannot verify. This
computational failure corresponds to a student giving up on the problem at
hand, simply not knowing how to proceed any further. It is an integral part of
the cognitive model, embodying the fact that students sometimes get stumped.
It also opens a way to improve our implementation: augment the tactics with
a system for user interaction. That way, when a student is stumped (a tactic
fails), the teacher (user) can be asked for assistance. From many different
perspectives (e.g., cognitive modeling, automated reasoning, educational soft-
ware), it would be beneficial to model this kind of student/teacher interaction
and its results.
To discuss the typical tactic calls that do not result in computational fail-
ure, we begin by considering the highest-level inferences directly embodied
by Leib tac. On a high level, according to our model, when students are
presented with an inference to verify (including a premise and a way to in-
stantiate that premise), they follow the method given in chapter 6: they decide
which Leibniz lemma to apply, instantiate it, carry out the Leibniz substitu-
tion, match the premise needed for the Leibniz lemma against the premise
presented to them, etc. On this level of detail, the model in chapter 6 seems
plausible, but this shallow analysis fails to exploit the detail of the model. By
considering slightly lower-level behavior, other interesting factors arise, and we
are better able to evaluate the adequacy and cognitive descriptive accuracy of
the model.
For instance, consider the behavior that our model suggests for instantiat-
ing a Leibniz lemma. It seems right in suggesting that the search for a way
to instantiate the textual substitution in the Leibniz lemma is a significant
component. Using some sort of recursive descent on formula structure may
even be the way people actually arrive at that instantiation. Other aspects
of the model seem descriptively accurate for only the most novice students,
and even that assessment may be charitable. The model suggests that, when
looking for a Leibniz substitution body, students consider only possibilities
where the Leibniz variable appears once. In addition, it suggests that the only
kind of associativity/commutativity reasoning students can do automatically
(i.e., without requiring a separate proof step) is with equivalence operator ≡ .
These make the model seem descriptively inaccurate.
Further, consider the model on sub-inferences that are components of Leib-
niz inference. For OE-typing inference, it suggests that people actually keep
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track of types using structures like type assignment updates, and people actu-
ally rely heavily on proving propositions by type-assignment agreement. The
model may well be accurate on this point, but we have not tested it. Other
modeled behavior seems less cognitively plausible. On OV-inequality reason-
ing, our tactics essentially only prove propositions by referring to hypotheses.
As previously mentioned, those hypotheses are generally absent from the text-
book [GS93b], but people still perform well on these inferences. People use
methods and presumptions that we did not encode in our tactics, such as “dif-
ferent letters stand for different variables, except when obviously otherwise”.
Indeed, a detailed analysis will expose many inadequacies of our tactics
as a descriptively accurate model of cognitive inference. The fact that such a
detailed analysis is possible, however, is a significant virtue. For instance, our
model of OV-inequality reasoning may be inaccurate, but that inference has
been absent from other models,6 and our model could feasibly be improved to
remedy its inaccuracy.
Some readers will surely find other, yet-unmentioned aspects of the pro-
posed cognitive model implausible. They may have ideas on how to improve
it by adding new constructs or changing existing ones.7 Perhaps, for instance,
we failed to encode an important strategy for proving OE-typing proposi-
tions. Perhaps our data language lacks some construct that is necessary for
the model to be cognitively accurate. Such concerns can be readily addressed
in our framework for cognitive modeling; the compositional/modular structure
of the model makes it easy to alter/improve it or simply test it with different
tactics. This combination —the essentials of a detailed cognitive model and
the feasibility of extensions and improvements— is precisely the goal of our
research. Perfection is not yet the point. We are more concerned with the
approach to modeling than with one particular model.
9.2 Related Research and Future Directions
As we have mentioned, neither calculational logic nor Nuprl are essential for
our approach to cognitive modeling. Continuing our research could therefore
take several directions, including further feasibility demonstrations regarding
the general approach, applications to calculational logic, and applications to
other inference tasks.
6For instance, the book [GS93b] from which students were taught did not mention OV-
inequality reasoning.
7The author is one such reader.
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9.2.1 Extending the model
Throughout this dissertation, we have mentioned the possibility of extending
our tactics to cover more of textbook [GS93b]. There are several other pos-
sible extensions of computational and cognitive interest, such as integrating
eyetracking results into the model. Our feasibility demonstration for the ac-
tual computational model centered on the major user-level inference forms;
our eyetracking results involved higher-level tasks (e.g., searching for premises
to use in Leibniz inferences), so we did not incorporate them into the model.
It would certainly be possible to run further eyetracking experiments to get
results that could be used in the model or extend the current model to the
point where our current eyetracking results could apply.
In addition, the model as described does not account for many factors that
are important from a cognitive science perspective. For instance, we have not
yet made any effort to model human memory recall and recognition in our
model. We could make such a model, creating the necessary routines and data
structures in the programming language ML. (Recall that tactics are part of
ML in Nuprl.) Other than the expressiveness constraints on all programming
languages, we would be unbounded in what kinds of memory models we could
implement, from simple, brute force methods to complex spreading activation
models (e.g., [Kli94]). Part of the strength of our approach is that it can be
so powerfully extended.
Implementing a complex memory model in ML might be quite difficult. In-
deed, implementing our complex tactic model took considerable effort, mostly
in establishing its foundation. Once the fundamental modules were written,
things moved much more quickly; we had essentially created a small library of
tactics for the component inferences of calculational logic, so all we needed to
do for further development was apply them, not re-create them. For large cog-
nitive inference modeling tasks, this process of developing a library or toolkit
of modules is an extremely useful preliminary to creating the actual model,
and should perhaps be seen as a separate task altogether. Indeed, one can
view this dissertation as describing a library of modular tactics for use in
modeling calculational logic, along with the theory behind the modules and a
demonstration that they work in the case of a simple model. A similar library
could be assembled for adding memory-modeling features, and once it was
implemented, creating the actual model might not be so demanding.
Another advantage of such a library would be its support of experimen-
tation. For instance, several important issues could be explored by inves-
tigating the results of replacing one module with another from the library:
expert/novice distinctions, the results of different inference strategies, the re-
sults of emphasizing certain concepts (as if they had been freshly taught) in
problem solving, etc.
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9.2.2 Applications to other tasks
Although our general approach could be applied to many high-level infer-
ence tasks, the model we presented in this dissertation was intended only
for theorem proving. Like any computational/algorithmic model of high-level
inference, it has some similarities to PSYCOP [Rip94] and other models of
human inference, but those other projects are not geared to theorem proving.
Our cognitive model is more similar to structures in automated mathematical
proof assistants like Omega [SKM99].8 We were not creating a comprehen-
sive cognitive architecture (e.g., SOAR [New90]) or a model of general human
problem-solving behavior; we were creating a model of formal, mathematical
inference.
Nonetheless, there are aspects of our research that could be adapted for
non-mathematical high-level inference tasks. For instance, the incorporation of
visual attention in a deeply detailed model of inference lends itself to important
questions in decision making, like what information a person actually attends
to and uses in making a decision. The issue of what strategies are used in
focusing and refocusing attention during decision making is also interesting.
By adapting our method, we can study issues like how previously observed
information affects where a person next focuses visual attention.
Such adaptations may be applicable to several disparate communities.
Web-based technologies focus users’ visual attention on presentations and
products, and the focusing and refocusing process determines whether a point
of pedagogy is communicated, whether a viewer is persuaded, whether a sale is
made. The military must provide screens of information to strategic and tacti-
cal decision makers without flooding them with unnecessary or incomprehen-
sible detail.9 For life-critical occupations such as airline pilot, train engineer,
and traffic controller, it is important to determine what level of granularity
of information is sufficient to ensure safety without overwhelming or disrupt-
ing their abilities to focus attention. These need not be related to tactics in
any way, but we believe that the general framework —formalize an inference
method, create compositional models about which one can prove properties,
and apply eyetracking methods to gain insight into the inference method— can
be fruitfully adapted to such new contexts. Further, if someone applying this
general framework wanted their model to be compositional, detailed enough
to expose hidden inferences, and formalized in such a way that it could be
proved correct with respect to a set of underlying rules, tactics might well be
good tools to use.
8Omega is well suited for cognitive modeling. It has wide-ranging, well-developed capac-
ities for representing inference methods and permitting interaction between such represen-
tations.
9In this military context, this suggestion is similar to work done by Marshall [M + ].
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Computers are the tools of choice for constructing and applying practical
models of high-level cognitive inference. Their successful widespread appli-
cation for this purpose demonstrates that this confluence of applied logic,
artificial intelligence, and cognitive science results in both practical and theo-
retical advancements. Our approach to cognitive modeling complements other
approaches in many significant ways. It provides greater understanding of the
inference method being modeled. It results in a substantial library of tactics
that not only constitute a cognitive model but also serve as building blocks
for future models. It draws interesting insights about computation and psy-
chology alike from its eyetracking component. Perhaps most importantly, it
opens the inference method being modeled (and its related psychology) so that
new questions about it can be fruitfully pursued. Our work demonstrates the
feasibility of our approach, suggesting that future research could be applied
in various ways: as a part of further investigations into calculational logic,
as part of existing projects pertaining to high-level cognitive inference (e.g.,
[Mel94, M + ]), or even to open up a previously unstudied inference method to
exploration by both cognitive and computational sciences.
Appendix A
Highlights of the Nuprl
Implementation
This appendix contains a listing of selected material from our Nuprl imple-
mentation of calculational logic inference. It presents typical code; it does not
contain code for every procedure mentioned in the body of the dissertation. It
has been automatically generated (except for the choice of included objects)
by a Nuprl facility for printing hard copies of Nuprl objects. The kinds of
objects listed here (and how they are indicated in the listing) are:
ABS abstractions, which are definitions of terms
ML ML programs and tactics
THM theorems
The objects are listed immediately below. Following it in section A.1 is
an alphabetical index for this listing. The number next to each object name
in the index refers to the position of that object in the listing. Abstraction
objects are alphabetically sorted by display form; display forms are presented
alongside the abstraction names.
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___
Not_onlist(elt,l:T) ABS notonlist_gen {1}
== Case of l
null → True
h.t → ¬ h = elt ∈ T & Not_onlist(elt,t:T)
{recursive}
___
THM notonlist_gen_wf {2}
∀ elt:T, l:T List. Not_onlist(elt,l:T) ∈ Prop
___
Distinct_elts(l,T) ABS alleltsdiff_gen {3}
== Case of l
null → True
h.t → Not_onlist(h,t:T) & Distinct_elts(t,T)
{recursive}
___
THM alleltsdiff_gen_wf {4}
∀ l:T List. Distinct_elts(l,T) ∈ Prop
allonlist(A; L1; L2) ABS allonlist {5}
== ∀ x:A. x onlist(A) L1 ⇒ x onlist(A) L2
THM allonlist_wf {6}
∀ L1,L2:A List. allonlist(A; L1; L2) ∈ Prop
___
zip(L1,L2) ABS zip {7}
== Case of L1
null → nil
h.t → Case of L2
null → nil
x.y → <h,x>.zip(t,y)
{recursive}
___
THM zip_wf {8}
∀ L1:T List, L2:T2 List. zip(L1,L2) ∈ (T× T2) List
OGT == N 2 ABS OGT {9}
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IND_O == 0 ABS oindtype {10}
IND_O ∈ OGT THM oindtype_wf {11}
B _O == 1 ABS obooltype {12}
B _O ∈ OGT THM obooltype_wf {13}
Qind == N 2 ABS quantind {14}
Qind∃ == 1 ABS qind_exists {15}
Qind∃ ∈ Qind THM qind_exists_wf {16}
Qind∀ == 0 ABS qind_all {17}
Qind∀ ∈ Qind THM qind_all_wf {18}
OTS == OGT× N ABS obtypsigs {19}
ABS ots_form {20}
ots(gdtype,degree) == <gdtype,degree>
THM ots_form_wf {21}
∀ gdtype:OGT, degree:N . ots(gdtype,degree) ∈ OTS
ind(n) == ots(IND_O,n) ABS indsig {22}
∀ n:N . ind(n) ∈ OTS THM indsig_wf {23}
ind ∈ {ind, bool} THM indsig_wf2 {24}
bool(n) == ots(B _O,n) ABS boolsig {25}
∀ n:N . bool(n) ∈ OTS THM boolsig_wf {26}
bool ∈ {ind, bool} THM boolsig_wf2 {27}
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ABS IndBool {28}
{ind, bool} == {x:OTS| x = bool ∨ x = ind}
OPIDS == N 5 ABS OPIDS {29}
ABS oebv {30}
oebv(opid; posn) == if opid= 2 4→ 1 else 0 fi
THM oebv_wf {31}
∀ opid:OPIDS, posn:N . oebv(opid; posn) ∈ N 2
opid_f == 0 ABS opid_false {32}
opid_f ∈ OPIDS THM opid_false_wf {33}
opid_all == 4 ABS opid_all {34}
opid_all ∈ OPIDS THM opid_all_wf {35}
opid_eq == 3 ABS opid_eq {36}
opid_eq ∈ OPIDS THM opid_eq_wf {37}
opid_imp == 2 ABS opid_imp {38}
opid_imp ∈ OPIDS THM opid_imp_wf {39}
opid_ap == 1 ABS opid_ap {40}
opid_ap ∈ OPIDS THM opid_ap_wf {41}
ABS oesbtms {42}
oesbtms(opid) == if opid= 2 0→ 0 ;opid= 2 4→ 1 else 2 fi
∀ opid:OPIDS. oesbtms(opid) ∈ N THM oesbtms_wf {43}
IDENT == Atom× N ABS ident {44}
___
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no_2ofs_equal(L) ABS no_2ofs_equal {45}
== ∀ x1,x2:(IDENT× IDENT).
¬ x1 = x2 &
x1 onlist(IDENT× IDENT) L &
x2 onlist(IDENT× IDENT) L
⇒
¬ 2of(x1) = 2of(x2)
___
THM no_2ofs_equal_wf {46}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List. no_2ofs_equal(L) ∈ Prop
___
all_2ofs_diff(L) ABS all_2ofs_diff {47}
== Case of L
null → True
h.t → (∀ k:(IDENT× IDENT).
k onlist(IDENT× IDENT) t ⇒
¬ 2of(h) = 2of(k) ∈ IDENT) &
all_2ofs_diff(t)
{recursive}
___
THM all_2ofs_diff_wf {48}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List. all_2ofs_diff(L) ∈ Prop
PossBV(opid;posn) ABS PossBV {49}
== if oebv(opid; posn)= 2 1→ IDENT else Unit fi
THM PossBV_wf {50}
∀ opid:OPIDS, posn:N . PossBV(opid;posn) ∈ Type
ABS renamed_var {51}
ren’dvar(x,num) == <1of(x),num+1>
THM renamed_var_wf {52}
∀ x:IDENT, num:N . ren’dvar(x,num) ∈ IDENT
ABS ident2 {53}
ident2(identifier) == 2of(identifier)
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THM ident2_wf {54}
∀ identifier:IDENT. ident2(identifier) ∈ N
___
all_2ofs_gtr_n(L,n) ABS all_2ofs_gtr_n {55}
== Case of L
null → True
h.t → ident2(2of(h)) > n & all_2ofs_gtr_n(t,n)
{recursive}
___
THM all_2ofs_gtr_n_wf {56}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List, n:N . all_2ofs_gtr_n(L,n) ∈ Prop
___
max_ident_num(L) ABS max_ident_num {57}
== Case of L
null → 0
h.t → imax(ident2(h);max_ident_num(t))
{recursive}
___
THM max_ident_num_wf {58}
∀ L:IDENT List. max_ident_num(L) ∈ N
id1= 2 id2 ABS eq_ident {59}
== ident1(id1)= 2 ident1(id2)∈ Atom∧ 2
(ident2(id1)= 2 ident2(id2))
∀ id1,id2:IDENT. id1= 2 id2 ∈ B THM eq_ident_wf {60}
$t|$n == <"$t",$n> ABS ident_literal_form {61}
OE ABS obexpn {62}
== rec(OE.IDENT+i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j))
ABS assoc_mod_iff {63}
equal_mod_AC_props(A;B) == PRIMITIVE
THM assoc_mod_iff_wf {64}
∀ A,B:OE. equal_mod_AC_props(A;B) ∈ Prop
___
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alleltsdiff(l) ABS alleltsdiff {65}
== Case of l
null → True
h.t → notonlist(h; l) & alleltsdiff(t)
{recursive}
___
THM alleltsdiff_wf {66}
∀ l:OE List. alleltsdiff(l) ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_mp {67}
thm_mp(exp,f,reccall1,reccall2)
== exp = f ∈ OE & reccall1 & reccall2
THM thmclause_mp_wf {68}
∀ exp,f:OE, reccall1,reccall2:Prop.
thm_mp(exp,f,reccall1,reccall2) ∈ Prop
is_a_ovar(ov) == isl(ov) ABS is_a_ovar {69}
∀ ov:OE. is_a_ovar(ov) ∈ B THM is_a_ovar_wf {70}
(∀ p|:q) == inr(<4,λ posn.<q,p>>) ABS oforall {71}
∀ p:IDENT, q:OE. (∀ p|:q) ∈ OE THM oforall_wf {72}
ABS oeq {73}
p = q == inr(<3,λ posn.if posn= 2 0→ <p, · > else <q, · > fi>)
∀ p,q:OE. p = q ∈ OE THM oeq_wf {74}
ABS thmclause_equiv_as_eq {75}
thm_equiv_as_eq(exp,a,b,reccall)
== exp = a = b & reccall
THM thmclause_equiv_as_eq_wf {76}
∀ exp,a,b:OE, reccall:Prop.
thm_equiv_as_eq(exp,a,b,reccall) ∈ Prop
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p ⇒ q ABS oimp {77}
== inr(<2,λ posn.if posn= 2 0→ <p, · > else <q, · > fi>)
∀ p,q:OE. (p ⇒ q) ∈ OE THM oimp_wf {78}
ABS thmclause_arrow_intro {79}
thm_arrow_intro(exp,e,f,reccall)
== exp = (e ⇒ f) & reccall
THM thmclause_arrow_intro_wf {80}
∀ exp,e,f:OE, reccall:Prop.
thm_arrow_intro(exp,e,f,reccall) ∈ Prop
f == inr(<0,λ posn.0>) ABS ofalse {81}
f ∈ OE THM ofalse_wf {82}
t == f ⇒ f ABS otrue {83}
t ∈ OE THM otrue_wf {84}
u_b == if b =_Qind 0→ t else f fi ABS unit_qind {85}
∀ b:Qind. u_b ∈ OE THM unit_qind_wf {86}
¬ p == p ⇒ f ABS onot {87}
∀ p:OE. (¬ p) ∈ OE THM onot_wf {88}
(∃ x|:p) == ¬ (∀ x|:¬ p) ABS oexists {89}
∀ x:IDENT, p:OE. (∃ x|:p) ∈ OE THM oexists_wf {90}
p ∨ q == ¬ p ⇒ q ABS oor {91}
∀ p,q:OE. p ∨ q ∈ OE THM oor_wf {92}
p ∧ q == ¬ ¬ p ∨ ¬ q ABS oand {93}
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∀ p,q:OE. p ∧ q ∈ OE THM oand_wf {94}
ABS q_op_infix {95}
r *_b p == if b =_Qind 0→ r ∧ p else r ∨ p fi
∀ b:Qind, r,p:OE. r *_b p ∈ OE THM q_op_infix_wf {96}
ABS suchthat_qind {97}
s.t.(b,r,p) == if b =_Qind 0→ r ⇒ p else r ∧ p fi
THM suchthat_qind_wf {98}
∀ b:Qind, r,p:OE. s.t.(b,r,p) ∈ OE
p ≡ q == p ⇒ q ∧ q ⇒ p ABS oequiv {99}
∀ p,q:OE. p ≡ q ∈ OE THM oequiv_wf {100}
Ovar(X) == inl(X) ABS ovar {101}
∀ X:IDENT. Ovar(X) ∈ OV THM ovar_wf2 {102}
∀ X:IDENT. Ovar(X) ∈ OE THM ovar_wf {103}
$vname_ov == Ovar(<"$vname",0>) ABS ovar_lit {104}
IsOvar(Y) == ∃ X:IDENT. Ovar(X) = Y ABS IsOvar {105}
∀ Y:OE. IsOvar(Y) ∈ Prop THM IsOvar_wf {106}
OV == {Y:OE| ∃ X:IDENT. Ovar(X) = Y} ABS obvar {107}
ABS otse_agree {108}
(otse1,otse2 agree on x) == otse1(x) = otse2(x) ∈ OTS
THM otse_agree_wf {109}
∀ otse1:(OV→ OTS), x:OV, otse2:(OV→ OTS).
(otse1,otse2 agree on x) ∈ Prop
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identofovar(ov) == outl(ov) ABS identofovar {110}
THM identofovar_wf {111}
∀ ov:OV. identofovar(ov) ∈ IDENT
(*_b x|:p) ABS emptyrangequant {112}
== if b =_Qind 0→ (∀ identofovar(x)|:p)
else (∃ identofovar(x)|:p) fi
THM emptyrangequant_wf {113}
∀ b:Qind, x:OV, p:OE. (*_b x|:p) ∈ OE
___
(*_b xs | r : p) ABS qstar {114}
== Case of xs
null → s.t.(b,r,p)
h.t → (*_b h|:(*_b t | r : p))
{recursive}
___
THM qstar_wf {115}
∀ b:Qind, xs:OV List, r,p:OE. (*_b xs | r : p) ∈ OE
ABS ol_exists {116}
ol_exists(xs; r; p) == (*_1 xs | r : p)
THM ol_exists_wf {117}
∀ xs:OV List, r,p:OE. ol_exists(xs; r; p) ∈ OE
ABS ol_all {118}
ol_all(xs; r; p) == (*_0 xs | r : p)
THM ol_all_wf {119}
∀ xs:OV List, r,p:OE. ol_all(xs; r; p) ∈ OE
ABS eq_ov {120}
x= 2 y == identofovar(x)= 2 identofovar(y)
∀ x,y:OV. x= 2 y ∈ B THM eq_ov_wf {121}
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eq_OV(x,y) == x= 2 y ABS eqovsep {122}
eq_OV ∈ OV→ OV→ B THM eqovsep_wf {123}
ABS obap {124}
p(q) == inr(<1,λ posn.if posn= 2 0→ <p, · > else <q, · > fi>)
∀ p,q:OE. p(q) ∈ OE THM obap_wf {125}
ABS non_ov {126}
NonOV == {Y:OE| ¬ (∃ X:IDENT. Ovar(X) = Y)}
ABS opid_of_OE {127}
opid_of_OE(obexpn) == 1of(outr(obexpn))
THM opid_of_OE_wf {128}
∀ obexpn:NonOV. opid_of_OE(obexpn) ∈ OPIDS
ABS fn_of_OE {129}
fn_of_OE(obexpn) == 2of(outr(obexpn))
___
∀ obexpn:NonOV. THM fn_of_OE_wf {130}
fn_of_OE(obexpn)
∈ j:N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(obexpn))→ OE×
PossBV(opid_of_OE(obexpn);j)
___
ABS nthsbtm {131}
nthsbtm(oe,posn) == 1of(fn_of_OE(oe)(posn))
THM nthsbtm_wf {132}
∀ oe:NonOV, posn:N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(oe)).
nthsbtm(oe,posn) ∈ OE
___
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Case of term:OE ABS OEcase {133}
Ovar(x) → varfn(x)
f → falsecase
u(v) → apfn(u;v)
u⇒ v → impfn(u;v)
u=v → eqlfn(u;v)
(∀ x|:v) → allfn(x;u)
== Case of term
inl(x) → varfn(x)
inr(y) → if
opid_of_OE(term)= 2 0→ falsecase
;opid_of_OE(term)= 2 1→
apfn(nthsbtm(term,0);nthsbtm(term,1))
;opid_of_OE(term)= 2 2→
impfn(nthsbtm(term,0);nthsbtm(term,1))
;opid_of_OE(term)= 2 3→
eqlfn(nthsbtm(term,0);nthsbtm(term,1))
else allfn(2of(fn_of_OE(term)(0))
;nthsbtm(term,0)) fi
___
ABS bv_of_OE {134}
bv_of_OE(oe,posn) == 2of(fn_of_OE(oe)(posn))
{returns IDENT or UNIT }
THM bv_of_OE_wf {135}
∀ oe:NonOV, posn:N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(oe)).
bv_of_OE(oe,posn) ∈ PossBV(opid_of_OE(oe);posn)
___
is_bvar_in_OE(id,exp) ABS is_bvar_in_OE {136}
== if
is_a_ovar(exp)→ False
;opid_of_OE(exp)= 2 opid_f→ False
;opid_of_OE(exp)= 2 opid_all→
bv_of_OE(exp,0) = id ∈ IDENT ∨ is_bvar_in_OE(
id,nthsbtm(exp,0))
else is_bvar_in_OE(id,nthsbtm(exp,0))
∨ is_bvar_in_OE(id,nthsbtm(exp,1)) fi
{recursive}
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___
THM is_bvar_in_OE_wf {137}
∀ exp:OE, id:IDENT. is_bvar_in_OE(id,exp) ∈ Prop
___
Osubstn_ready(E,n) ABS osubstn_ready {138}
== ∀ id:IDENT. is_bvar_in_OE(id,E) ⇒ ident2(id) > n
___
THM osubstn_ready_wf {139}
∀ E:OE, n:Z . Osubstn_ready(E,n) ∈ Prop
___
hnum_aux(e) ABS hnum_aux {140}
== if
is_a_ovar(e)→ ident2(identofovar(e))
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_f→ 0
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_all→
imax(ident2(bv_of_OE(e,0));hnum_aux(nthsbtm(e,0)))
else imax(hnum_aux(nthsbtm(e,0));
hnum_aux(nthsbtm(e,1))) fi
{recursive}
___
∀ x:OE. hnum_aux(x) ∈ N THM hnum_aux_wf {141}
___
hnum(es) ABS hnum {142}
== Case of es
null → 0
x.y → imax(hnum_aux(x);hnum(y))
{recursive}
{Note it’s for use in big_ident_num }
___
∀ es:OE List. hnum(es) ∈ N THM hnum_wf {143}
___
170
big_ident_num(e,Vs,Ps) ABS big_ident_num {144}
== imax(hnum_aux(e);imax(max_ident_num(Vs);hnum(Ps)))
{This is to get the number above which all bd vars need to
be rewritten for substitution.}
___
THM big_ident_num_wf {145}
∀ e:OE, Vs:IDENT List, Ps:OE List.
big_ident_num(e,Vs,Ps) ∈ N
___
(v occurs free in e) ABS Ofree {146}
== if
is_a_ovar(e)→ e = v ∈ OV
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_f→ False
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_all→
v 6= Ovar(bv_of_OE(e,0))∈ OV &
(v occurs free in nthsbtm(e,0))
else (v occurs free in nthsbtm(e,0)) ∨ ... fi
{recursive}
{this is for one OV and one expression }
___
THM Ofree_wf {147}
∀ e:OE, v:OV. (v occurs free in e) ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_all_elim2 {148}
thm_all_elim2(exp,e,x,reccall)
== exp = e ∈ OE & reccall & ¬ (x occurs free in e)
THM thmclause_all_elim2_wf {149}
∀ exp,e:OE, reccall:Prop, x:OV.
thm_all_elim2(exp,e,x,reccall) ∈ Prop
___
171
ABS Es_notoccurs {150}
{OV v not occur free in any OE in Es }
Es_not_occurs(v,Es)
== Case of Es
null → True
h.t → ¬ (v occurs free in h) & Es_not_occurs(v,t)
{recursive}
___
THM Es_notoccurs_wf {151}
∀ Es:OE List, v:OV. Es_not_occurs(v,Es) ∈ Prop
___
(no vs

+  occur free in Es) ABS NotOcc_vsfirst {152}
== Case of vs
null → True
h.t → Es_not_occurs(h,Es) &
(no t

+  occur free in Es)
{recursive}
___
∀ vs:OV List, Es:OE List. THM NotOcc_vsfirst_wf {153}
(no vs

+  occur free in Es) ∈ Prop
___
ABS vs_notoccurs {154}
{no OV in vs occurs free in OE E }
vs_not_occurs(vs,E)
== Case of vs
null → True
h.t → ¬ (h occurs free in E) & vs_not_occurs(t,E)
{recursive}
___
THM vs_notoccurs_wf {155}
∀ vs:OV List, E:OE. vs_not_occurs(vs,E) ∈ Prop
___
(no vs occur free in Es

+  ) ABS NotOcc_Esfirst {156}
== Case of Es
null → True
h.t → vs_not_occurs(vs,h) &
(no vs occur free in t

+  )
{recursive}
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___
∀ Es:OE List, vs:OV List. THM NotOcc_Esfirst_wf {157}
(no vs occur free in Es

+  ) ∈ Prop
___
ABS Esoccurs {158}
{does OV v occur free in some OE in Es }
Esoccurs(v,Es)
== Case of Es
null → False
h.t → (v occurs free in h) ∨ Esoccurs(v,t)
{recursive}
___
THM Esoccurs_wf {159}
∀ Es:OE List, v:OV. Esoccurs(v,Es) ∈ Prop
___
ABS Occurs_vsfirst {160}
{some vs free in some OE on Es; unroll vs first }
(some vs

+ 
occur free in Es)
== Case of vs
null → False
h.t → Esoccurs(h,Es) ∨ (some t

+ 
occur free in Es)
{recursive}
___
∀ vs:OV List, Es:OE List. THM Occurs_vsfirst_wf {161}
(some vs

+  occur free in Es) ∈ Prop
___
vsoccurs(vs;E) ABS vsoccurs {162}
== Case of vs
null → False
h.t → (h occurs free in E) ∨ vsoccurs(t;E)
{recursive}
___
THM vsoccurs_wf {163}
∀ E:OE, vs:OV List. vsoccurs(vs;E) ∈ Prop
___
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(some vs occur free in Es) ABS Occurs {164}
== Case of Es
null → False
h.t → vsoccurs(vs;h) ∨ (some vs occur free in t)
{recursive}
___
∀ vs:OV List, Es:OE List. THM Occurs_wf {165}
(some vs occur free in Es) ∈ Prop
___
ABS thmclause_all_intro {166}
thm_all_intro(exp,x,e,assumps,reccall)
== exp = (∀ x|:e) &
reccall &
¬ (some [x] occur free in assumps)
___
THM thmclause_all_intro_wf {167}
∀ exp:OE, x:OV, e:OE, assumps:OE List, reccall:Prop.
thm_all_intro(exp,x,e,assumps,reccall) ∈ Prop
ABS mk_nonOV {168}
mk_nonOV(opid,fn_of_oe) == inr(<opid,fn_of_oe>)
___
THM mk_nonOV_wf {169}
∀ opid:OPIDS, fn_of_oe:j:N oesbtms(opid)→ OE×
PossBV(opid;j).
mk_nonOV(opid,fn_of_oe) ∈ OE
___
THM mk_nonOV_wf2 {170}
∀ opid:OPIDS, fn_of_oe:j:N oesbtms(opid)→ OE×
PossBV(opid;j).
mk_nonOV(opid,fn_of_oe) ∈ NonOV
___
[x] == [x] ABS singlist {171}
∀ x:T. [x] ∈ T List THM singlist_wf {172}
env(V) == (IDENT× V) List ABS env_type {173}
___
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lookup_env(ident,env) ABS lookup_env {174}
== Case of env
null → inr( · )
h.t → if ident= 2 1of(h)→ inl(2of(h))
else lookup_env(ident,t) fi
{recursive}
___
∀ ident:IDENT, env:env(T). THM lookup_env_wf {175}
lookup_env(ident,env) ∈ T+Unit
___
rename_lem_env(env,L) ABS env_for_rename_lemma {176}
== Case of L
null → nil
h.t → if isl(lookup_env(1of(h),env))→
<2of(h),outl(lookup_env(1of(h),env))>
.rename_lem_env(env,t)
else rename_lem_env(env,t) fi
{recursive}
IDENTnums_gtr_n(L,n) ABS IDENTnums_gtr_n {177}
== ∀ id:IDENT.
isl(lookup_env(id,L)) ⇒
ident2(outl(lookup_env(id,L))) > n
___
THM IDENTnums_gtr_n_wf {178}
∀ L:env(IDENT), n:Z . IDENTnums_gtr_n(L,n) ∈ Prop
___
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zip_env(idents,vals) ABS zip_env {179}
== Case of idents
null → nil
h.t → Case of vals
null → nil
x.y → <h,x>.zip_env(t,y)
{recursive}
___
THM zip_env_wf {180}
∀ idents:IDENT List, vals:T List.
zip_env(idents,vals) ∈ env(T)
l@env == l @ env ABS updates_env {181}
THM updates_env_wf {182}
∀ l,env:env(T). l@env ∈ env(T)
ABS update_env {183}
update_env([var,val],env) == [<var,val>]@env
THM update_env_wf {184}
∀ var:IDENT, val:T, env:env(T).
update_env([var,val],env) ∈ env(T)
___
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rename(e,num,rewrites) ABS renamebdvars {185}
== Case of e
inl(x) → Case of lookup_env(x,rewrites)
inl(y) → Ovar(y)
inr(z) → Ovar(x)
inr(t)
→ if
opid_of_OE(e)= 2 0→ e
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 4→
(∀ <1of(bv_of_OE(e,0)),num+1>
|:rename(nthsbtm(e,0),num+1,
update_env([bv_of_OE(e,0),
<1of(bv_of_OE(e,0))
,num+1>],
rewrites)))
else mk_nonOV(opid_of_OE(e), λ posn.
if posn= 2 0→
<rename(nthsbtm(e,0),num,rewrites), · >
else <rename(nthsbtm(e,1),num,rewrites)
, · > fi) fi
{recursive}
{rewrites is a env(IDENT) }
___
THM renamebdvars_wf {186}
∀ e:OE, num:N , rewrites:env(IDENT).
rename(e,num,rewrites) ∈ OE
___
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captureoksubst(e; vps) ABS captureoksubst {187}
== Case of e
inl(x) → Case of lookup_env(x,vps)
inl(y) → y
inr(z) → e
inr(t) → if
opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_f→ f
;opid_of_OE(e)= 2 opid_all→
(∀ bv_of_OE(e,0)
|:captureoksubst
(nthsbtm(e,0);
update_env([bv_of_OE(e,0),
Ovar(bv_of_OE(e,0))],
vps)))
else mk_nonOV(opid_of_OE(e), λ posn.
if posn= 2 0→
<captureoksubst(nthsbtm(e,0); vps
)
, · >
else <captureoksubst(nthsbtm(e,1);
vps)
, · > fi) fi
{recursive}
{vps is a env(OE), named from v := p pairs }
___
THM captureoksubst_wf {188}
∀ e:OE, vps:env(OE). captureoksubst(e; vps) ∈ OE
___
e[vs := ps] ABS osubstn {189}
== captureoksubst(rename(e,big_ident_num(e,map( λ x.
identofovar(x);vs),ps),nil);
zip_env(map(λ x.identofovar(x);vs),ps)
)
___
THM osubstn_wf {190}
∀ e:OE, vs:OV List, ps:OE List. e[vs := ps] ∈ OE
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(e)[v := p] == e[[v] := [p]] ABS osubst_1var {191}
THM osubst_1var_wf {192}
∀ e:OE, v:OV, p:OE. (e)[v := p] ∈ OE
___
findfirst(L; x.P(x)) ABS findfirst {193}
== Case of L
null → inr( · )
h.t → if P(h)→ inl(h) else findfirst(t; x.P(x)) fi
{recursive}
___
THM findfirst_wf {194}
∀ L:T List, P:(T→ B ). findfirst(L; x.P(x)) ∈ T+Unit
___
179
t1 =_alph(corr) t2 ABS Oalpha_eq {195}
== if
is_a_ovar(t1)→
if is_a_ovar(t2)→
Case of findfirst(corr;
h.(1of(h)= 2 identofovar(t1)
∨ 2 2of(h)= 2 identofovar(t2)))
inl(x) → x = <identofovar(t1),identofovar(t2)>
inr(y) → t1 = t2 ∈ OV
else False fi
;is_a_ovar(t2)→ False
;opid_of_OE(t1)= 2 opid_of_OE(t2)→
∀ i:N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(t1)).
nthsbtm(t1,i) =_alph(if oebv(opid_of_OE(t1); 0)= 2 1→
<bv_of_OE(t1,0)
,bv_of_OE(t2,0)>
.corr
else corr fi) nthsbtm(t2,i)
else False fi
{recursive}
{corr is going to be an IDENTXIDENT list, not an env }
___
THM Oalpha_eq_wf {196}
∀ t1,t2:OE, corr:(IDENT× IDENT) List.
t1 =_alph(corr) t2 ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_cbv {197}
thm_cbv(exp,f,rec_call) == exp =_alph(nil) f & rec_call
∀ exp,f:OE, rec_call:Prop. THM thmclause_cbv_wf {198}
thm_cbv(exp,f,rec_call) ∈ Prop
ABS fnupdate {199}
f[x{eq}:=v](y) == if eq(x,y)→ v else f(y) fi
THM fnupdate_wf {200}
∀ eq:(T→ T→ B ), x:T, v:U, f:(T→ U). f[x{eq}:=v] ∈ T→ U
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otse[X← v] == otse[X{eq_OV}:=v] ABS otseupdate {201}
THM otseupdate_wf {202}
∀ X:OV, v:OTS, otse:(OV→ OTS). otse[X← v] ∈ OV→ OTS
___
otse[Vs← Sigs] ABS otseupdate_2lists {203}
== Case of Vs
null → otse
X.Ys → Case of Sigs
null → otse
S.Ts → otse[X← S][Ys← Ts]
{recursive}
___
THM otseupdate_2lists_wf {204}
∀ Vs:OV List, Sigs:OTS List, otse:(OV→ OTS).
otse[Vs← Sigs] ∈ OV→ OTS
otse[Xs← v] ABS otseupdate_var_list {205}
== Case of Xs : null → otse ; X.Ys → otse[X← v][Ys← v]
{recursive}
THM otseupdate_var_list_wf {206}
∀ Xs:OV List, otse:(OV→ OTS), v:OTS.
otse[Xs← v] ∈ OV→ OTS
___
f[Xs{eq}:=v] ABS fnupdate_var_list {207}
== Case of Xs
null → f
X.Ys → f[X{eq}:=v][Ys{eq}:=v]
{recursive}
___
THM fnupdate_var_list_wf {208}
∀ Xs:T List, f:(T→ U), eq:(T→ T→ B ), v:U.
f[Xs{eq}:=v] ∈ T→ U
___
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(env) e :: sig ABS Owfdelt {209}
== Case of e:OE
Ovar(x) → env(e) = sig ∈ OTS
f → sig = bool
p(q) → (env) q :: ind &
(env) p :: ots(1of(sig),2of(sig)+1)
p⇒ q → sig = bool &
(env) p :: bool &
(env) q :: bool
p=q → sig = bool &
((env) p :: bool & (env) q :: bool ∨ (env)
p :: ind &
(env) q :: ind)
(∀ x|:q) → sig = bool &
(env[Ovar(x){eq_OV}:=ind]) p :: bool
___
THM Owfdelt_wf {210}
∀ e:OE, sig:OTS, env:(OV→ OTS). (env) e :: sig ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_false_elim {211}
thm_false_elim(exp,e,env,reccall)
== exp = e ∈ OE & reccall & (env) e :: bool
THM thmclause_false_elim_wf {212}
∀ exp,e:OE, reccall:Prop, env:(OV→ OTS).
thm_false_elim(exp,e,env,reccall) ∈ Prop
Ogdtmelt(exp,env) ABS Ogdtmelt {213}
== (env) exp :: bool ∨ (env) exp :: ind
THM Ogdtmelt_wf {214}
∀ exp:OE, env:(OV→ OTS). Ogdtmelt(exp,env) ∈ Prop
___
(env) Es :: sig ABS Owfd {215}
== Case of Es
null → True
e.es → (env) e :: sig & (env) es :: sig
{recursive}
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___
THM Owfd_wf {216}
∀ Es:OE List, sig:OTS, env:(OV→ OTS).
(env) Es :: sig ∈ Prop
___
ABS thmclause_eq_intro {217}
thm_eq_intro(exp,a,env,assumps)
== exp = a = a &
(∃ r:{ind, bool}.
(env) a :: r & (env) assumps :: bool)
___
THM thmclause_eq_intro_wf {218}
∀ exp,a:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), assumps:OE List.
thm_eq_intro(exp,a,env,assumps) ∈ Prop
___
ABS thmclause_eq_elim {219}
thm_eq_elim(exp,e,x,a,b,env,reccall1,reccall2)
== exp = (e)[x := b] &
reccall1 &
reccall2 &
(∃ r:{ind, bool}.
(env) [a; b] :: r & (env[x← r]) e :: bool)
___
THM thmclause_eq_elim_wf {220}
∀ exp,e:OE, x:OV, b:OE, reccall1,reccall2:Prop, a:OE
, env:(OV→ OTS).
thm_eq_elim(exp,e,x,a,b,env,reccall1,reccall2) ∈ Prop
___
ABS Ogdtm {221}
Ogdtm(Es; env) == (env) Es :: bool ∨ (env) Es :: ind
THM Ogdtm_wf {222}
∀ Es:OE List, env:(OV→ OTS). Ogdtm(Es; env) ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_all_elim {223}
thm_all_elim(exp,e,x,f,env,reccall)
== exp = (e)[x := f] & reccall & (env) f :: ind
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THM thmclause_all_elim_wf {224}
∀ exp,e:OE, x:OV, f:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), reccall:Prop.
thm_all_elim(exp,e,x,f,env,reccall) ∈ Prop
___
ABS thmclause_thinning {225}
thm_thinning(sublist,env,assumps,reccall)
== allonlist(OE; sublist; assumps) & reccall &
(env) assumps :: bool
___
THM thmclause_thinning_wf {226}
∀ sublist,assumps:OE List, reccall:Prop, env:(OV→ OTS).
thm_thinning(sublist,env,assumps,reccall) ∈ Prop
ABS thmclause_hypothesis {227}
thm_hyp(exp,env,assumps)
== exp onlist(OE) assumps & (env) assumps :: bool
THM thmclause_hypothesis_wf {228}
∀ exp:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), assumps:OE List.
thm_hyp(exp,env,assumps) ∈ Prop
___
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Othmaux_2(exp,env,assumps,n) ABS Othmaux_v2 {229}
== thm_hyp(exp,env,assumps) ∨ 0<n &
((∃ sublist:OE List.
thm_thinning(sublist,env,assumps,
Othmaux_2(exp,env,sublist,n-1)))
∨ (∃ e,f:OE.
thm_mp(exp,f,Othmaux_2(e ⇒ f,env,assumps,n-1),
Othmaux_2(e,env,assumps,n-1)))
∨ (∃ e,f:OE.
thm_arrow_intro(exp,e,f,Othmaux_2(f,env,
e.assumps,
n-1)))
∨ (∃ f:OE.
thm_cbv(exp,f,Othmaux_2(f,env,assumps,n-1)))
∨ (∃ x:OV, e,f:OE.
thm_all_elim(exp,e,x,f,env,
Othmaux_2(( ∀ x|:e),env,assumps,
n-1)))
∨ (∃ x:OV, e:OE.
thm_all_elim2(exp,e,x,
Othmaux_2((∀ x|:e),env,assumps,
n-1)))
∨ (∃ x:OV, e:OE.
thm_all_intro(exp,x,e,assumps,
Othmaux_2(e,env[x← ind],assumps,
n-1)))
∨ (∃ e:OE.
thm_false_elim(exp,e,env,
Othmaux_2(f,env,assumps,n-1)))
∨ (∃ x:OV, e,a,b:OE.
thm_eq_elim(exp,e,x,a,b,env,
Othmaux_2((e)[x := a],env,assumps,
n-1),
Othmaux_2(a = b,env,assumps,n-1)))
∨ (∃ a:OE. thm_eq_intro(exp,a,env,assumps))
∨ (∃ a,b:OE.
thm_equiv_as_eq(exp,a,b,
Othmaux_2(a ≡ b,env,assumps,
n-1))))
{recursive}
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___
THM Othmaux_v2_wf {230}
∀ n:N , exp:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), assumps:OE List.
Othmaux_2(exp,env,assumps,n) ∈ Prop
(env) assumps ` exp ABS Othm {231}
== ∃ n:N . Othmaux_2(exp,env,assumps,n)
THM Othm_wf {232}
∀ exp:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), assumps:OE List.
(env) assumps ` exp ∈ Prop
nil ∈ env(t) THM NilIsEnv {233}
∀ x:OPIDS. x ∈ Z THM OPIDS_in_int {234}
THM unrolled_OE_in_OE {235}
(IDENT+i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j)) ⊆ OE
THM OE_in_unrolled_OE {236}
OE ⊆ (IDENT+i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j))
___
∀ x,y:OE. THM OEexps_in_unrolled_OE {237}
x = y
⇐⇒
x = y ∈ IDENT+i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j)
___
THM unrolled_OE_exps_in_OE {238}
∀ x,y:IDENT+i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j).
x = y ∈ OE ⇐⇒ x = y
OV ⊆ OE THM obvar_inc {239}
THM Ofree_on_OVs {240}
∀ v,x:OV. (v occurs free in x) ⇐⇒ v = x
THM Occurs_on_OVs {241}
∀ v,x:OV. (some [v] occur free in [x]) ⇐⇒ v = x
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THM Occurs_on_OVs_for_backchn {242}
∀ v,x:OV. ¬ (some [v] occur free in [x]) ⇒ ¬ v = x
THM Occurs_on_OVs_for_NotOcc_bckchn {243}
∀ v,x:OV. ¬ v = x ⇒ ¬ (some [v] occur free in [x])
___
THM Occ_EsList_expand {244}
∀ Vs:OV List, H:OE, T:OE List.
(some Vs occur free in H.T)
⇐⇒
(some Vs occur free in [H]) ∨ (some Vs occur free in T)
___
∀ x,y:OV. ¬ x = y ⇒ ¬ y = x THM NotEq_OV_sym {245}
THM Occurs_on_OVs_for_backchn_sym {246}
∀ v,x:OV. ¬ (some [v] occur free in [x]) ⇒ ¬ x = v
THM Occurs_on_OVs_for_NotOcc_bckchn_sym {247}
∀ v,x:OV. ¬ x = v ⇒ ¬ (some [v] occur free in [x])
___
THM OVs_diff_OTS_then_neq {248}
∀ v:OV, sig1:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), x:OV, sig2:OTS.
(∈ ) [v] :: sig1 & (∈ ) [x] :: sig2 & ¬ sig1 = sig2 ⇒
¬ v = x
___
THM Not_Occ_on_varListvariable {249}
∀ X:OV, Y:OV List, alpha:OE List.
¬ (some X.Y occur free in alpha)
⇐⇒
¬ (some [X] occur free in alpha) &
¬ (some Y occur free in alpha)
___
THM NotOcc_Es_iff_NotOcc_vs {250}
∀ Es:OE List, Vs:OV List.
(no Vs occur free in Es

+  )
⇐⇒
(no Vs

+  occur free in Es)
___
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THM NotOcc_Es_iff_Es_notoccurs {251}
∀ Es:OE List, x:OV.
Es_not_occurs(x,Es) ⇐⇒ (no [x] occur free in Es

+  )
___
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List. THM Occ_Es_iff_Occ_vs {252}
(some Vs occur free in Es)
⇐⇒
(some Vs

+ 
occur free in Es)
___
THM NotOcc_iff_not_Occ_Es {253}
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List.
¬ (some Vs occur free in Es)
⇐⇒
(no Vs occur free in Es

+  )
___
THM Not_Occ_on_var_List {254}
∀ X:OV, Y:OV List, E:OE.
¬ (some X.Y occur free in [E])
⇐⇒
¬ (some [X] occur free in [E]) &
¬ (some Y occur free in [E])
___
THM Not_Occ_on_exp_List {255}
∀ X:OV List, E:OE, Y:OE List.
¬ (some X occur free in E.Y)
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [E]) & ¬ (some X occur free in Y)
___
THM NotOcc_iff_not_Occ_vs {256}
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List.
¬ (some Vs

+ 
occur free in Es)
⇐⇒
(no Vs

+  occur free in Es)
___
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∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_oeq {257}
¬ (some X occur free in [P = Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_OLand {258}
¬ (some X occur free in [P ∧ Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_OLor {259}
¬ (some X occur free in [P ∨ Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
THM Not_Occ_OLfalse {260}
∀ X:OV List. ¬ (some X occur free in [f])
THM Not_Occ_OLtrue {261}
∀ X:OV List. ¬ (some X occur free in [t])
THM Not_Occ_OLunitqind {262}
∀ X:OV List, b:Qind. ¬ (some X occur free in [u_b])
___
THM Not_Occ_OLqopinfix {263}
∀ X:OV List, b:Qind, P,Q:OE.
¬ (some X occur free in [P *_b Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
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∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_obap {264}
¬ (some X occur free in [P(Q)])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
∀ X:OV List, P:OE. THM Not_Occ_OLnot {265}
¬ (some X occur free in [¬ P])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P])
___
∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_oequiv {266}
¬ (some X occur free in [P ≡ Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
∀ X:OV List, P,Q:OE. THM Not_Occ_oimp {267}
¬ (some X occur free in [P ⇒ Q])
⇐⇒
¬ (some X occur free in [P]) &
¬ (some X occur free in [Q])
___
∀ V:OV, P,E:OE. THM Not_Occ_osubst1v {268}
¬ (some [V] occur free in [P]) ⇒
¬ (some [V] occur free in [(E)[V := P]])
___
THM Not_Occ_osubstn {269}
∀ Vs:OV List, Ps:OE List, E:OE.
¬ (some Vs occur free in Ps) ⇒
¬ (some Vs occur free in [E[Vs := Ps]])
___
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THM Not_Occ_qstar {270}
∀ V:OV, b:Qind, Y:OV List, R,B:OE.
¬ V onlist(OV) Y ⇒
(¬ (some [V] occur free in [R]) &
¬ (some [V] occur free in [B])
⇐⇒
¬ (some [V] occur free in [(*_b Y | R : B)]))
___
THM Not_Occ_qstar_forC {271}
∀ V:OV, b:Qind, Y:OV List, R,B:OE.
(¬ V onlist(OV) Y ⇒
¬ (some [V] occur free in [R]) &
¬ (some [V] occur free in [B]))
⇐⇒
¬ (some [V] occur free in [(*_b Y | R : B)])
___
THM Not_Occ_qstar_forH {272}
∀ V:OV, b:Qind, Y:OV List, R,B:OE.
V onlist(OV) Y ∨ ¬ V onlist(OV) Y &
¬ (some [V] occur free in [R]) &
¬ (some [V] occur free in [B])
⇐⇒
¬ (some [V] occur free in [(*_b Y | R : B)])
___
THM decidable__isl_of_lookup {273}
∀ x:IDENT, L:env(T). Dec(isl(lookup_env(x,L)))
___
THM LookupOnNonListHead {274}
∀ v:env(t), u:(IDENT× t), k:IDENT.
k= 2 1of(u) = false 2 ⇒
lookup_env(k,u.v) = lookup_env(k,v)
___
∀ l:env(t), k:IDENT. THM NotIslLookupIsInr {275}
¬ 2 isl(lookup_env(k,l)) ⇒ lookup_env(k,l) = inr( · )
___
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THM LookupOnFrontOfList {276}
∀ l:env(T), k:IDENT, env:env(T).
isl(lookup_env(k,l)) ⇒
lookup_env(k,l @ env) = lookup_env(k,l)
___
∀ k:IDENT, v:env(T). THM OutlLookupInType {277}
isl(lookup_env(k,v)) ⇒ outl(lookup_env(k,v)) ∈ T
THM identofovar_characterization {278}
∀ ov:OV. Ovar(identofovar(ov)) = ov ∈ OV
∀ x:OV. is_a_ovar(x) THM is_a_ovar_on_OV {279}
THM is_a_ovar_characterization {280}
∀ x:OE. IsOvar(x) ⇐⇒ is_a_ovar(x)
THM inr_y_in_NonOV {281}
∀ y:i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j).
inr(y) ∈ OE ⇒ inr(y) ∈ NonOV
∀ a,b:N . imax(a;b) ∈ N THM imax_on_nat {282}
THM imax_gtr_than {283}
∀ a,b,c:Z . a > imax(b;c) ⇐⇒ a > b & a > c
THM make_equality_on_OPIDS {284}
∀ x,y:OPIDS. x= 2 y ⇐⇒ x = y ∈ Z
THM OPIDS_bool_N5_prop {285}
∀ x,y:OPIDS. x= 2 y ⇐⇒ x = y ∈ N 5
∀ nonov:NonOV. THM not_ofalse_then_subterms {286}
¬ opid_of_OE(nonov)= 2 opid_f ⇒
0 ∈ N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(nonov))
THM opid_not_ofalse_then_subterms {287}
∀ op:OPIDS. ¬ op= 2 opid_f ⇒ 0 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
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THM opid_not_false_or_all_then_2_subterms {288}
∀ op:OPIDS.
¬ op= 2 opid_f & ¬ op= 2 opid_all ⇒ 1 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
THM OEcase_else_opid_is_oforall {289}
∀ n:OPIDS. ¬ n= 2 0 & ¬ n= 2 1 & ¬ n= 2 2 & ¬ n= 2 3 ⇒ n= 2 opid_all
THM opid_Ap_or_Imp_or_Eq_then_2_subterms {290}
∀ op:OPIDS. op= 2 1 ∨ op= 2 2 ∨ op= 2 3 ⇒ 1 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
THM opid_Eq_then_2_sbtms {291}
∀ op:OPIDS. op= 2 3 ⇒ 1 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
THM opid_Imp_then_2_sbtms {292}
∀ op:OPIDS. op= 2 2 ⇒ 1 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
THM opid_Ap_then_2_sbtms {293}
∀ op:OPIDS. op= 2 1 ⇒ 1 ∈ N oesbtms(op)
∀ nonov:NonOV. THM if_oforall_then_bv {294}
opid_of_OE(nonov)= 2 opid_all ⇒
bv_of_OE(nonov,0) ∈ IDENT
THM if_not_oforall_then_no_bv {295}
∀ op:OPIDS, posn:N . ¬ op= 2 opid_all ⇒ · ∈ PossBV(op;posn)
___
∀ n,opid1,opid2:OPIDS. THM ContraryCases1 {296}
n= 2 opid1 = true 2 & n= 2 opid2 = true 2 & ¬ opid1 = opid2 ∈ Z
⇒
False
___
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THM HnumauxUnrollOpidall {297}
∀ n:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(n)→ OE× PossBV(n;j).
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(n,ff))= 2 opid_all = true 2 ⇒
hnum_aux(mk_nonOV(n,ff))
=
imax(ident2(bv_of_OE(mk_nonOV(n,ff),0));
hnum_aux(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(n,ff),0)))
∈ N
___
THM HnumauxUnrollOpidelse {298}
∀ n:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(n)→ OE× PossBV(n;j).
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(n,ff))= 2 opid_f = false 2 &
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(n,ff))= 2 opid_all = false 2
⇒
hnum_aux(mk_nonOV(n,ff))
=
imax(hnum_aux(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(n,ff),0));
hnum_aux(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(n,ff),1)))
∈ N
___
THM RenamebdvarsToIfThenElse {299}
∀ k:IDENT, num:Z , l:env(IDENT).
rename(Ovar(k),num,l)
=
if isl(lookup_env(k,l))→ Ovar(outl(lookup_env(k,l)))
else Ovar(k) fi
___
THM Othm_oeq_refl {300}
∀ P:OE, r:{ind, bool}, ep:(OV→ OTS), alpha:OE List.
(ep) [P] :: r & (ep) alpha :: bool ⇒
(ep) alpha ` P = P
___
THM Othm_oeq_sym {301}
∀ P,Q:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), A:OE List.
(env) A ` P = Q ⇒ (env) A ` Q = P
∀ x:NonOV. ¬ is_a_ovar(x) THM is_a_ovar_on_NonOV {302}
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___
THM Othmaux_monotonicity {303}
∀ n:N , exp:OE, env:env(OTS), assumps:OE List.
Othm_aux(exp,env,assumps,n) ⇒
(∀ k:N . (k ≥ n ) ⇒ Othm_aux(exp,env,assumps,k))
___
∀ e,f:OE, A:OE List, env:env(OTS). THM OthmMP {304}
(env) A ` e ⇒ f & (env) A ` e ⇒ (env) A ` f
THM OthmArrowIntro {305}
∀ e,f:OE, A:OE List, env:env(OTS).
(env) e.A ` f ⇒ (env) A ` e ⇒ f
___
THM OthmThin {306}
∀ e:OE, A,sublist:OE List, env:env(OTS).
allonlist(OE; sublist; A) &
(env) sublist ` e &
(env) A :: bool
⇒
(env) A ` e
___
∀ e,f:OE, A:OE List, env:env(OTS). THM OthmCBV {307}
e =_alph(nil) f & (env) A ` f ⇒ (env) A ` e
___
THM OthmAllIntro {308}
∀ e:OE, x:IDENT, A:OE List, env:env(OTS).
(update_env([x,ind],env)) A ` e &
¬ (some [Ovar(x)] occur free in A)
⇒
(env) A ` (∀ x|:e)
___
THM OthmAllElim {309}
∀ e,f:OE, x:IDENT, A:OE List, env:env(OTS).
(env) A ` (∀ x|:e) & (env) f :: ind ⇒
(env) A ` (e)[x := f]
___
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THM OthmEnvsAgree {310}
∀ e:OE, A:OE List, env,env2:env(OTS).
(env2) A ` e &
(∀ id:IDENT.
(Ovar(id) occurs free in e) ⇒
lookup_env(id,env) = lookup_env(id,env2))
⇒
(env) A ` e
___
∀ e:OE, A:OE List, env:env(OTS). THM OthmAx {311}
Axiom(e,env) & (env) A :: bool ⇒ (env) A ` e
∀ e:OE, A:OE List, env:env(OTS). THM OthmHyp {312}
e onlist(OE) A & (env) A :: bool ⇒ (env) A ` e
∀ P:OE, env:(OV→ OTS). THM OnotWfdelt {313}
(env) P :: bool ⇒ (env) ¬ P :: bool
∀ P,Q:OE, env:(OV→ OTS). THM OorWfdelt {314}
(env) P :: bool & (env) Q :: bool ⇒
(env) P ∨ Q :: bool
∀ P,Q:OE, env:(OV→ OTS). THM OandWfdelt {315}
(env) P :: bool & (env) Q :: bool ⇒
(env) P ∧ Q :: bool
∀ P,Q:OE, env:(OV→ OTS). THM OequivWfdelt {316}
(env) P :: bool & (env) Q :: bool ⇒
(env) P ≡ Q :: bool
___
∀ e:NonOV. THM OesbtmsUnrollOn2sbtms {317}
opid_of_OE(e)= 2 0 = false 2 & opid_of_OE(e)= 2 4 = false 2
⇒
oesbtms(opid_of_OE(e)) = 2 ∈ N
___
THM OsubstReadyOfSubterms {318}
∀ e:NonOV, n:Z , i:N oesbtms(opid_of_OE(e)).
Osubstn_ready(e,n) ⇒ Osubstn_ready(nthsbtm(e,i),n)
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∀ x,y:IDENT. x= 2 y ⇐⇒ x = y THM AssertOfEqIdent {319}
∀ L:env(T), x:IDENT. THM LookupFailsIffInr {320}
¬ isl(lookup_env(x,L)) ⇐⇒ lookup_env(x,L) = inr( · )
___
THM LookupFailsOnFrontOfList {321}
∀ L,ep:env(T), x:IDENT.
¬ isl(lookup_env(x,L)) ⇒
lookup_env(x,L @ ep) = lookup_env(x,ep)
___
THM LookupWithEqualListFronts {322}
∀ x:IDENT, L1,L2,ep:env(T).
lookup_env(x,L1) = lookup_env(x,L2) ⇒
lookup_env(x,L1 @ ep) = lookup_env(x,L2 @ ep) ∈ T+Unit
___
THM RenameOvarIsOvar {323}
∀ id:IDENT, n:N , L:env(IDENT).
∃ id2:IDENT. rename(Ovar(id),n,L) = Ovar(id2)
THM RenamePreservesOpid {324}
∀ e:OE, L:env(IDENT), n:N .
¬ IsOvar(e) ⇒ opid_of_OE(e) = opid_of_OE(rename(e,n,L))
THM NotIsOvarMknonOV {325}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j).
¬ IsOvar(mk_nonOV(m,ff))
___
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THM RenameUnrolling2sbtmCase {326}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), n:N
, L:env(IDENT).
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff))= 2 opid_f = false 2 &
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff))= 2 opid_all = false 2
⇒
rename(mk_nonOV(m,ff),n,L)
=
mk_nonOV(opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff)), λ posn.
if posn= 2 0→ <rename(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0),n,L), · >
else <rename(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),1),n,L), · > fi)
___
THM RenameUnrollOpidAll {327}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), n:N
, L:env(IDENT).
m= 2 opid_all ⇒
rename(mk_nonOV(m,ff),n,L)
=
(∀ <1of(bv_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0)),n+1>
|:rename(nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0),n+1,
update_env([bv_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0),
<1of(bv_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0))
,n+1>],
L)))
___
THM OwfdeltUnrollForOpid1 {328}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), sig:OTS
, env:(OV→ OTS).
m = 1 ∈ OPIDS ⇒
(env) mk_nonOV(m,ff) :: sig
=
((env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),1) :: ind &
(env)
nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0) :: ots(1of(sig),2of(sig)+1))
___
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THM OwfdeltUnrollForOpidImp {329}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), sig:OTS
, env:(OV→ OTS).
m = 2 ∈ OPIDS ⇒
(env) mk_nonOV(m,ff) :: sig
=
(sig = bool &
(env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0) :: bool &
(env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),1) :: bool)
___
THM OwfdeltUnrollForOpidEq {330}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), sig:OTS
, env:(OV→ OTS).
m = 3 ∈ OPIDS ⇒
(env) mk_nonOV(m,ff) :: sig
=
(sig = bool &
((env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0) :: bool &
(env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),1) :: bool
∨ (env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0) :: ind &
(env) nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),1) :: ind))
___
THM OwfdeltUnrollForOpidAll {331}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), sig:OTS
, env:(OV→ OTS).
m = 4 ∈ OPIDS ⇒
(env) mk_nonOV(m,ff) :: sig
=
(sig = bool &
(env[Ovar(2of(fn_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff))(0))){eq_OV}:=
ind])
nthsbtm(mk_nonOV(m,ff),0) :: bool)
___
THM InlNeqInrInOE {332}
∀ x:IDENT, y:i:OPIDS× j:N oesbtms(i)→ OE× PossBV(i;j).
¬ inl(x) = inr(y) ∈ OE
___
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∀ E,F:OE. THM OvarNotMknonOV {333}
(∃ x:IDENT. E = Ovar(x)) &
(∃ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j).
F = mk_nonOV(m,ff))
⇒
¬ E = F
___
THM OvarNotMknonOVPt2 {334}
∀ E:OV, F:NonOV. ¬ E = F ∈ OE
THM RenameNonOVIsNonOV {335}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), n:N
, L:env(IDENT). rename(mk_nonOV(m,ff),n,L) ∈ NonOV
___
THM NotOpidOfRenameNonOVThenNotOpidOfNonOV {336}
∀ m:OPIDS, ff:j:N oesbtms(m)→ OE× PossBV(m;j), op:OPIDS
, L:env(IDENT), n:N .
opid_of_OE(rename(mk_nonOV(m,ff),n,L))= 2 op = false 2 ⇒
opid_of_OE(mk_nonOV(m,ff))= 2 op = false 2
___
THM All2ofsGtrToOnlist {337}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List, n:N , x,y:IDENT.
all_2ofs_gtr_n(L,n) & <x,y> onlist(IDENT× IDENT) L ⇒
ident2(y) > n
___
∀ x,u:T, v:T List. THM OnlistForTails {338}
¬ x = u & x onlist(T) u.v ⇒ x onlist(T) v
THM IdentOnlistForTails {339}
∀ x,u:IDENT, v:IDENT List.
¬ x = u ⇒ x onlist(IDENT) u.v ⇒ x onlist(IDENT) v
___
THM IslToOnlist {340}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List, k:IDENT.
isl(lookup_env(k,L)) ⇒
<k,outl(lookup_env(k,L))> onlist(IDENT× IDENT) L
___
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THM LookupToOnlist {341}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List, x,y:IDENT.
lookup_env(x,L) = inl(y) ∈ IDENT+Unit ⇒
<x,y> onlist(IDENT× IDENT) L
___
∀ x,y:IDENT. Dec(x = y) THM decidable__eq_ident {342}
THM decidable__equalpairofidents {343}
∀ x,u:(IDENT× IDENT). Dec(x = u)
THM No2ofsEqualForListTails {344}
∀ u:(IDENT× IDENT), v:(IDENT× IDENT) List.
no_2ofs_equal(u.v) ⇒ no_2ofs_equal(v)
THM All2ofsDiffThenNo2ofsEqual {345}
∀ L:(IDENT× IDENT) List.
all_2ofs_diff(L) ⇒ no_2ofs_equal(L)
___
∀ L1,L2:env(T). THM LookupsEqIffAlwaysSame {346}
(∀ x:IDENT. lookup_env(x,L1) = lookup_env(x,L2))
⇐⇒
(∀ x:IDENT, tau:T+Unit.
lookup_env(x,L1) = tau ⇐⇒ lookup_env(x,L2) = tau)
___
∀ L1,L2:env(T). THM LookupsEqIffAlwaysSameInls {347}
(∀ x:IDENT. lookup_env(x,L1) = lookup_env(x,L2))
⇐⇒
(∀ x:IDENT, tau:T.
lookup_env(x,L1) = inl(tau)
⇐⇒
lookup_env(x,L2) = inl(tau))
___
THM NotEqOvIfDiffHnumaux {348}
∀ z,v:OV. ¬ hnum_aux(z) = hnum_aux(v) ⇒ ¬ z = v
THM Otseup_reduce {349}
∀ x,y:OV, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
¬ x = y ⇒ ∈ [x← sig](y) = ∈ (y)
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THM Otseup_OVmatch {350}
∀ x,y:OV, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
x = y ⇒ ∈ [x← sig](y) = sig
{ind, bool} ⊆ OTS THM IndBool_inc {351}
___
THM OtseAgree_on_freevars {352}
∀ E:OE List, ∈ 1,∈ 2:(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in E) ⇒ (∈ 1,∈ 2 agree on x))
⇒
(∈ 1) E :: sig ⇒ (∈ 2) E :: sig
___
THM Not_Occ_to_OtseAgree {353}
∀ x:OV, L:OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
¬ (some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(∀ y:OV.
(some [y] occur free in L) ⇒
(∈ ,∈ [x← sig] agree on y))
___
THM OtseAgree_sym {354}
∀ ∈ :(OV→ OTS), x:OV, f:(OV→ OTS).
(∈ ,f agree on x) ⇐⇒ (f,∈ agree on x)
___
THM Not_Occ_to_OtseAgree_on_firstOtse {355}
∀ x:OV, L:OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
¬ (some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(∀ y:OV.
(some [y] occur free in L) ⇒
(∈ [x← sig],∈ agree on y))
___
THM Otseup1var_sym {356}
∀ x,y:OV, L:OE List, t,sig2,sig1:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
¬ x = y ⇒
((∈ [x← sig1][y← sig2]) L :: t
⇐⇒
(∈ [y← sig2][x← sig1]) L :: t)
___
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THM Otses_eq_dup_updates {357}
∀ x:OV, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS).
ep[x← sig][x← sig] = ep[x← sig]
___
THM Otseup1var_sym_for_bckchn {358}
∀ x,y:OV, L:OE List, t,sig2,sig1:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS).
¬ x = y ⇒
(ep[x← sig1][y← sig2]) L :: t ⇒
(ep[y← sig2][x← sig1]) L :: t
___
THM Otseup1var_sym_in_OtseAgree {359}
∀ x,y:OV, sig2,sig1:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), v:OV, f:(OV→ OTS).
¬ x = y ⇒
((∈ [x← sig1][y← sig2],f agree on v)
⇐⇒
(∈ [y← sig2][x← sig1],f agree on v))
___
THM OtseAgree_non_updated_vars {360}
∀ x:OV, A:OV List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
¬ x onlist(OV) A ⇒ (∈ ,∈ [A← sig] agree on x)
___
THM Leib_quant_body {361}
∀ Xs:OV List, α :OE List, R,A,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS)
, r:{ind, bool}, P:OE, Z:OV, b:Qind.
¬ (some Xs occur free in α ) &
(∈ [Xs← ind]) α ` R ⇒ A = B &
(∈ [Xs← ind]) [A; B] :: r &
(∈ [Xs← ind][[Z]← r]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b Xs | R : (P)[Z := A])
=
(*_b Xs | R : (P)[Z := B])
___
203
THM Leib_quant_range {362}
∀ b:Qind, Xs:OV List, R:OE, Z:OV, A,P,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS)
, α :OE List, r:{ind, bool}.
¬ (some Xs occur free in α ) &
(∈ [Xs← ind]) α ` A = B &
(∈ [Xs← ind]) [P] :: bool &
(∈ [Xs← ind]) [A; B] :: r &
(∈ [Xs← ind][[Z]← r]) [R] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b Xs | (R)[Z := A] : P)
=
(*_b Xs | (R)[Z := B] : P)
___
THM Leib_simple {363}
∀ E,A,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List, r,r’:{ind, bool}
, Z:OV.
(∈ ) α ` A = B & (∈ ) [A; B] :: r & (∈ [[Z]← r]) [E] :: r’
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (E)[Z := A] = (E)[Z := B]
___
THM One_point_rule {364}
∀ x:OV, E:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind, P:OE.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [E]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [E] :: ind &
(∈ [x← ind]) [P] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | x = E : P) = (P)[x := E]
___
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THM Nesting {365}
∀ y:OV, R:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P,Q:OE, x:OV
, b:Qind.
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [P; Q; R] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ Q : P)
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | Q : P))
___
THM Nesting_varsym {366}
∀ y:OV, R:OE, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P,Q:OE, x:OV
, b:Qind.
¬ (some [x] occur free in [R]) &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [P; Q; R] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ Q : P)
=
(*_b [y] | R : (*_b [x] | Q : P))
___
THM Substitution_3_84a {367}
∀ α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), e,f:OE, r:{ind, bool}, E:OE
, z:OV.
(∈ ) α :: bool &
(∈ ) [e; f] :: r &
(∈ [[z]← r]) [E] :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (E)[z := f] ∧ e = f = (E)[z := e] ∧ e = f
___
THM osubst1_var_same {368}
∀ x:OV, E:OE. (x)[x := E] = E
___
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THM Othm_Osubst1_unroll_notocc {369}
∀ α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), P:OE, r:{ind, bool}, x:OV
, E:OE.
(∈ ) α :: bool & (∈ ) [P] :: r &
¬ (some [x] occur free in [P])
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (P)[x := E] = P
___
THM Osubst1_rep_var_with_self {370}
∀ ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List, E:OE, x:OV.
(∈ ) α ` (E)[x := x] = E
∀ X:OV, P,E:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_notocc {371}
¬ (some [X] occur free in [P]) ⇒ (P)[X := E] = P
THM Arrowintro_for_Leib {372}
∀ R:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), T:OE, A:OE List.
(env) [R] :: bool & (env) A ` T ⇒ (env) A ` R ⇒ T
∀ P,Q:OE, env:(OV→ OTS), A:OE List. THM oeq_sym {373}
(env) A ` P = Q ⇒ (env) A ` Q = P
∀ x,h:T, t:T List. THM onlist_step_v2 {374}
x onlist(T) h.t ⇒ x = h ∨ x onlist(T) t
∀ X,H:T, L:T List. THM notonlist_step_v2 {375}
¬ X onlist(T) H.L ⇒ ¬ X = H & ¬ X onlist(T) L
∀ X:T. ¬ X onlist(T) nil THM notonlist_on_nil {376}
THM onlist_on_nil_imp_false {377}
∀ x:T. x onlist(T) nil ⇒ False
∀ X,H:T, L:T List. THM notonlist_step {378}
¬ H = X & ¬ X onlist(T) L ⇒ ¬ X onlist(T) H.L
∀ x,h:T, t:T List. THM onlist_unroll {379}
x onlist(T) h.t ⇐⇒ x = h ∨ x onlist(T) t
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THM onlist_on_zip_nil {380}
∀ X:T, L:T List. X onlist(T) zip(nil,L) ⇒ False
∀ h:T, t:T List, x:T. THM notonlist_gen_unroll {381}
Not_onlist(x,h.t:T) ⇐⇒ ¬ x = h & Not_onlist(x,t:T)
THM notonlist_gen_on_nil {382}
∀ x:T. Not_onlist(x,nil:T)
___
THM distinct_elts_gen_unroll {383}
∀ h1:T, t1:T List, h:T.
Distinct_elts([h; h1/ t1],T)
⇐⇒
Not_onlist(h,h1.t1:T) & Distinct_elts(h1.t1,T)
___
THM distinct_elts_gen_on_singletonlist {384}
∀ X:T. Distinct_elts([X],T)
THM otseup_var_list_unroll {385}
∀ H:OV, T:OV List, ep:(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
ep[H.T← sig] = ep[H← sig][T← sig]
THM otseup_var_list_on_nil {386}
∀ ep:(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS. ep[nil← sig] = ep
THM otseupdate_2lists_unroll {387}
∀ h1:OV, t1:OV List, ep:(OV→ OTS), h2:OTS, t2:OTS List.
ep[h1.t1← h2.t2] = ep[h1← h2][t1← t2]
THM otseupdate_2lists_on_nil_vars {388}
∀ ep:(OV→ OTS), Ss:OTS List. ep[nil← Ss] = ep
THM Owfd_otrue_on_osubst1 {389}
∀ sig:OTS, V:OV, E:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [t] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [(t)[V := E]] :: sig
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THM Owfd_ofalse_on_osubst1 {390}
∀ sig:OTS, V:OV, E:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [f] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [(f)[V := E]] :: sig
THM Owfd_unitqind_on_osubst1 {391}
∀ b:Qind, sig:OTS, V:OV, E:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [u_b] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [(u_b)[V := E]] :: sig
THM Owfd_otrue_on_osubstn {392}
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [t] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [t[Vs := Es]] :: sig
THM Owfd_ofalse_on_osubstn {393}
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [f] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [f[Vs := Es]] :: sig
THM Owfd_unitqind_on_osubstn {394}
∀ b:Qind, Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS).
(ep) [u_b] :: sig ⇒ (ep) [u_b[Vs := Es]] :: sig
THM zip_rewrite_nillist1 {395}
∀ L:T List. zip(nil,L) = nil ∈ T List
THM zip_rewrite_conslists_gen {396}
∀ h1:T, t1:T List, h2:T2, t2:T2 List.
zip(h1.t1,h2.t2) = <h1,h2>.zip(t1,t2)
___
THM Othm_refl_for_AC_use_ONLY {397}
∀ A,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List.
A = B & (∈ ) [A = B] :: bool & (∈ ) α :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) α ` A = B
___
THM Same_envs_agree_in_conseq {398}
∀ L:OE List, ep:(OV→ OTS), x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (ep,ep agree on x)
THM Same_envs_agree {399}
∀ ep:(OV→ OTS), x:OV. (ep,ep agree on x)
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___
THM Envagree_unroll_outmost_var {400}
∀ ep1:(OV→ OTS), v:OV, ep2:(OV→ OTS), x:OV, sig:OTS.
(ep1,ep2 agree on v) ⇒
(ep1[x← sig],ep2[x← sig] agree on v)
___
THM Envagree_unroll_outmost_var_V2 {401}
∀ L:OE List, ep1,ep2:(OV→ OTS), v:OV, sig:OTS.
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (ep1,ep2 agree on x))
⇒
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(ep1[v← sig],ep2[v← sig] agree on x))
___
THM Envagree_lemma_for_ltd_transitivity {402}
∀ L:OE List, e1,e2:(OV→ OTS), v:OV, sig:OTS.
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒ (e1,e2 agree on x)) &
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(e2,e2[v← sig] agree on x))
⇒
(∀ x:OV.
(some [x] occur free in L) ⇒
(e1,e2[v← sig] agree on x))
___
THM assoc_mod_iff_lemma {403}
∀ A,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List.
equal_mod_AC_props(A;B) &
(∈ ) [A = B] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` A = B
___
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THM Othm_oimp_if_othm_conseq {404}
∀ P:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS), Q:OE, alpha:OE List.
(ep) [P] :: bool & (ep) alpha ` Q ⇒
(ep) alpha ` P ⇒ Q
___
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_oimp {405}
((P)[V := E] ⇒ (Q)[V := E]) = (P ⇒ Q)[V := E]
___
THM Osubst1_unroll_qstar_capture_permitting {406}
∀ b:Qind, X:OV List, R:OE, V:OV, E,B:OE.
(*_b X | (R)[V := E] : (B)[V := E])
=
((*_b X | R : B))[V := E]
___
∀ f,x:OE, V:OV, E:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_obap {407}
(f(x))[V := E] = (f)[V := E]((x)[V := E])
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_oeq {408}
(P)[V := E] = (Q)[V := E] = (P = Q)[V := E]
THM Osubst1_unroll_onot {409}
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E:OE. (¬ (P)[V := E]) = (¬ P)[V := E]
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_oequiv {410}
(P)[V := E] ≡ (Q)[V := E] = (P ≡ Q)[V := E]
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_oor {411}
(P)[V := E] ∨ (Q)[V := E] = (P ∨ Q)[V := E]
∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE. THM Osubst1_unroll_oand {412}
(P)[V := E] ∧ (Q)[V := E] = (P ∧ Q)[V := E]
THM Osubst1_unroll_qop {413}
∀ b:Qind, P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] *_b (Q)[V := E] = (P *_b Q)[V := E]
THM Osubst1_unroll_unitqind {414}
∀ b:Qind, V:OV, E:OE. u_b = (u_b)[V := E]
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THM Osubst1_unroll_otrue {415}
∀ V:OV, E:OE. t = (t)[V := E]
THM Osubst1_unroll_ofalse {416}
∀ V:OV, E:OE. f = (f)[V := E]
THM Exist_new_OVs {417}
∀ L:OE List. ∃ x:OV. ¬ (some [x] occur free in L)
THM Othm_Oeq_trans {418}
∀ p,p1:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS), a:OE List, q:OE.
(ep) a ` p = p1 & (ep) a ` p1 = q ⇒ (ep) a ` p = q
THM Owfd_over_Onlist {419}
∀ Es:OE List, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), E:OE.
(∈ ) Es :: sig & E onlist(OE) Es ⇒ (∈ ) [E] :: sig
___
∀ P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_oeq {420}
(∈ ) [P = Q] :: bool
⇐⇒
(∃ r:{ind, bool}. (∈ ) [P] :: r & (∈ ) [Q] :: r)
___
THM Owfd_oeq2 {421}
∀ P:OE, r:{ind, bool}, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE.
(∈ ) [P] :: r & (∈ ) [Q] :: r ⇒ (∈ ) [P = Q] :: bool
___
∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE. THM Owfd_oeq3 {422}
(∈ ) [P] :: ind & (∈ ) [Q] :: ind ∨ (∈ ) [P] :: bool &
(∈ ) [Q] :: bool
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [P = Q] :: bool
___
∀ sig:OTS, P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_and {423}
(∈ ) [P ∧ Q] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool & sig = bool
___
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∀ sig:OTS, P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_or {424}
(∈ ) [P ∨ Q] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool & sig = bool
___
THM Owfd_false {425}
∀ sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). (∈ ) [f] :: sig ⇐⇒ sig = bool
___
∀ F,x:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_obap {426}
(∈ ) [F(x)] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [F] :: ots(1of(sig),2of(sig)+1) & (∈ ) [x] :: ind
___
∀ P:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_not {427}
(∈ ) [¬ P] :: sig ⇐⇒ (∈ ) [P] :: bool & sig = bool
___
∀ sig:OTS, P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_oequiv {428}
(∈ ) [P ≡ Q] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool & sig = bool
___
∀ sig:OTS, P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_oimp {429}
(∈ ) [P ⇒ Q] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool & sig = bool
___
THM Owfd_qstar {430}
∀ b:Qind, X:OV List, R,P:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∈ ) [(*_b X | R : P)] :: sig
⇐⇒
(∈ [X← ind]) [R] :: bool & (∈ [X← ind]) [P] :: bool &
sig = bool
___
∀ V:OV, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_on_OV {431}
(∈ ) [V] :: sig ⇐⇒ ∈ (V) = sig
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THM Owfd_otseup1_on_OV {432}
∀ x:OV, sig:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS). (ep[x← sig]) [x] :: sig
THM Owfd_otseup1_unroll_diffvars {433}
∀ x,y:OV, sig2:OTS, ep:(OV→ OTS), sig:OTS.
¬ x = y ⇒ (ep) [y] :: sig2 ⇒ (ep[x← sig]) [y] :: sig2
___
THM Owfd_osubst1 {434}
∀ E:OE, v:OV, p:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), sig2:OTS.
(∈ ) [p] :: sig2 & (∈ [v← sig2]) [E] :: sig ⇒
(∈ ) [(E)[v := p]] :: sig
___
THM Owfdelt_osubst1 {435}
∀ E:OE, v:OV, p:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), sig2:OTS.
(∈ ) p :: sig2 & (∈ [v← sig2]) E :: sig ⇒
(∈ ) (E)[v := p] :: sig
___
THM Owfd_to_Owfdelt {436}
∀ A:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∈ ) A :: sig ⇐⇒ (∈ ) [A] :: sig
THM Owfd_list_unroll {437}
∀ L:OE List, A:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∈ ) [A] :: sig & (∈ ) L :: sig ⇐⇒ (∈ ) A.L :: sig
∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE. THM Owfd_oequiv_Vif {438}
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [P ≡ Q] :: bool
∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE. THM Owfd_oand_Vif {439}
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [P ∧ Q] :: bool
∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE. THM Owfd_orCD_Vif {440}
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [P ∨ Q] :: bool
THM Owfd_notCD_Vif {441}
∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). (∈ ) [P] :: bool ⇒ (∈ ) [¬ P] :: bool
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∀ P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), Q:OE. THM Owfd_impCD_Vif {442}
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [P ⇒ Q] :: bool
THM Owfd_true_Vif {443}
∀ ∈ :(OV→ OTS). (∈ ) [t] :: bool
THM Owfd_unitqind_Vif {444}
∀ b:Qind, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). (∈ ) [u_b] :: bool
∀ P,Q:OE, b:Qind, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_qop_Vif {445}
(∈ ) [P] :: bool & (∈ ) [Q] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [P *_b Q] :: bool
THM Owfd_false_Vif {446}
∀ ∈ :(OV→ OTS). (∈ ) [f] :: bool
___
THM Owfd_obap_Vif {447}
∀ F,x:OE, sig:OTS, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∈ ) [F] :: ots(1of(sig),2of(sig)+1) & (∈ ) [x] :: ind
⇒
(∈ ) [F(x)] :: sig
___
∀ P,Q:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS). THM Owfd_oeq_Vif {448}
(∃ r:{ind, bool}. (∈ ) [P] :: r & (∈ ) [Q] :: r) ⇒
(∈ ) [P = Q] :: bool
___
THM Owfd_qstar_Vif {449}
∀ b:Qind, X:OV List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∈ [X← ind]) [R] :: bool & (∈ [X← ind]) [P] :: bool ⇒
(∈ ) [(*_b X | R : P)] :: bool
___
THM Owfd_osubst1var_CDlemma {450}
∀ P:OE, T:OTS, V:OV, tau:OTS, env:(OV→ OTS), E:OE.
(env[V← tau]) [P] :: T & (env) [E] :: tau ⇒
(env) [(P)[V := E]] :: T
___
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THM Owfd_bool_if_Othm_assump {451}
∀ expn:OE, ep:(OV→ OTS), L:OE List.
(ep) L ` expn ⇒ (ep) L :: bool
___
THM Owfd_osubstn_CDlemma {452}
∀ Vs:OV List, Es:OE List, Sigs:OTS List, P:OE, T:OTS
, env:(OV→ OTS).
Distinct_elts(Vs,OV) & ||Vs|| = ||Es|| ∈ Z &
||Sigs|| = ||Es|| ∈ Z &
(env[Vs← Sigs]) [P] :: T &
(∀ ESigpair:(OE× OTS).
ESigpair onlist(OE× OTS) zip(Es,Sigs) ⇒
(ESigpair/E,Sig.(env) [E] :: Sig))
⇒
(env) [P[Vs := Es]] :: T
___
THM ChgD_step1_V2 {453}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] : (P)[x := f(y)])
=
(*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P))
___
215
THM ChgD_step2 {454}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] :
(*_b [x] | x = f(y) : P))
=
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := f(y)] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
___
THM ChgD_step3 {455}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := f(y)] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := x] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
___
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THM ChgD_step4_1 {456}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | (R)[x := x] ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x; y] | R ∧ x = f(y) : P)
___
THM ChgD_step4_2 {457}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x; y] | R ∧ x = f(y) : P)
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | x = f(y) : P))
___
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THM Assump_to_thm_for_ChgD_step6 {458}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, ∈ :(OV→ OTS).
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α )
⇒
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) α ` x = f(y) = y = f
 
(x)
___
THM ChgD_step6 {459}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | x = f(y) : P))
=
(*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | y = f
 
(x) : P))
___
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THM ChgD_step8 {460}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f & ¬ y = f
 
&
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (P)[y := f
 
(x)])
=
(*_b [x] | R : P)
___
THM ChgD_step7 {461}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y &
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
¬ x = f & ¬ y = f
 
&
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [x] | R : (*_b [y] | y = f
 
(x) : P))
=
(*_b [x] | R : (P)[y := f
 
(x)])
___
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THM FullPf_ChgD {462}
∀ x,y,f,f
 
:OV, α :OE List, R,P:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), b:Qind.
(∀ [x; y] |:x = f(y) ≡ y = f
 
(x)) onlist(OE) α &
(∈ [[x]← ind]) [R; P] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool &
¬ (some [y] occur free in [R; P]) &
¬ x = y & ¬ y = f &
¬ x = f & ¬ y = f
 
&
¬ (some [x; y] occur free in α ) &
(∈ [[x; y]← ind]) [f; f
 
] :: ind(1)
⇒
(∈ ) α ` (*_b [y] | (R)[x := f(y)] : (P)[x := f(y)])
=
(*_b [x] | R : P)
___
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MLDEF solve_not_occ_via_noteqOV {463}
let solve_not_occ_via_noteqOV {463}≡
WithPf p.
let occexpn ≡ subterm (concl p) 1 ,
[varlist;expnlist] ≡ subterms occexpn in
if opid_of_term expnlist=‘cons‘
then let [var;nilcomp] ≡ subterms expnlist in
if nilcomp=nil
then let occvar ≡ subterm varlist 1 in
if some (upto 1 (num_hyps p))
(λ i.
type_of_hyp i p
=mk_not_term
(mk_simple_term ‘equal‘
[OV;occvar;var]))
then BackThruLemma
Thm* ∀ v,x:OV.
¬ v = x ⇒
¬ (some [v] occur free in [x])
{243}
THENM
Complete Hypothesis
else if some (upto 1 (num_hyps p))
(λ i.
type_of_hyp i p
=mk_not_term
(mk_simple_term ‘equal‘
[OV;var;occvar]))
then BackThruLemma
Thm* ∀ v,x:OV.
¬ x = v ⇒
¬ (some [v] occur free in [x])
{247}
THENM
Complete Hypothesis
else
FailWith
‘solve_NotOcc_via_noteqOV:
No applicable noteqOV hypothesis‘
else
FailWith
‘solve_NotOcc_via_noteqOV:
expnlist not singleton‘
else
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FailWith
‘solve_NotOcc_via_noteqOV: explist not a cons list‘ ;;
MLDEF solve_not_occ_concl_v1 {464}
let solve_not_occ_concl_v1 {464}≡
WithPf p.
NotOccHD 1
THENM
(WithPf q.
Complete Hypothesis
ORELSE
(Not_OccCD
THENM
(Complete Hypothesis
ORELSE
Onlist_cleanup
ORELSE
solve_not_occ_via_noteqOV {463}))) ;;
___
MLDEF ProveEqModIffAssoc {465}
let ProveEqModIffAssoc {465}≡
WithPf p.
let c ≡ concl p in
if edit_match

equal_mod_AC_props(<A>;<B>)  c
then let F X T
≡ Assert (mk_member_term

OE  X)
THENL
[AddHiddenLabel ‘wf‘;T] in
F (subterm c 1) (F (subterm c 2) Fiat)
else
FailWith
‘ProveEqModIffAssoc: ‘^‘Concl of wrong form. ‘ ;;
___
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MLDEF Othm_oeq_refl_mod_AC_tac {466}
let Othm_oeq_refl_mod_AC_tac {466}≡
{NOTE: only called when we know thmexpn has opid
‘oeq‘ }
WithPf p.
let conc ≡ concl p ,
[thmexpn;otse;assumps] ≡ subterms conc ,
[leftside;rightside] ≡ subterms thmexpn ,
eq_type ≡ OEsig_guess_1sig leftside otse (hs p) in
if termeql_v1 leftside rightside
& (eq_type=ind or eq_type=bool)
then BackThruLemma
Thm* ∀ A,B:OE, ∈ :(OV→ OTS), α :OE List.
equal_mod_AC_props(A;B) &
(∈ ) [A = B] :: bool &
(∈ ) α :: bool
⇒
(∈ ) α ` A = B {403}
THENM
(D 0
THENL
[ProveEqModIffAssoc {465} ....
;D 0
THEN
(solve_Owfd_v1
ORELSE
(OwfdHD THENM solve_Owfd_v1))])
THEN
IfLab ‘wf‘ Id
(FailWith
‘oeq_refl_mod_AC:
cannot prove type correctness‘)
else
FailWith
‘Othm_oeq_refl_mod_AC_tac_v1:
two sides of =_oe not AC termeql or
unable to guess type signature‘ ;;
___
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MLDEF leibrewrite_aux {467}
let leibrewrite_aux {467} newvarname i≡
WithPf p.
(Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
((P)[V := E] ⇒ (Q)[V := E])
=
(P ⇒ Q)[V := E] {405})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] ∧ (Q)[V := E] = (P ∧ Q)[V := E]
{412})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] ∨ (Q)[V := E] = (P ∨ Q)[V := E]
{411})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
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opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] ≡ (Q)[V := E] = (P ≡ Q)[V := E]
{410})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E:OE.
(¬ (P)[V := E]) = (¬ P)[V := E] {409})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] = (Q)[V := E] = (P = Q)[V := E]
{408})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(LemmaC
Thm* ∀ f,x:OE, V:OV, E:OE.
(f(x))[V := E] = (f)[V := E]((x)[V := E])
{407})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
225
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(LemmaC Thm* ∀ x:OV, E:OE. (x)[x := E] = E {368})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ b:Qind, P:OE, V:OV, E,Q:OE.
(P)[V := E] *_b (Q)[V := E]
=
(P *_b Q)[V := E] {413})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ V:OV, E:OE. f = (f)[V := E] {416})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ V:OV, E:OE. t = (t)[V := E] {415})))
i
ORELSE
Rewrite
(SweepDnC
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(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname)
(RevLemmaC
Thm* ∀ b:Qind, V:OV, E:OE. u_b = (u_b)[V := E]
{414})))
i
ORELSE
(Rewrite
(SweepDnC
(IfC
(λ e.λ t.
opid_of_term t=‘osubst_1var‘
& subterm t 2=newvarname
& member (opid_of_term (subterm t 1))
[‘variable‘;‘ovar_lit‘])
(LemmaC
Thm* ∀ X:OV, P,E:OE.
¬ (some [X] occur free in [P]) ⇒
(P)[X := E] = P {371})))
i
THEN
IfLab ‘rewrite subgoal‘
(Try
(Complete Hypothesis
ORELSE
(solve_newvar_notocc_v2
THEN
IfLab ‘wf‘ Id
(FailWith
‘leibrewrite:
solve_newvar didnt complete goal‘))))
Id)
ORELSE
FailWith ‘leibrewrite:No lemma to apply‘)
THEN
IfLab ‘antecedent‘ Trivial Id ;;
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___
MLDEF leibrewrite {468}
letrec leibrewrite {468} newvarname i≡
WithPf p.
leibrewrite_aux {467} newvarname i
THENM
Try leibrewrite {468} newvarname i ;;
___
MLDEF lame_LeibQBap_v1 {469}
let lame_LeibQBap_v1 {469}≡
WithPf q.
setupnewvar (listforsetupnewvar (subterm (concl q) 1))
THENM
(WithPf p.
let conc ≡ concl p ,
[thmexpn;otse;assumps] ≡ subterms conc ,
[leftside;rightside] ≡ subterms thmexpn ,
contguess,[lguess;rguess],varname
≡ find_context_match_v1 leftside rightside
(mk_variable_term (getnewvarname p)) ,
[qind;vars;range;realcontguess]
≡ subterms contguess in
Leib_quant_body_apply_v1 realcontguess varname lguess
rguess) ;;
___
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let Leib_tac_v1 {470}≡ MLDEF Leib_tac_v1 {470}
WithPf p.
let conc ≡ concl p in
if opid_of_term conc=‘Othm‘
then let [thmexpn;otse;assumps] ≡ subterms conc in
if opid_of_term thmexpn=‘oeq‘
then let [leftside;rightside]
≡ subterms thmexpn ,
lopid ≡ opid_of_term leftside ,
ropid ≡ opid_of_term rightside in
if lopid=‘qstar‘ & ropid=‘qstar‘
then let [lqind;lquantvarlist;lrange;lbody]
≡ subterms leftside ,
[rqind;rquantvarlist;rrange;rbody]
≡ subterms rightside in
if lqind=rqind
& lquantvarlist=rquantvarlist
then if {this case is now covered in
lame_Leib_tac_ap_v1; do not
take it out of here,
though--may be useful in
recursive case }
termeql_v1 lrange rrange
& termeql_v1 lbody rbody
then Othm_oeq_refl_mod_AC_tac
{466}
else if termeql_v1 lrange rrange
then lame_LeibQBap_v1 {469}
else if termeql_v1 lbody rbody
then lame_LeibQRap_v1
else lame_Leibsimpap_v1
else lame_Leibsimpap_v1
else lame_Leibsimpap_v1
else
FailWith ‘Leib_tac_v1: concl not form A=_oeB‘
else FailWith ‘Leib_tac_v1: concl not Othm expn‘ ;;
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A.1 Index of Nuprl Highlights
ABS
obap {124} p(q)
Owfdelt {209} (env) e :: sig
Owfd {215} (env) Es :: sig
osubst_1var {191} (e)[v := p]
Othm {231} (env) assumps ` exp
oforall {71} (∀ p|:q)
oexists {89} (∃ x|:p)
oeq {73} p = q
eq_ov {120} x= 2 y
eq_ident {59} id1= 2 id2
updates_env {181} l@env
osubstn {189} e[vs := ps]
singlist {171} [x]
fnupdate_var_list {207} f[Xs{eq}:=v]
fnupdate {199} f[x{eq}:=v]
otseupdate_var_list {205} otse[Xs← v]
otseupdate {201} otse[X← v]
otseupdate_2lists {203} otse[Vs← Sigs]
ident_literal_form {61} $t|$n
oimp {77} p ⇒ q
oand {93} p ∧ q
onot {87} ¬ p
oequiv {99} p ≡ q
oor {91} p ∨ q
emptyrangequant {112} (*_b x|:p)
qstar {114} (*_b xs | r : p)
q_op_infix {95} r *_b p
Oalpha_eq {195} t1 =_alph(corr) t2
obooltype {12} B _O
ovar_lit {104} $vname_ov
otse_agree {108} (otse1,otse2 agree on x)
all_2ofs_diff {47} all_2ofs_diff(L)
all_2ofs_gtr_n {55} all_2ofs_gtr_n(L,n)
alleltsdiff {65} alleltsdiff(l)
allonlist {5} allonlist(A; L1; L2)
big_ident_num {144} big_ident_num(e,Vs,Ps)
boolsig {25} bool(n)
bv_of_OE {134} bv_of_OE(oe,posn)
captureoksubst {187} captureoksubst(e; vps)
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OEcase {133} Case of term:OE
Ovar(x) → varfn(x)
f → falsecase
u(v) → apfn(u;v)
u⇒ v → impfn(u;v)
u=v → eqlfn(u;v)
(∀ x|:v) → allfn(x;u)
alleltsdiff_gen {3} Distinct_elts(l,T)
env_type {173} env(V)
eqovsep {122} eq_OV
assoc_mod_iff {63} equal_mod_AC_props(A;B)
Es_notoccurs {150} Es_not_occurs(v,Es)
Esoccurs {158} Esoccurs(v,Es)
ofalse {81} f
findfirst {193} findfirst(L; x.P(x))
fn_of_OE {129} fn_of_OE(obexpn)
hnum {142} hnum(es)
hnum_aux {140} hnum_aux(e)
ident {44} IDENT
ident2 {53} ident2(identifier)
IDENTnums_gtr_n {177} IDENTnums_gtr_n(L,n)
identofovar {110} identofovar(ov)
indsig {22} ind(n)
oindtype {10} IND_O
IndBool {28} {ind, bool}
is_a_ovar {69} is_a_ovar(ov)
is_bvar_in_OE {136} is_bvar_in_OE(id,exp)
IsOvar {105} IsOvar(Y)
lookup_env {174} lookup_env(ident,env)
max_ident_num {57} max_ident_num(L)
mk_nonOV {168} mk_nonOV(opid,fn_of_oe)
no_2ofs_equal {45} no_2ofs_equal(L)
non_ov {126} NonOV
NotOcc_Esfirst {156} (no vs occur free in Es

+  )
NotOcc_vsfirst {152} (no vs

+  occur free in Es)
notonlist_gen {1} Not_onlist(elt,l:T)
nthsbtm {131} nthsbtm(oe,posn)
Ofree {146} (v occurs free in e)
obexpn {62} OE
oebv {30} oebv(opid; posn)
oesbtms {42} oesbtms(opid)
Ogdtm {221} Ogdtm(Es; env)
Ogdtmelt {213} Ogdtmelt(exp,env)
OGT {9} OGT
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ol_all {118} ol_all(xs; r; p)
ol_exists {116} ol_exists(xs; r; p)
opid_all {34} opid_all
opid_ap {40} opid_ap
opid_eq {36} opid_eq
opid_false {32} opid_f
opid_imp {38} opid_imp
opid_of_OE {127} opid_of_OE(obexpn)
OPIDS {29} OPIDS
osubstn_ready {138} Osubstn_ready(E,n)
Othmaux_v2 {229} Othmaux_2(exp,env,assumps,n)
obtypsigs {19} OTS
ots_form {20} ots(gdtype,degree)
obvar {107} OV
ovar {101} Ovar(X)
PossBV {49} PossBV(opid;posn)
quantind {14} Qind
qind_all {17} Qind∀
qind_exists {15} Qind∃
renamebdvars {185} rename(e,num,rewrites)
env_for_rename_lemma {176} rename_lem_env(env,L)
renamed_var {51} ren’dvar(x,num)
Occurs {164} (some vs occur free in Es)
Occurs_vsfirst {160} (some vs

+ 
occur free in Es)
suchthat_qind {97} s.t.(b,r,p)
otrue {83} t
thmclause_all_elim {223} thm_all_elim(exp,e,x,f,env,
reccall)
thmclause_all_elim2 {148} thm_all_elim2(exp,e,x,
reccall)
thmclause_all_intro {166} thm_all_intro(exp,x,e,
assumps,
reccall)
thmclause_arrow_intro {79} thm_arrow_intro(exp,e,f,
reccall)
thmclause_cbv {197} thm_cbv(exp,f,rec_call)
thmclause_eq_elim {219} thm_eq_elim(exp,e,x,a,b,env,
reccall1,
reccall2)
thmclause_eq_intro {217} thm_eq_intro(exp,a,env,
assumps)
thmclause_equiv_as_eq {75} thm_equiv_as_eq(exp,a,b,
reccall)
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thmclause_false_elim {211} thm_false_elim(exp,e,env,
reccall)
thmclause_hypothesis {227} thm_hyp(exp,env,assumps)
thmclause_mp {67} thm_mp(exp,f,reccall1,
reccall2)
thmclause_thinning {225} thm_thinning(sublist,env,
assumps,
reccall)
unit_qind {85} u_b
update_env {183} update_env([var,val],env)
vs_notoccurs {154} vs_not_occurs(vs,E)
vsoccurs {162} vsoccurs(vs;E)
zip {7} zip(L1,L2)
zip_env {179} zip_env(idents,vals)
MLDEF
lame_LeibQBap_v1 {469}
Leib_tac_v1 {470}
leibrewrite {468}
leibrewrite_aux {467}
Othm_oeq_refl_mod_AC_tac {466}
ProveEqModIffAssoc {465}
solve_not_occ_concl_v1 {464}
solve_not_occ_via_noteqOV {463}
THM
All2ofsDiffThenNo2ofsEqual {345}
All2ofsGtrToOnlist {337}
all_2ofs_diff_wf {48}
all_2ofs_gtr_n_wf {56}
alleltsdiff_gen_wf {4}
alleltsdiff_wf {66}
allonlist_wf {6}
Arrowintro_for_Leib {372}
AssertOfEqIdent {319}
assoc_mod_iff_lemma {403}
assoc_mod_iff_wf {64}
Assump_to_thm_for_ChgD_step6 {458}
big_ident_num_wf {145}
boolsig_wf {26}
boolsig_wf2 {27}
bv_of_OE_wf {135}
captureoksubst_wf {188}
ChgD_step1_V2 {453}
ChgD_step2 {454}
ChgD_step3 {455}
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ChgD_step4_1 {456}
ChgD_step4_2 {457}
ChgD_step6 {459}
ChgD_step7 {461}
ChgD_step8 {460}
ContraryCases1 {296}
decidable__eq_ident {342}
decidable__equalpairofidents {343}
decidable__isl_of_lookup {273}
distinct_elts_gen_on_singletonlist {384}
distinct_elts_gen_unroll {383}
emptyrangequant_wf {113}
Envagree_lemma_for_ltd_transitivity {402}
Envagree_unroll_outmost_var {400}
Envagree_unroll_outmost_var_V2 {401}
eq_ident_wf {60}
eq_ov_wf {121}
eqovsep_wf {123}
Es_notoccurs_wf {151}
Esoccurs_wf {159}
Exist_new_OVs {417}
findfirst_wf {194}
fn_of_OE_wf {130}
fnupdate_var_list_wf {208}
fnupdate_wf {200}
FullPf_ChgD {462}
hnum_aux_wf {141}
hnum_wf {143}
HnumauxUnrollOpidall {297}
HnumauxUnrollOpidelse {298}
ident2_wf {54}
IDENTnums_gtr_n_wf {178}
identofovar_characterization {278}
identofovar_wf {111}
IdentOnlistForTails {339}
if_not_oforall_then_no_bv {295}
if_oforall_then_bv {294}
imax_gtr_than {283}
imax_on_nat {282}
IndBool_inc {351}
indsig_wf {23}
indsig_wf2 {24}
InlNeqInrInOE {332}
inr_y_in_NonOV {281}
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is_a_ovar_characterization {280}
is_a_ovar_on_NonOV {302}
is_a_ovar_on_OV {279}
is_a_ovar_wf {70}
is_bvar_in_OE_wf {137}
IslToOnlist {340}
IsOvar_wf {106}
Leib_quant_body {361}
Leib_quant_range {362}
Leib_simple {363}
lookup_env_wf {175}
LookupFailsIffInr {320}
LookupFailsOnFrontOfList {321}
LookupOnFrontOfList {276}
LookupOnNonListHead {274}
LookupsEqIffAlwaysSame {346}
LookupsEqIffAlwaysSameInls {347}
LookupToOnlist {341}
LookupWithEqualListFronts {322}
make_equality_on_OPIDS {284}
max_ident_num_wf {58}
mk_nonOV_wf {169}
mk_nonOV_wf2 {170}
Nesting {365}
Nesting_varsym {366}
NilIsEnv {233}
No2ofsEqualForListTails {344}
no_2ofs_equal_wf {46}
Not_Occ_obap {264}
Not_Occ_oeq {257}
Not_Occ_oequiv {266}
Not_Occ_oimp {267}
Not_Occ_OLand {258}
Not_Occ_OLfalse {260}
Not_Occ_OLnot {265}
Not_Occ_OLor {259}
Not_Occ_OLqopinfix {263}
Not_Occ_OLtrue {261}
Not_Occ_OLunitqind {262}
Not_Occ_on_exp_List {255}
Not_Occ_on_var_List {254}
Not_Occ_on_varListvariable {249}
Not_Occ_osubst1v {268}
Not_Occ_osubstn {269}
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Not_Occ_qstar {270}
Not_Occ_qstar_forC {271}
Not_Occ_qstar_forH {272}
Not_Occ_to_OtseAgree {353}
Not_Occ_to_OtseAgree_on_firstOtse {355}
not_ofalse_then_subterms {286}
NotEq_OV_sym {245}
NotEqOvIfDiffHnumaux {348}
NotIslLookupIsInr {275}
NotIsOvarMknonOV {325}
NotOcc_Es_iff_Es_notoccurs {251}
NotOcc_Es_iff_NotOcc_vs {250}
NotOcc_Esfirst_wf {157}
NotOcc_iff_not_Occ_Es {253}
NotOcc_iff_not_Occ_vs {256}
NotOcc_vsfirst_wf {153}
notonlist_gen_on_nil {382}
notonlist_gen_unroll {381}
notonlist_gen_wf {2}
notonlist_on_nil {376}
notonlist_step {378}
notonlist_step_v2 {375}
NotOpidOfRenameNonOVThenNotOpidOfNonOV {336}
nthsbtm_wf {132}
Oalpha_eq_wf {196}
oand_wf {94}
OandWfdelt {315}
obap_wf {125}
obooltype_wf {13}
obvar_inc {239}
Occ_Es_iff_Occ_vs {252}
Occ_EsList_expand {244}
Occurs_on_OVs {241}
Occurs_on_OVs_for_backchn {242}
Occurs_on_OVs_for_backchn_sym {246}
Occurs_on_OVs_for_NotOcc_bckchn {243}
Occurs_on_OVs_for_NotOcc_bckchn_sym {247}
Occurs_vsfirst_wf {161}
Occurs_wf {165}
OE_in_unrolled_OE {236}
oebv_wf {31}
OEcase_else_opid_is_oforall {289}
OEexps_in_unrolled_OE {237}
oeq_sym {373}
236
oeq_wf {74}
oequiv_wf {100}
OequivWfdelt {316}
oesbtms_wf {43}
OesbtmsUnrollOn2sbtms {317}
oexists_wf {90}
ofalse_wf {82}
oforall_wf {72}
Ofree_on_OVs {240}
Ofree_wf {147}
Ogdtm_wf {222}
Ogdtmelt_wf {214}
oimp_wf {78}
oindtype_wf {11}
ol_all_wf {119}
ol_exists_wf {117}
One_point_rule {364}
onlist_on_nil_imp_false {377}
onlist_on_zip_nil {380}
onlist_step_v2 {374}
onlist_unroll {379}
OnlistForTails {338}
onot_wf {88}
OnotWfdelt {313}
oor_wf {92}
OorWfdelt {314}
opid_all_wf {35}
opid_Ap_or_Imp_or_Eq_then_2_subterms {290}
opid_Ap_then_2_sbtms {293}
opid_ap_wf {41}
opid_Eq_then_2_sbtms {291}
opid_eq_wf {37}
opid_false_wf {33}
opid_Imp_then_2_sbtms {292}
opid_imp_wf {39}
opid_not_false_or_all_then_2_subterms {288}
opid_not_ofalse_then_subterms {287}
opid_of_OE_wf {128}
OPIDS_bool_N5_prop {285}
OPIDS_in_int {234}
Osubst1_rep_var_with_self {370}
Osubst1_unroll_notocc {371}
Osubst1_unroll_oand {412}
Osubst1_unroll_obap {407}
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Osubst1_unroll_oeq {408}
Osubst1_unroll_oequiv {410}
Osubst1_unroll_ofalse {416}
Osubst1_unroll_oimp {405}
Osubst1_unroll_onot {409}
Osubst1_unroll_oor {411}
Osubst1_unroll_otrue {415}
Osubst1_unroll_qop {413}
Osubst1_unroll_qstar_capture_permitting {406}
Osubst1_unroll_unitqind {414}
osubst1_var_same {368}
osubst_1var_wf {192}
osubstn_ready_wf {139}
osubstn_wf {190}
OsubstReadyOfSubterms {318}
Othm_oeq_refl {300}
Othm_oeq_sym {301}
Othm_Oeq_trans {418}
Othm_oimp_if_othm_conseq {404}
Othm_Osubst1_unroll_notocc {369}
Othm_refl_for_AC_use_ONLY {397}
Othm_wf {232}
OthmAllElim {309}
OthmAllIntro {308}
OthmArrowIntro {305}
Othmaux_monotonicity {303}
Othmaux_v2_wf {230}
OthmAx {311}
OthmCBV {307}
OthmEnvsAgree {310}
OthmHyp {312}
OthmMP {304}
OthmThin {306}
otrue_wf {84}
ots_form_wf {21}
otse_agree_wf {109}
OtseAgree_non_updated_vars {360}
OtseAgree_on_freevars {352}
OtseAgree_sym {354}
Otses_eq_dup_updates {357}
Otseup1var_sym {356}
Otseup1var_sym_for_bckchn {358}
Otseup1var_sym_in_OtseAgree {359}
Otseup_OVmatch {350}
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Otseup_reduce {349}
otseup_var_list_on_nil {386}
otseup_var_list_unroll {385}
otseupdate_2lists_on_nil_vars {388}
otseupdate_2lists_unroll {387}
otseupdate_2lists_wf {204}
otseupdate_var_list_wf {206}
otseupdate_wf {202}
OutlLookupInType {277}
ovar_wf {103}
ovar_wf2 {102}
OvarNotMknonOV {333}
OvarNotMknonOVPt2 {334}
OVs_diff_OTS_then_neq {248}
Owfd_and {423}
Owfd_bool_if_Othm_assump {451}
Owfd_false {425}
Owfd_false_Vif {446}
Owfd_impCD_Vif {442}
Owfd_list_unroll {437}
Owfd_not {427}
Owfd_notCD_Vif {441}
Owfd_oand_Vif {439}
Owfd_obap {426}
Owfd_obap_Vif {447}
Owfd_oeq {420}
Owfd_oeq2 {421}
Owfd_oeq3 {422}
Owfd_oeq_Vif {448}
Owfd_oequiv {428}
Owfd_oequiv_Vif {438}
Owfd_ofalse_on_osubst1 {390}
Owfd_ofalse_on_osubstn {393}
Owfd_oimp {429}
Owfd_on_OV {431}
Owfd_or {424}
Owfd_orCD_Vif {440}
Owfd_osubst1 {434}
Owfd_osubst1var_CDlemma {450}
Owfd_osubstn_CDlemma {452}
Owfd_otrue_on_osubst1 {389}
Owfd_otrue_on_osubstn {392}
Owfd_otseup1_on_OV {432}
Owfd_otseup1_unroll_diffvars {433}
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Owfd_over_Onlist {419}
Owfd_qop_Vif {445}
Owfd_qstar {430}
Owfd_qstar_Vif {449}
Owfd_to_Owfdelt {436}
Owfd_true_Vif {443}
Owfd_unitqind_on_osubst1 {391}
Owfd_unitqind_on_osubstn {394}
Owfd_unitqind_Vif {444}
Owfd_wf {216}
Owfdelt_osubst1 {435}
Owfdelt_wf {210}
OwfdeltUnrollForOpid1 {328}
OwfdeltUnrollForOpidAll {331}
OwfdeltUnrollForOpidEq {330}
OwfdeltUnrollForOpidImp {329}
PossBV_wf {50}
q_op_infix_wf {96}
qind_all_wf {18}
qind_exists_wf {16}
qstar_wf {115}
renamebdvars_wf {186}
RenamebdvarsToIfThenElse {299}
renamed_var_wf {52}
RenameNonOVIsNonOV {335}
RenameOvarIsOvar {323}
RenamePreservesOpid {324}
RenameUnrolling2sbtmCase {326}
RenameUnrollOpidAll {327}
Same_envs_agree {399}
Same_envs_agree_in_conseq {398}
singlist_wf {172}
Substitution_3_84a {367}
suchthat_qind_wf {98}
thmclause_all_elim2_wf {149}
thmclause_all_elim_wf {224}
thmclause_all_intro_wf {167}
thmclause_arrow_intro_wf {80}
thmclause_cbv_wf {198}
thmclause_eq_elim_wf {220}
thmclause_eq_intro_wf {218}
thmclause_equiv_as_eq_wf {76}
thmclause_false_elim_wf {212}
thmclause_hypothesis_wf {228}
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thmclause_mp_wf {68}
thmclause_thinning_wf {226}
unit_qind_wf {86}
unrolled_OE_exps_in_OE {238}
unrolled_OE_in_OE {235}
update_env_wf {184}
updates_env_wf {182}
vs_notoccurs_wf {155}
vsoccurs_wf {163}
zip_env_wf {180}
zip_rewrite_conslists_gen {396}
zip_rewrite_nillist1 {395}
zip_wf {8}
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